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ABSTRACT
This Article expands on Professor Jeremy Waldron’s recent work 
arguing that U.S. courts ought to cite foreign law in deciding U.S. 
cases. The authors make a Hayekian argument in favor of the 
citation of foreign law, but they note that there are powerful counter-
vailing ideas in consent theory and for economics of federalism 
reasons. The Article concludes that foreign law should be cited 
where it is informative but denies that foreign law is in any way 
binding on U.S. courts. 
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INTRODUCTION
Of the just in the political sense, one part is natural, the other, 
conventional. The natural [part of political justice] is that which has the 
same capacity everywhere and is not dependent on being held to exist or 
not, whereas the conventional part is that which at the beginning makes no 
difference whether it is thus or otherwise, but once people have set it 
down, it does make a difference . . . . 
In the opinion of some people, all [just things] are of this character, 
because what is by nature is unchangeable and has the same capacity 
everywhere, just as fire burns both here and in Persia, whereas they see the 
just things being changed. But this is not the way it is . . . . 
. . . [T]he just things that are not natural but human are not 
everywhere the same, since the regimes are not either; but everywhere 
there is only one regime that is in accord with nature, the best regime. 
Aristotle1
In 2005, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional capital 
punishment for offenses committed by a person under the age of 
eighteen.2 Roper v. Simmons concerned a Missouri resident named 
Christopher Simmons, who at age seventeen burgled his neighbor
Shirley Cook, tied her up, kidnapped her, and threw her over a 
bridge.3 The evidence was overwhelmingly against Simmons, and he 
was sentenced to death.4 At the time of sentencing, Simmons was 
over the age of eighteen.5 He appealed, arguing that the U.S. 
Constitution forbade execution of offenders younger than eighteen.6
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the 
juvenile death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of “cruel and unusual punishment[].”7 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted that the question of whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of capital punishment 
for juvenile offenders required the Court to interpret the Constitution 
“according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and 
precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the 
                                                     
1. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 104-05 
(Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2011) (c. 384 
B.C.E.) (first and third alteration in original). 
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
3. Id. at 556-57. 
4. Id. at 557-58. 
5. Id. at 556 (“About nine months later, after he had turned 18, he was 
tried and sentenced to death.”).
6. Id. at 559. 
7. Id. at 554, 568; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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constitutional design,”8 and also with regard to “‘the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’”9
a concept first articulated by the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles.10
Far from coming as a total surprise, the ruling followed a line 
of precedent developed by the Court over the prior seventeen years.11
The 1988 decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, which forbade the 
execution of offenders under the age of sixteen when they committed 
a capital crime,12 referred to foreign law.13 In 2002, the Court cited 
“‘evolving standards of decency’” and foreign law in Atkins v. 
Virginia in prohibiting capital punishment for the individual with an 
intellectual disability.14
Nonetheless, one line of reasoning Justice Kennedy pursued in 
his opinion in Roper v. Simmons wound up engendering particular 
controversy.15 At one point, Justice Kennedy wrote, “[T]he stark 
reality [is] that the United States is the only country in the world that 
continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”16 In
fact, “only seven countries other than the United States have 
executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. 
Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital 
punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice.”17
These words were met with fierce antipathy in some quarters.18
In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “[T]he basic premise of 
                                                     
8. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
9. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
10. 356 U.S. at 101. 
11. See generally Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
12. 487 U.S. at 838. 
13. Id. at 830-31. 
14. 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101); id. at 316 n.21 
(“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” 
(citing the European Union’s amicus brief)); id. at 321. 
15. See, e.g., 543 U.S. 551, 607-08, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 181 (2009); Jason DeParle, In 
Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says, Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2005, at A1; JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 196-99 (2007). 
16. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
17. Id. at 577. 
18. See sources cited supra note 15. 
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the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the 
laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand. . . . In 
many significant respects the laws of most other countries differ 
from our law . . . .”19 In the wake of Roper, as well as other opinions 
citing foreign law, talk of impeachment circulated, and death threats 
were even made against the Justices.20 Legislation was introduced in 
Congress that would have forbade reliance on foreign law by federal 
courts.21
Roper v. Simmons was hardly the first Supreme Court decision 
to cite foreign law.22 Indeed, the Supreme Court has relied on foreign 
law since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall,23 but it was not 
until the 1940s that “the Supreme Court . . . greatly accelerated the 
number of references it has made to foreign law in constitutional 
cases” and relied on foreign law in holding statutes 
unconstitutional.24 Seven majority opinions and one dissent used 
                                                     
19. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20. See, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address Before the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa: “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of 
[Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_02-07b-06.html; see also Ginsburg, 
O’Connor Targets of Death Threat, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 3; Tony Mauro, 
Ginsburg Discloses Threats on Her Life: In Speeches, Justice Says She and Sandra 
Day O’Connor Were Targeted Because of Use of Foreign Law in Cases, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 15, 2006, at 8; Gene C. Gerard, Conservatives, Judicial Impeachment, and 
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, DISSIDENT VOICE (May 7, 2005), 
http://www.dissidentvoice.org/May05/Gerard0507.htm (“Some of the strongest calls 
by conservatives for impeachment have been heaped on U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Anthony Kennedy. . . . [E]arlier this year, he joined the court majority in ruling that 
it was unlawful to administer the death penalty to those under eighteen years of 
age.”); Carl Hulse, Republicans May Hasten Showdown on Judicial-Nomination 
Filibusters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/13/ 
politics/13judges.html (“As the author of the decision on executions in juvenile 
crime . . . Justice Kennedy has been a target of sustained attack, with some 
conservatives calling for his impeachment.”); Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on 
Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38308-2005Apr8.html (“[The] 
chairman of the Home School Legal Defense Association[] said Kennedy ‘should be 
the poster boy for impeachment’ for citing international norms in his opinions.” 
(quoting Michael P. Farris, Chairman of the Home School Legal Defense 
Association)). 
21. H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. §§ 201, 301-302 (2004); S. 520, 109th Cong. 
§§ 101, 301-302 (2005).
22. See generally Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note *. 
23. Id. at 763. 
24. Id. at 838. 
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foreign law between 1804 and 1840: Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy,25 Rose v. Himely,26 Brown v. United States,27 The Antelope,28
United States v. Smith,29 Columbian Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. 
Ashby,30 The Rapid,31 and Justice Joseph Story’s dissent in Brown v. 
United States.32 Between 1840 and 1890, at least four majority 
opinions relied on foreign law: Dred Scott v. Sandford,33 Reynolds v. 
United States,34 Hurtado v. California,35 and two of the three Legal 
Tender Cases.36 The dissenters in Dred Scott also relied on foreign 
law.37 Between 1890 and 1940, at least seven Supreme Court 
opinions cited foreign law: Block v. Hirsh,38 the Selective Draft 
                                                     
25. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that an Act of Congress 
should not be construed to violate the laws of nations “if any other possible 
construction remains”).
26. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 270-72 (1808) (analyzing British precedent on 
jurisdiction in foreign nations), overruled in part by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 
Cranch) 281 (1810). 
27. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 124-25 (1814) (detailing views of famous 
foreign jurists on war powers). 
28. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114-16 (1825) (analyzing international 
consensus for the slave trade). 
29. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-62 (1820) (citing various European legal 
sources and commentaries in discussing what constitutes a violation of the laws of 
nations); id. at 168-80 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
30. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331, 337-38 (1839) (looking to European maritime 
law and Roman jurisprudence concerning general averages). 
31. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 162 (1814) (considering the law of nations and 
the laws of England before the American Revolution). 
32. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 131-35 (Story, J., dissenting) (detailing the work 
of famous foreign jurists, but reaching a very different interpretation than the 
majority in that case). 
33. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426, 461-62, 467-68, 475-80, 486, 495-97, 500, 
534-35, 591-92, 595 (1856) (referencing foreign law in six opinions in the decision, 
four concurring and two dissenting), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note *, at 794-802. 
34. 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878) (contrasting the development of British and 
U.S. case law regarding testimony of absent witnesses). 
35. 110 U.S. 516, 521-26 (1884) (interpreting due process in light of the 
language and interpretation given to parts of the Magna Carta).
36. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 447 (1884) (pointing to the 
European belief that the sovereign can issue paper currency for private debts); Knox 
v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 568-69 (1870) (Bradley, J., concurring) (arguing that 
European nations, notably England and France, authorized the use of paper currency 
to pay wartime debt). 
37. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 534-35 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 591-92, 
595, 602 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
38. 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) (upholding the constitutionality of rent 
control statutes and stating that the “question is whether Congress was incompetent 
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Cases,39 O’Malley v. Woodrough,40 United States v. Perkins,41 Palko 
v. Connecticut,42 Muller v. Oregon,43 and The Paquete Habana.44
And since 1940, at least seventeen Supreme Court decisions 
have cited, considered, or relied on foreign law.45 They include Trop 
v. Dulles,46 Miranda v. Arizona,47 Coker v. Georgia,48 Enmund v. 
Florida,49 Thompson,50 Atkins,51 and Roper.52 Other post-1940 
Supreme Court decisions that rely on or cite foreign law are Roe v. 
Wade,53 Washington v. Glucksberg,54 Lawrence v. Texas,55 and 
                                                                                                               
to meet it in the way in which it has been met by most of the civilized countries of 
the world”).
39. 245 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1918) (surveying the list of countries requiring 
military service in times of need and specifically discussing such rules in England). 
40. 307 U.S. 277, 281 n.8 (1939) (noting a decision by the Supreme Court 
of South Africa interpreting language taken from a clause of Article III, § 1 of the 
U.S. Constitution). 
41. 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) (discussing British taxation statutes during the 
reigns of Henry II and Henry VIII). 
42. 302 U.S. 319, 326 n.3 (1937) (noting that there is no immunity from 
compulsory self-incrimination in many Continental European countries). 
43. 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908) (noting foreign statutes regarding gender-
based worker regulation). 
44. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law . . . .”).
45. See infra notes 46-62. 
46. 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion) (examining U.N. surveys 
detailing which countries impose expatriation as a punishment and concluding that 
expatriation is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 
47. 384 U.S. 436, 486-90 (1966) (pointing to English, Scottish, and Indian 
law enforcement policies to show that warning the accused of his custodial rights 
does not seriously hamper effective law enforcement). 
48. 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting international 
consensus against the use of the death penalty for rape). 
49. 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (noting foreign views regarding the 
death penalty in felony murder cases). 
50. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion) 
(“The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a 
person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent 
with the views . . . expressed by . . . other nations that share our Anglo-American 
heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European community.”).
51. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world 
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”).
52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-77 (2005). 
53. 410 U.S. 113, 136-38 (1973) (referring to English legislative and 
judicial developments to help support the proposition that statutory criminalization 
of abortion was largely a nineteenth- and twentieth-century phenomenon). 
54. 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (noting actions by courts and legislatures 
in Canada, England, New Zealand, and Australia during the 1990s to prohibit 
assisted suicide). 
8 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1 
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.56 Still other cases in this modern time period citing 
foreign law include Rochin v. California,57 Smith v. California,58
Adamson v. California,59 Wolf v. Colorado,60 Printz v. United 
States,61 and Knight v. Florida.62
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas law 
classifying consensual, adult homosexual intercourse as sodomy.63
That opinion noted that a report prepared for the British Parliament 
by an advisory committee recommended that laws punishing 
homosexual conduct be repealed in 1957.64 More recently, in 1981, 
the European Court of Human Rights invalidated a law from 
Northern Ireland criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct.65
Noting that the right being sought by the plaintiff in Lawrence “has 
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries,” Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]here ha[d] been no 
showing that . . . the governmental interest in circumscribing 
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent” in this 
country.66
                                                                                                               
55. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (discussing recent decisions in Europe 
striking down laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy). 
56. 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). While he did not 
directly cite foreign law, Justice Harlan adopted his concurrence in Griswold from 
his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
which rooted due process protection in the Magna Carta. 
57. 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (suggesting that American criminal procedure 
rules should be rooted in the “notions of justice of English-speaking peoples”).
58. 361 U.S. 147, 166 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing 
debates in the House of Commons over obscenity provisions). 
59. 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referencing 
English methods for ascertaining facts during the eighteenth century in passing a 
method for interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
60. 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949) (“When we find that in fact most of the English-
speaking world does not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence 
thus [unlawfully] obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential 
ingredient of the [Fourth Amendment] right.”).
61. 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (mentioning 
European federalism balances). 
62. 120 S. Ct. 459, 462 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (analyzing Jamaican 
interpretation of British laws addressing the length of time after sentencing within 
which a prisoner must be executed). 
63. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
64. Id. at 572-73; THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 5-6, 48 (1963). 
65. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 19-20 (1981). 
66. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
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In Printz v. United States, decided in 1997, the Supreme Court 
invalidated an interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act that required local law enforcement officers to 
conduct background checks on potential gun buyers.67 In his dissent, 
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote, “[T]he United States is not the only 
nation that seeks to reconcile the practical need for a central 
authority with the democratic virtues of more local control,” citing 
Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union as examples of other 
countries facing the same basic problem.68 Acknowledging that there 
may be relevant differences between foreign legal systems and our 
own, and that American courts are charged only with interpreting the 
U.S. Constitution, Justice Breyer wrote that another country’s
“experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.”69
We believe Justice Breyer’s invocation of foreign law here failed to 
account for crucial differences in the structures of government 
established by the American and German constitutions. While it is 
true that in Germany the national legislature can force the German 
states to execute the law,70 German states also wield greater power 
against the national government by directly electing representatives 
to the national legislature.71 We think Justice Breyer’s
misunderstanding of the relevance of foreign law here reveals some 
pitfalls that courts should try to avoid.
Roper was clearly not the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to 
cite foreign law. Indeed, the question of whether and when it is 
                                                     
67. 521 U.S. 898, 902-04, 935 (1997). 
68. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“At least some other countries, facing 
the same basic problem, have found that local control is better maintained through 
application of a principle that is the direct opposite of the principle the majority 
derives from the silence of our Constitution.”).
69. Id. at 977. 
70. Id. at 976. 
71. Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist 
Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004) (“German states have a powerful 
tool with which to fight back against federal commandeering—a tool which the 
American states lack. That tool is the fact that in Germany the state legislatures 
continue to this day to elect the Upper House of the German National Legislature, 
while in this country the states have lacked that protection since the adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.”); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of 
Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 155 (2006) (“[I]n Germany, the states play a far 
greater role in creating national law than American states do, and this institutional 
difference may well make German law uninformative on the questions that concern 
Americans.”).
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appropriate for American courts to cite the decisions of foreign 
courts in their judgments has long produced heated debate in the 
legal community with many prominent and respected legal scholars 
on both sides of the argument.72 Professor Calabresi has written 
about this subject in three prior law review articles.73
                                                     
72. See generally, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World 
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997); Roger P. Alford, Misusing 
International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004); 
James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? 
Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006); Philip 
Alston, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights, in PROMOTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1 (Philip 
Alston ed., 1999); HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1087 (3d ed. 
2007); Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL’Y REV., June 
& July 2005, at 33; William D. Araiza, Foreign and International Law in 
Constitutional Gay Rights Litigation: What Claims, What Use, and Whose Law?, 32 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455 (2006); Aharon Barak, Comparison in Public Law, in
JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? 287 (Basil 
Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke eds., 2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL RECOURSE]; David J. 
Bederman, World Law Transcendent, 54 EMORY L.J. 53 (2005); Anke Iman 
Bouzenita, The Siyar––An Islamic Law of Nations?, 35 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 19 
(2007); Ronald A. Brand, Judicial Review and United States Supreme Court
Citations to Foreign and International Law, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 423 (2007); Paolo G. 
Carozza, “My Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius 
Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2003); Anupam Chander, 
Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 393 (2007); Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The 
International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273 (2006); 
Ian Cram, Resort to Foreign Constitutional Norms in Domestic Human Rights 
Jurisprudence with Reference to Terrorism Cases, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 118 (2009); 
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 291 (2005); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National 
Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000); Rosalind 
Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 947 
(2008); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and the American Constitution, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 (2006); Eric Engle, European Law in American 
Courts: Foreign Law as Evidence of Domestic Law, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 99 
(2007); RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (2010); Daniel A. Farber, The 
Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of 
History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335 (2007); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in 
Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking 
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Most recently Jeremy Waldron, a professor of philosophy at 
New York University, has criticized the Supreme Court for failing to 
articulate “a general theory of the citation and authority of foreign 
law.”74 “The justices who cited foreign law,” he says, “simply gave 
the impression that they thought it was a good idea.”75 Obviously, 
this is not enough. “[H]ow could what the law happened to be in . . . 
any other country that retains the death penalty, but not for crimes 
committed in childhood, be relevant to an American decision about 
what the Eighth Amendment . . . permits a state . . . to do?”76 Surely 
“an international consensus on this issue should give American 
legislators pause when the question of the juvenile death penalty 
comes before them.”77 Justice Kennedy, however, was speaking 
“about positive law on both sides of the equation.”78 Waldron argues 
that the use of foreign law in this way “is not a matter of a foreign 
consensus supporting a normative conclusion as to what American 
law ought to be, or foreign advocacy adding to the weight of 
American advocacy concerning law reform in the United States.”79
Instead, he says that Justice Kennedy was making a claim “that 
factual or positive-law propositions about what the law is 
elsewhere—the ‘stark reality’ of law elsewhere in the world—is
capable of supporting, of providing ‘respected and significant 
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confirmation’ for, factual propositions about the law that the U.S. 
Supreme Court is bound to apply.”80
Some critics of the Court’s approach to using foreign law have 
accused it of relying on natural law arguments.81 “Natural law is 
perhaps the most coherent rationale for recognizing the validity of 
comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication,” asserted 
Professor Roger Alford.82 Judge Richard Posner has likewise claimed 
of Justice Kennedy’s invocation of foreign law:  
It marks [him] as a natural lawyer. The basic idea of natural law is that 
there are universal principles of law that inform—and constrain—positive 
law. If they are indeed universal, they should be visible in foreign legal 
systems and so it is “natural” to look to the decisions of foreign courts for 
evidence of universality.83
Though the Court “does not admit to invoking the idea of 
natural law,” said Eric Engle, “that is what it is [in effect] doing.”84
He says the Supreme Court is “looking for universal standards to be 
discovered in the law of foreign nations . . . [and] developing a 
materialist natural law.”85 Joan Larsen argues that citing foreign law 
is akin to “moral fact-finding.”86
In his book “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign 
Law in American Courts, and in a series of law review articles, 
Professor Waldron attempts to explain the Supreme Court’s citation 
of foreign legal decisions in at least quasi-positive rather than purely 
natural law terms,87 explaining “why American courts are legally 
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14 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1 
permitted (or obliged) to cite to non-American sources and how that 
practice connects with the status of courts as legal institutions.”88
Waldron argues that “convergent currents of foreign statutes, foreign 
constitutional provisions, and foreign precedents sometimes add up 
to a body of law that has its own claim on us: the law of nations, or 
ius gentium, which applies to us simply as law, not as the law of any 
particular jurisdiction.”89 Waldron characterizes the ius gentium as “a
body of positive law regulating relations within states particularly 
between citizen and government but also sometimes between private 
individuals.”90 Waldron is not talking about mere “persuasive 
authority” either; his is “an argument for giving weight to foreign 
holdings on grounds other than the correctness of its reasoning . . . 
not an argument for overwhelming weight, but it is an argument for 
weight nonetheless.”91
The ius gentium, Waldron says, is defined by its commonality 
across sovereign nation states, overlapping with the positive laws of 
many different nations.92 Its commonality, moreover, is its claim of 
authority.93 Waldron rests his case for the ius gentium in part on the 
principle of “treating like cases alike.”94 He argues for harmonizing 
the law of nations on the grounds “that the peoples of the world, 
have constituted themselves as a single community so far as the 
demand for human rights is concerned . . . [and] develop[ed] a global 
consensus on rights to help sustain certain demands for rights that 
may be made here and there in the world.”95 His argument boils 
down to two parts: 
(1) the administration of national bills of rights is to be understood as part 
and parcel of the broader enterprise of securing human rights in the world; 
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88. Waldron, Foreign Law, supra note 87, at 130. 
89. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 3. 
90. Id. at 28. 
91. Waldron, supra note 74, at 35. 
92. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 28 (“The ius gentium . . . is a body of 
positive law regulating relations within states particularly between citizen and 
government but also sometimes between private individuals. Its distinguishing 
feature is its commonality: the law of nations represents a sort of overlap between 
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93. Id.
94. Waldron, supra note 74, at 17.
95. Id. at 33. 
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and (2) that broader enterprise is to be understood as subject to a principle 
of consistency, integrity or fairness that requires that like cases, even in 
different countries, be treated alike.96
In developing his idea of the ius gentium, Waldron invokes 
Justinian’s maxim: “Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, 
partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure 
utuntur,” which translates as “[e]very community governed by laws 
and customs uses partly its own law, partly laws common to all 
mankind.”97 The ius gentium is, Waldron stresses, a “positive law 
concept, not a natural law one.”98 Nor is it only about “global 
uniformity,” for while sovereign nation states may be governed in 
part by laws shared with the world, they are also governed in part by 
laws of their own.99 The ius gentium relates to “principles which 
ha[ve] their own positivity right here on earth.”100 The ius gentium in 
Waldron’s mind is a “normative consensus . . . among lawmakers, 
judges, and jurists around the world.”101 Nor is it an “intellectual 
consensus,” but one “derived from these principles’ having become 
established in practice as actual legal arrangements all over the 
known and civilized world.”102
The relevance of natural law to the ius gentium, however, is not 
entirely nonexistent. Waldron describes the ius gentium as the 
product of a “reflective equilibrium” between positive and natural 
law:  
On its own, philosophical inquiry into natural law was conceived as 
unsatisfactory, but so too was a merely empirical inquiry into the existence 
of legal consensus. If consensus was to function normatively, it had to be 
less than complete (so that there could be someone whose choices were 
guided by it). But if one is looking for anything less than a complete 
consensus, then there are choices to be made, and those choices would 
necessarily be guided by a sense of justice and right.103  
Waldron argues that the ius gentium could function at various times 
“in both positive and critical modes”—as positive law where “legal 
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103. JEREMY WALDRON, FOREIGN LAW AND THE MODERN IUS GENTIUM 7
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resources it offered were needed directly for the settlement of 
disputes” and as natural law where other systems “looked to it for 
inspiration or critique on matters they purported to deal with 
themselves.”104
Waldron attempts to articulate a jurisprudence addressing “the 
authority accorded foreign law, confirmatory versus persuasive 
versus conclusive; about the areas in which foreign law should and 
should not be invoked . . . and about which foreign legal systems 
should be cited.”105 In explaining how “[c]ountries learn from each 
other and copy each others’ laws, grafting legal conceptions from 
one system on to another,”106 Waldron also attempts to explain why 
this should “dispel the serious misgivings many Americans have 
about this practice” and why “American courts are legally permitted 
or obliged to invoke non-American sources and how that practice 
connects with the status of courts as legal institutions.”107
And yet, something from Waldron’s proposal seems to be 
missing. While Waldron professes to articulate more of a “complete 
jurisprudence” (although he does not claim to offer a wholly 
complete one),108 we think more is needed. In our opinion, the case 
for citing the ius gentium as persuasive in the courts of sovereign 
nation states must rely on something more substantial than simply 
the desirability of “treating like cases alike.”109 The best Waldron can 
offer is an assertion that the principles of “comity[,] . . . integrity[,] 
and fairness” are sometimes so important that they are best 
understood “in the form of the relevant legal propositions’ having a 
claim on us as law . . . in the world.”110 Dworkinian arguments such 
as this are highly unlikely to satisfy the opponents of American 
citation of foreign court decisions, since these critics virtually to a 
person disagree with Dworkin as well. With this line of reasoning, 
Waldron is merely preaching to the choir. For us, more of a concrete 
theory is needed, if it is even possible to develop one.  
We set out to identify and articulate such a theory, and we then 
discuss some important limits to that theory. We argue that Friedrich 
A. Hayek’s arguments in favor of the virtue of spontaneous, as 
opposed to planned, systems of order may to some extent provide a 
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compelling argument in favor of citing the ius gentium where the text 
of the U.S. Constitution makes it relevant.111 In essence, Hayek 
argues that spontaneous orders can be exceedingly “complex . . . 
comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or 
manipulate.”112 Think “language and morals,” systems that, though 
possessing rules, were “the outcome of a process of evolution whose 
results nobody foresaw or designed.”113 Hayek claims that 
spontaneous systems of order are a better “adaptation to a large 
number of particular facts which will not be known in their totality to 
anyone.”114 In addition, we will argue large groups, under the proper 
conditions, are better equipped to make decisions the bigger they 
are.115
We agree with Hayek that the distinction between spontaneous 
and planned systems of order applies to law,116 and “that such law 
which, like the common law, emerges from the judicial process is 
necessarily abstract.”117 The global ius gentium that Waldron 
describes may be in some ways a spontaneous order formation. 
There is no global overseer who directs and shapes the ius gentium;
instead, it arises naturally and independently in sovereign nation 
states all over the world. Just as free markets account for information 
pertaining to costs better than governments118 and “lead[] to an 
increase of the stream of goods and of the prospects of all 
participants to satisfy their needs,”119 and just as large groups are 
likelier to make better decisions than smaller groups,120 we think 
                                                     
111. See generally 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES 
AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter 
HAYEK, MIRAGE]; 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL 
ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, FREE PEOPLE]. 
112. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 38. 
113. Id. at 37. 
114. Id. at 40. 
115. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 10 (Anchor Books 
2005) (2004). 
116. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 85-89. 
117. Id. at 86. 
118. HAYEK, MIRAGE, supra note 111, at 116 (“Indeed, probably the most 
important instance of the price system bringing about the taking into account of 
conflicts of desires which otherwise would have been overlooked is the accounting 
of costs—in the interests of the community at large the most important aspect, i.e. 
the one most likely to benefit many other persons, and the one at which private 
enterprise excels but government enterprise notoriously fails.”).
119. Id. at 115. 
120. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 10. 
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there is inherent value in looking to other sovereign nation states’
courts to see how they have resolved the difficult questions that have 
arisen in our own legal system and that this process may enable 
American courts to reach better outcomes. 
In this Article, we attempt to explain Friedrich Hayek’s theory 
of spontaneous order and how it both applies to and partially justifies 
Waldron’s conception of the ius gentium. In Part I, we offer 
criticisms of Waldron’s presentation of the ius gentium. These 
include that it lacks methodology and is therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply to the real world; that he does not give a strong 
enough reason to believe that foreign legal norms are relevant to our 
own legal system; that it is not backed by a rational, compelling 
normative argument; that he does not offer empirical evidence to 
suggest that his idea is a good one; and that he expects his readers to 
agree with him based on the strength of his intuition.121
In Part II, we examine the critical relevance of Hayek and 
argue that Hayekian jurisprudence may give substance to a theory 
that otherwise lacks necessary weight. We explain the difference 
between spontaneous and planned systems of order, and we argue for 
the virtue of the former. Essentially, systems of spontaneous order,
such as markets and the prices that reflect them, best “secure the 
utilization of widely dispersed knowledge.”122 Those rules that arise 
in a spontaneous order are those that “are found to be required 
complements of the already established rules if the order which rests 
on them is to operate smoothly and efficiently.”123 They reflect “what 
is demanded by general principles on which the going order of 
society is based.”124 Finally, we raise the example of the firm, as 
explained by Ronald Coase,125 that is a planned order to illustrate our 
understanding of Hayek and of the relevance of his work for the ius 
gentium. 
In Part III, we apply Hayek’s theory directly to the ius gentium.
We show that just as “spontaneous order . . . utilize[s] . . . the 
dispersed knowledge of all its members,”126 so too giving legal force 
to the ius gentium by critically examining how other countries have 
confronted problems similar to those we face may give us a greater 
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base of knowledge on which we can then formulate our own 
response.127 We explain how the concept of Hayekian order, applied 
to the ius gentium, bridges legal positivism128 with natural law 
theory129—an argument Professor Calabresi first developed with 
Professor Gary Lawson when they were third-year law students at 
Yale in 1983 writing a paper under the supervision of Professor 
Anthony Kronman. Finally, we discuss where the constitutions of 
sovereign nation states may fit into the scheme we have described. 
In Part IV, we explain the circumstances under which the 
decisions of large groups possess wisdom and why this is relevant to 
our theory.130 Group decisions tend to be wiser than those of 
individuals, James Surowiecki argues, when the group is 
characterized by diversity of opinion, independence, 
decentralization, and proper aggregation.131 When these conditions 
are present, and they are often not present, large group decision-
making is more likely to be wise132 rather than result in an 
“information cascade.”133
In Part V, we examine some very powerful objections that can 
be levied against citing or relying on the ius gentium, including those 
based on the idea of the economics of federalism.134 Other objections 
include: (1) that the “rightness” alone of foreign law is insufficient to 
justify our according it meaning in our system, in which questions 
have “local” answers rather than universally “right” answers,135 and 
that reliance on foreign law threatens the sovereignty of “We, the 
People”;136 (2) that it is not always clear, if we are to treat like alike, 
just what in comparative constitutional law counts as “like” and what 
is “unlike”;137 (3) that judicial citation and reliance on the ius gentium
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may lead to an international oligarchy of legal elites and judges, 
which would be undesirable; and (4) that America’s view of itself as 
a shining city on a hill, which is a beacon of liberty and of 
democracy to the world, may pose special barriers to our own 
reliance on the ius gentium.138
In Part VI, we outline a model for under what circumstances it 
may be appropriate for American courts to cite foreign law.139 We 
argue that all American decisions must be rooted in American law 
and that any decision citing foreign law should be able to stand 
without the citation of foreign law. That being said, we think it is 
sometimes appropriate to see how other nations have resolved 
problems similar to those we face. We argue that American courts 
should only look to nations with reasonably similar cultures, 
histories, values, and legal and economic systems as our own. When 
invoking foreign law, courts must not simply pick the results they 
like, but look at how a broad range of nations have settled the issue 
in question and compare the relative merits of contrasting solutions. 
Finally, the exercise of examining foreign law should be for the most 
part limited to cases involving only certain specific open-ended 
provisions of the Constitution, such as the Fourth and Eighth 
Amendments, as well as the Equal Protection Clause. 
In his Roper dissent, Justice Scalia proclaimed that he does 
“not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more 
than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be 
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court 
and like-minded foreigners.”140 Waldron says there must be some sort 
of stronger “jurisprudential defense” and “underlying philosophy” on
the citation of foreign law by American courts.141 We go a step 
further, arguing that Waldron’s theory is also itself incomplete. It is 
an improvement upon the opportunistic application of judges’
favored rules embodied in foreign legal decisions, but as is, we 
believe Waldron’s conception of the ius gentium is lacking in 
substance. Our goal is to present a theory that more satisfyingly 
justifies the occasional citation of foreign law by domestic judges. 
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I. WHY WALDRON’S IUS GENTIUM FRAMEWORK FALLS SHORT
Before we introduce our own theoretical justification for 
Waldron’s ius gentium, it is fair to ask why it is necessary that we do 
so. The answer is that while Waldron presents an interesting theory 
that can serve as the starting point for discussion, we feel he fails to 
make a compelling case as to why sovereign nation states should 
recognize and be bound by it. Waldron’s intuition is intriguing, but 
this is not enough. We believe that the theoretical case for why 
American courts should accord any weight to the foreign law of 
other sovereign nations and their decisions must rest on something 
more substantial than the simple desirability that like cases in 
different sovereign nation states be treated alike—more of a theory is 
needed.142
To his credit, Waldron recognizes as much, saying that his aim 
is to present a theory and not to justify the actual use made of foreign 
law by American courts.143 Indeed, Waldron humbly acknowledges 
that “[t]he best arguments for and against the use of foreign law are 
complicated, and sometimes we have to dig beneath the platitudes 
that are wheeled out on the one side and the xenophobic slogans that 
are trumpeted on the other, to find where the true arguments lie.”144
Still, he counsels that “[w]e don’t want to lose touch with law in the 
rest of the world, for there is much to learn, and, whether we like it 
or not, we are part of a larger community.”145 Yet the question 
remains—so what? Or rather, in what meaningful sense is the 
sovereign United States a member of a “larger community”146 of 
other sovereign nations and of what relevance is this membership to 
the way we interpret our own law? 
                                                     
142. Waldron, supra note 74, at 25 (“In our national law, we sometimes 
justify following precedent, treating like cases alike, by appealing to the need for 
predictability and respect for established expectations. It is better that the law be 
settled, we say, than that we get it right on the merits, because only if it is settled can 
it serve as a basis for secure expectations. However, I doubt that this argument is 
going to carry us very far in the international context.”). Waldron then discusses the 
principle of treating like cases alike in light of the principles of fairness and 
Dworkinian integrity. Id. at 25-26. 
143. WALDRON, supra note 103, at 15 (“My aim in this Comment has been to 
present a theory, not a justification of the actual use that American courts have made 
of foreign law. What troubled me, at the outset of this paper, was that the Supreme 
Court in Roper failed to articulate any general ideas or any standard by which its use 
of foreign law might be evaluated.”).
144. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 222. 
145. Id. at 223. 
146. See id.
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A. Lack of a Compelling “Why?”
One criticism of Waldron’s model is that it does not offer a 
compelling rational, normative case for acceptance of the ius 
gentium whereby the court decisions of one sovereign nation become 
binding on the courts of other sovereign nations. He largely rests his 
argument on notions of “consistency, harmonization, and 
integrity,”147 as well as the principle that like cases ought to be 
treated alike—”just as fire burns in Persia as well as in Greece, so 
murder is wrong in Carthage and in Rome.”148 Granted, this may be a
particularly compelling argument with regard to human rights law;
we think Waldron makes a good point when he suggests that “human 
rights are the same everywhere; they are based on universal 
principles; so the law of human rights should be roughly the same in 
every country (give or take a margin of appreciation).”149 A person in 
the United States is as naturally entitled to a certain set of rights as is 
a Canadian, a Spaniard, a Ghanaian, or a North Korean. If “human 
rights are surely the same the world over,” as Waldron rhetorically 
suggests,150 then we believe that perhaps “the human right that 
prohibits cruel punishment ought to be administered in a harmonious 
manner.”151
Waldron justifies the “like cases” argument with two important 
concepts.152 One is “fairness”—it is not fair for two separate 
sovereign nation states to treat two cases differently when they are 
substantially the same.153 The other is “integrity”—the idea that laws 
ought to be developed coherently so that they can be said to 
“govern[] a genuine community.”154
                                                     
147. Id. at 141. He lays out these arguments in detail in Chapter Five. See 
generally id. at 109-41. 
148. Waldron, Foreign Law, supra note 87, at 134. 
149. Waldron, supra note 74, at 18. 
150. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
151. Id. at 25. 
152. Id. (“Two other principles . . . used to illuminate the idea of treating like 
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153. Id.
154. Id.
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Many nations, including the United States, have some kind of 
bill of rights.155 Waldron sees the bills of rights in separate sovereign 
nation states as components of a “global human rights enterprise,”156
parts of a system of “common responsibilities laid down at the top 
level by the law of international human rights.”157
This view is intriguing, and in fact it contains much merit, but 
it is not enough to justify the proposal Waldron puts forth. The motor 
works fine, but it just is not powerful enough to pull the eighteen-
wheeler he is driving. Moreover, it is not so obvious to us that this 
line of reasoning works as well in fields of law other than that of 
human rights. All human beings may be entitled to the same set of 
fundamental human rights, but is it really a great evil if the people of 
different nations are subject to different procedures or limitations in 
how they make contracts, or if they are subject to somewhat different 
penalties for various criminal offenses, or face somewhat different 
property rules?158 Here, the urgency of the “like cases” argument just 
does not seem as strong.159
In fact, we think there are many federalism-related reasons to 
think that it may be preferable for sovereign nation states to differ in 
the various aspects of their legal systems.160 Perhaps differing 
circumstances in different countries make it wise for them to 
approach an issue or rule differently.161 Just as two states that choose 
to handle a legal issue differently can serve as laboratories of 
                                                     
155. Id. at 21-24.
156. Id. at 24.
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158. We use these three examples because they are three areas in which 
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161. As is true of American states. See Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160,
at 32-34.
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experimentation and change,162 so too do we believe the adoption of 
diverse policies in separate countries can demonstrate to other 
nations what outcomes result from different approaches to the 
problem.163 Finally, some issues just do not seem to call for 
uniformity. What about amoral differences among nations, such as 
the side of the road on which vehicles drive? Is there a compelling 
argument that all nations should have either the adversarial or the 
inquisitorial approach to court procedure? We do not buy it. 
B. Lack of Empirical Support 
Another fault we find with Waldron’s theory is that he does not 
rely on any empirical evidence to show that what he suggests is a 
good idea. Before a reader commits to Waldron’s proposal—that 
“American courts are legally permitted or [even] obliged to invoke 
non-American sources” of law164—he or she may quite naturally 
want some reassurance that it is in fact a good idea, and to this end 
may reasonably expect some factual showing to this effect. Waldron 
offers no empirical, statistical support to back his claims. 
Once again, it is not enough simply to invoke the idea of 
“treating like cases alike,” as Waldron does.165 This is an intuition, 
and a valid one, but we are not sure it demonstrates that the practical 
consequences of his proposal would be desirable. When we 
introduce our theory later in this Article, we will attempt to back it 
up with some data. 
C. Lack of Methodology 
Yet another mark against Waldron, in our book, is that his 
theory is not methodological. In a world of roughly 200 sovereign 
nation states with very different political, economic, and legal 
systems, not to mention customs and values, how can we tell which 
countries to look toward for guidance and which precedents to 
avoid? How much is British precedent worth compared to South 
African precedent? Where the Israeli and Belgian legal systems 
differ, to whom should we pay more accord? Does one Canadian 
precedent equal an Irish plus an Australian precedent? Ought we 
                                                     
162. Id. at 34-38.
163. Waldron himself acknowledges the potency of this argument. See
WALDRON, supra note 75, at 221-22.
164. Id. at 22. 
165. Waldron, supra note 74, at 25. 
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account for any Québécois influence? How? There is no formula; 
there are no guidelines. Waldron urges that we “not look to the work 
of suspect or disreputable laboratories. . . . Maybe we should not 
give weight to courts in Zimbabwe or the Sudan.”166 This is still not 
much in the way of guidance, however. It is tremendously 
ambiguous and offers little in the way of practical assistance for 
discerning how to weigh and discount the laws of the many nations. 
This is a problem because it gives credence to those who claim that 
the citation of foreign law is an unscrupulous practice that permits 
judges to apply their own personal value judgments as the cloak of 
impartial legality. Waldron speaks of a jurisprudence involving 
“patient analysis, the untangling of issues, the ascertaining of just 
resolutions, and the learning and cooperation.”167 In characterizing 
the issue as “essentially a problem-solving enterprise,” it seems to us 
that Waldron thinks about the question of “Whose will should 
prevail?”168 the way Justice Potter Stewart did about pornography—
he cannot quite define it, but he knows it when he sees it.169
There are, in fact, many ways to quantify the weight that 
American courts ought to give the legal verdicts of the various 
sovereign nation states’ courts. We shall go over these in greater 
detail later, but for now let us look at three. One is population 
size170—weighing the decisions of India’s courts, for example, more 
than those of Luxembourg’s. One advantage this option yields is that 
in large countries, courts are more constrained in what they can do. 
This is because they are likelier to have greater variation in the 
population, making it more difficult to have universal national rules. 
In addition, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights give a federalism discount, or margin of appreciation, 
to allow for a diversity of legal rules from one individual state or 
territory to another.171 This, obviously, is a more cautious approach. 
Another way in which we could evaluate the weight of court 
decisions in other sovereign nation states is to weigh sovereign 
nations by GDP per capita. 
This criticism, we feel, is particularly devastating for Waldron, 
who said that any theory regarding the citation of foreign law must  
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be complicated enough to answer a host of questions raised by the 
practice . . . [including] the areas in which foreign law should and should 
not be cited . . . and about which foreign legal systems should be 
cited . . . . The theory has to be broad enough to explain the use of foreign 
law in all appropriate cases.172
Waldron makes an analogy to the concept of stare decisis.173 Judges 
may have different “conception[s] of the bindingness of [a] 
precedent,” Waldron says, but “it is surely better that he articulate 
such a theory than that he simply give the impression that he thinks 
deferring to precedent is a good idea.”174 He asserts that “[w]e should 
require nothing less for the citation of foreign law.”175 The problem is 
that while Waldron acknowledges that “[n]o crisp or precise litmus 
test defines the sort of international consensus that makes up ius 
gentium on any particular subject,”176 we feel that at least some more 
tangible guidelines should be offered to guide the application of the 
ius gentium in practice. 
Waldron says he is “not trying to assimilate legal method to the 
experimental methods of science”177 and cautions that we ought to 
experiment with “‘new conjectures and daring hypotheses’”178 in law, 
both “within the framework of existing paradigms and . . . 
challenging them,” lest we become “forever mired in a static 
consensus.”179 In our opinion, this still does not tell us enough about 
what sort of theory is being challenged in the first place. Once again, 
more is needed. 
D. Lack of American Applicability 
A final criticism of Waldron’s explanation of the ius gentium is 
that he does not satisfactorily explain what reason there is to believe 
that the legal decisions of other sovereign nations’ courts have any 
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significance for American courts given the sovereignty in this 
country of “We the People of the United States.”180 By this we mean 
why “the basic premise . . . that American law should conform to the 
laws of the rest of the world [] ought[n’t] . . . be rejected out of 
hand,” to borrow Justice Scalia’s phrasing.181 Perhaps other sovereign 
legal systems may find it permissible to lean on foreign sources of 
law, in part because their constitutions may authorize it,182 but this 
does not necessarily mean that the U.S. Constitution does the same 
thing. Why, many might think, should we lean on foreign law when 
our own system is adequately equipped to handle whatever 
controversies may arise? Others may learn from us, one might say, 
and that is fine and well, but our law is our law, and none other is. In 
this regard, Waldron’s appeal to treating like cases alike is not nearly 
compelling enough to justify something that might understandably 
make many Americans uncomfortable—placing our laws, to some 
degree, in the hands of outsiders by citing foreign legal opinions and 
doctrines. At best, Waldron’s justification explains why we may do 
this, why we might want to, or why it would be permissible. What he 
does not explain nearly as well as is necessary is why American 
courts would ever be “obliged to invoke non-American sources” of 
law.183
Indeed, we think there are strong arguments against allowing
American courts to rely on the foreign law of other sovereign nations 
at all. Justice Scalia argues that even if one believes that the 
Constitution should be kept up to date, it 
should keep up to date with the views of the American people. And on 
these constitutional questions, . . . you have to ask yourself . . . what does 
American society think? And the best way, the only way to determine that 
is certainly not to ask a very thin segment of American society—judges, 
lawyers, and law students—what they think but rather to look at the 
legislation that exists in states, democratically adopted by the American 
people.184
The concept that Americans may be bound by laws not of their own 
choosing, then, may be thought to contradict the notion of a 
sovereign people. “I doubt whether anybody would say, ‘Yes, we 
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want to be governed by the views of foreigners,’” Scalia says.185
“Why is it that foreign law would be relevant to what an American
judge does when he interprets . . . the Constitution?”186 This is a very 
fair argument; it must be addressed. 
The second point on this matter to bring up is that there may in 
fact be good reason to believe that America is very much unlike 
other sovereign nations, that our discrepancies with our neighbors 
are not incidental or irrelevant, but reflect fundamental divergences 
on crucial values and beliefs regarding certain economic, social, 
cultural, and legal matters.187 If the argument for the ius gentium is, 
as Waldron says, “to harmonize the way in which the laws about 
fundamental rights are administered all over the world,”188 one may 
respond, as Scalia does, that “we don’t have the same moral and 
legal framework as the rest of the world, and never have.”189
President Ronald Reagan once said that the United States is a 
“shining city []on a hill”190 that is “a beacon, still a magnet for all 
who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places 
who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home.”191 As 
Professor Calabresi has argued elsewhere, “[m]ost Americans think 
instead that the United States is an exceptional country that differs 
sharply from the rest of the world and that must therefore have its 
own laws and Constitution.”192 Professor Calabresi has asserted that 
Americans are “an exceptional people and [have] an exceptional role 
to play in the world.”193 He has also argued that “Americans think of 
the United States as an exceptional country, . . . [and] it has actually 
become an exceptional country . . . . Americans are more 
individualistic, more religious, more patriotic, more egalitarian, and 
more hostile to unions and Marxism than are the people of any other 
advanced democracy.”194 In part, this is because “it has attracted 
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immigrants with a unique constellation of ideological beliefs.”195 As 
Professor Calabresi argues, “American popular culture 
overwhelmingly rejects the idea that the United States has a lot to 
learn from foreign legal systems, including even those of countries to 
which we are closely related like the United Kingdom and 
Canada.”196 What do we, then, have to learn from the foreign law of 
the sovereign nations? Once again, this is a valid question that 
shouldn’t be ignored; it beckons a thoughtful response. This, too, is a 
question we shall address. 
Finally, in what meaningful sense can there be said to exist “‘a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State’”?197
Modern legal positivists say that law is “relative in a double sense: it 
is the law of a country because it applies to that country, and it is the 
law of a country because it was laid down or posited by that 
country’s political institutions.”198 As the Court said in Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, law “‘does not exist without some definite authority 
behind it.’”199 It seems obvious that a person cannot be a president 
without being the president of some thing or some place. To ask who 
the president is—not the President of the United States, of France, or 
of Goldman Sachs, but just the president—makes so little sense that 
the question is hardly coherent. The same, we argue, is true of law. 
There is the intellectual property law of Jamaica, the intellectual 
property law of Japan, and the intellectual property law of the United 
Kingdom, but no intellectual property law full stop. If we are to 
assert that the ius gentium is authoritative, the positivist conception 
of law as innately relative must be challenged. But on what basis can 
it be challenged? 
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II. THE CRITICAL RELEVANCE OF HAYEK
So far we have offered several criticisms that can be made of 
Waldron’s theory; yet, it is not our objective to argue that it ought to
be dismissed out of hand. The objection we raise is not that his 
proposed ius gentium lacks merit; rather, it is that there are better 
arguments that can be made in its favor than those that Waldron 
proffers himself. It is to these that we now turn. 
A. Legitimacy Through Consent 
There are at least three obvious ways of legitimizing something 
as a source of law. One invokes consent, either of parties to a 
contract or of a people to be governed under a democratic system. 
The principle of consent lies at the core of the concept of the social 
contract, the implicit agreement between individuals to unite and 
organize themselves into political societies, follow common rules, 
and accept duties and responsibilities in order to prevent a state of 
anarchy.200
Randy Barnett questions whether the principle of consent can 
realistically be said to characterize constitutional legitimacy.201
Barnett challenges the popular notion of consent theory as 
legitimizing government by denying that “consent of the governed”
is a sufficient justification for constitutional legitimacy.202 He argues 
that although “‘the People’ can surely be bound by their consent, this 
consent must be real, not fictional—unanimous, not majoritarian.”203
Barnett says that “this fiction turns dangerous when factions 
purporting to speak for ‘the People’ claim the power to restrict the 
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liberties of all.”204 For this reason, Barnett believes that consent 
theory alone cannot legitimize a constitution, for “it is a standard that 
no constitution can meet.”205
Consent theory is obviously of little relevance to the ius 
gentium. As consent is usually given in sovereign nation states 
through democratic means, it is impossible to cite consent as a 
justification for American judicial citation of reliance on foreign law. 
The Framers of the Constitution and of the Reconstruction 
Amendments can hardly be supposed to have consented to be 
governed by the law of other twenty-first century sovereign nation 
states, and the U.S. Constitution, unlike other foreign constitutions, 
does not allow for international or foreign law to be made binding in 
the United States. 
Russell Hardin rejects the idea that a constitution can be 
justified on the grounds of contractarianism.206 Instead, he says that 
“[t]he point of a constitution is to tie our hands in certain ways in 
order to discipline them to more productive use.”207 However, we do 
not think that Hardin’s coordination rationale for written 
constitutionalism enforced by judicial review is very helpful in 
justifying the ius gentium. To the extent that what matters is less that 
some specific set of rules exist than that there be some set of rules 
around which we can plan our behavior, we cannot see any reason 
why a system of rules involving foreign law lets us plan and 
coordinate any worse than one relying solely on domestic law. 
The U.S. Constitution is based on the consent of the governed, 
and the Declaration of Independence makes the consent of the 
governed central to a government’s legitimacy. We believe that the 
generations of people who ratified the Constitution and its twenty-
seven amendments did consent to the Constitution’s legitimacy and 
that that explains why the Constitution legally binds us today. The 
usual objection that is made to this argument is to say that the 
Constitution was ratified by only a few white male property owners, 
225 years ago, and that they had no authority to bind women, 
African-Americans, or the many immigrants who have come to our 
shores since 1789. 
                                                     
204. Id. at 3. 
205. Id.  
206. Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 100 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 
1989). 
207. Id. at 115. 
32 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1 
We disagree. Women have had the right to vote and run for 
office since 1920, and African-Americans have had that right 
effectively since 1965. There has been no noticeable move by any 
major group in American politics today to deny the legitimacy of the 
Constitution as it has been amended. Generations of immigrants have 
come to our shores because they like what the U.S. Constitution 
says, and there has been essentially no emigration out of the United 
States even though it has always been legal to emigrate for the whole 
of American history. A few African-Americans emigrated to Liberia 
in the days of slavery and of Jim Crow, and a few Americans left the 
U.S. to go to Canada to avoid the draft during the Vietnam War. 
Emigration from the United States has been negligible since 1789, 
but huge numbers of people want to come to the United States today 
and cannot do so legally because of our immigration laws. People 
vote with their feet, and the fact that no one wants to emigrate out of 
the U.S. strongly suggests that our amended Constitution continues 
to enjoy the consent of the governed.  
This brings us to the third way of legitimizing a source of 
law—the inherent justice or goodness of the rule itself. This is a 
tricky argument, as questions of a specific law’s goodness are 
fraught with subjectivity. Waldron relies on the principle that “[l]ike 
cases in the world must be treated alike.”208 In our opinion, this is not 
enough to legitimize his theory. 
B. Planned Versus Spontaneous Systems of Order 
A better jurisprudential argument for the legitimacy of U.S. 
courts occasionally relying on or citing the law of other sovereign 
nation states can be deduced from the writings of Friedrich Hayek.209
It is this Hayekian theory of jurisprudence that forms the crux of the 
beginning to our argument, and to which we now turn. We think this 
argument supports the legitimacy of U.S. courts in citing foreign law 
but that it does not support making foreign law legally binding in the 
U.S. 
Law, Legislation and Liberty may be Hayek’s magnum opus.
For our purposes, the most relevant of the ideas he puts forth is his 
description of spontaneous and planned systems of order and how 
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they contrast with one another.210 According to Hayek, there are two 
types of systems of order that can be found in the world.211 The first 
is made, or planned, order, also called “taxis” or “deliberate 
arrangements.”212 Such systems are “made by somebody putting the 
elements of a set in their places or directing their movements.”213
Examples of planned orders include militaries, corporations, 
government agencies, television, families, and classical music. In 
these institutions, “plans owe their seeming clarity to the planner’s
disregard of all the facts he does not know.”214
The other type of systematic order is “spontaneous order,” or 
“kosmos.”215 Unlike systems of “planned order,” systems of 
spontaneous order have “not been created by an outside agency” and 
“may persist while all the particular elements they comprise, and 
even the number of such elements, change.”216 They are “very 
complex . . . comprising more particular facts than any brain could 
ascertain or manipulate.”217 Hayek says that although spontaneous 
orders may possess “several nuclei,” they lack “sharp boundaries.”218
A prime example of a spontaneous system of order is language.219
Although nobody planned the English or French languages (or, for 
that matter, possibly could have), language is without a doubt a real 
system of social order with binding rules. There is a right way to 
speak English and a wrong way, even though the language grew up 
spontaneously and has no planning committee steering its path or 
guiding its constant evolution. Other systems of spontaneous order 
include the Internet, jazz, and free markets. 
                                                     
210. For our purposes, this discussion occurs primarily, although not 
entirely, in Volume I. See generally HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111. 
211. Id. at 37 (“The made order which we have already referred to as an 
exogenous order or an arrangement may again be described as a construction, an 
artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a directed social order, as 
an organization. The grown order, on the other hand, which we have referred to as a 
self-generating or endogenous order, is in English most conveniently described as a 
spontaneous order.”).
212. Id. at 38. 
213. Id. at 37. 
214. Id. at 15. 
215. Id. at 38. 
216. Id. at 39. 
217. Id. at 38. 
218. Id. at 37, 47 (“Although there was a time when men believed that even 
language and morals had been ‘invented’ by some genius of the past, everybody 
recognizes now that they are the outcome of a process of evolution whose results 
nobody foresaw or designed.”).
219. Id. at 37. 
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Hayek identifies the market as a type of spontaneous order.220
Market “activities are not governed by a single scale or hierarchy of 
ends,”221 but nonetheless “secure a high degree of coincidence of 
expectations and an effective utilization of the knowledge and skills 
of the several members.”222 Nobody plans to make bread available 
for a specific price at the local grocery store, but it is always there, 
seldom varying in price by much more than a quarter. “The 
manufacturer does not produce shoes because he knows that Jones 
needs them,” Hayek says.223 “He produces because he knows that 
dozens of traders will buy certain numbers at various prices because 
they (or rather the retailer they serve) know that thousands of 
Joneses, whom the manufacturer does not know, want to buy 
them.”224
Hayek argues that spontaneous systems of order arise naturally 
over time through a process of “growth” or “evolution.”225 He says 
that “practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or 
even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the 
group in which they had arisen to prevail over others.”226
                                                     
220. Id. at 37-38 (“The main reason is that such orders as that of the market 
do not obtrude themselves on our senses but have to be traced by our intellect. We 
cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, this order of meaningful actions, but 
are only able mentally to reconstruct it by tracing the relations that exist between the 
elements. We shall describe this feature by saying that it is an abstract and not a 
concrete order.”). Further, he says that “[t]he market order in particular will 
regularly secure only a certain probability that the expected relations will prevail, 
but it is, nevertheless, the only way in which so many activities depending on 
dispersed knowledge can be effectively integrated into a single order.” Id. at 42. In 
Volume II, he says that 
[i]t is because the circumstances in which the different individuals find 
themselves at a given moment are different, and because many of these 
particular circumstances are known only to them, that there arises the 
opportunity for the utilization of so much diverse knowledge—a function 
which the spontaneous order of the market performs. 
HAYEK, MIRAGE, supra note 111, at 9.
221. HAYEK, MIRAGE, supra note 111, at 108. 
222. Id. at 107. 
223. Id. at 115-16. 
224. Id. at 116. 
225. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 9 (“[T]hat orderliness of 
society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due 
solely to institutions and practices which had been invented or designed for that 
purpose, but was largely due to a process described at first as ‘growth’ and later as 
‘evolution’ . . . .”).
226. Id.
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For our purposes, the great advantage of the spontaneous 
system of order is its ability, as Hayek says, to process and exploit 
more information than any individual “could ascertain or 
manipulate.”227 Unlike planned orders, which are “created by an 
outside agency,” a spontaneous order “can have no purpose, although 
its existence may be very serviceable to the individuals which move 
within such order.”228 Such systems “are not necessarily complex, but 
unlike deliberate human arrangements, they may achieve any degree 
of complexity.”229
The elegance of the spontaneous order lies in the fact that 
although “each member of society can have only a small fraction of 
the knowledge possessed by all, and . . . is therefore ignorant of most 
of the facts on which the working of society rests,”230 spontaneous 
orders operate on the “utilization of much more knowledge than 
anyone can possess,”231 creating “a coherent structure most of whose 
determinants are unknown to” members of society.232 “In civilized 
society,” Hayek says, an “individual may be very ignorant, more 
ignorant than many a savage, and yet greatly benefit from the 
civilization in which he lives.”233 Edmund Burke expressed the 
benefit of spontaneous order with respect to individuals’ 
understanding of politics: 
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of 
reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that 
the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and 
capital of nations and of ages.234
Hayek asserts that “most of the rules of conduct which govern 
our actions, and most of the institutions which arise out of this 
regularity, are adaptations to the impossibility of anyone taking 
conscious account of all the particular facts which enter into the 
order of society.”235 Spontaneous orders, unlike planned orders, take 
advantage of what Hayek calls the “fragmentation of knowledge,” the 
situation in which “each member of society can have only a small 
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234. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 74
(Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790). 
235. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 13. 
36 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1 
fraction of the knowledge possessed by all, and that each is therefore 
ignorant of most of the facts on which the working of society 
rests.”236 The ability of society to utilize all of this dispersed 
knowledge is, in Hayek’s words, the principle feature of 
civilizations.237
Hayek argues that although “[c]omplete rationality of action”
requires “complete knowledge of all the relevant facts,” we must be 
mindful of “the fact of the necessary and irremediable ignorance on 
everyone’s part of most of the particular facts which determine the 
actions of all the several members of human society.”238 Failure to 
confront this ignorance is, Hayek says, “the source of the central 
problem of all social order.”239 In contrast, Hayek argues that what 
really matters in “civilized society” is “not so much the greater 
knowledge that the individual can acquire, [but] the greater benefit 
he receives from the knowledge possessed by others.”240
There are some things that human beings just cannot willfully 
“bring about only by availing ourselves of the known forces which 
tend to lead to their formation.”241 Hayek points out that we cannot 
“produce a crystal . . . by placing the individual atoms in such a 
position that they will form the lattice of a crystal.”242 We can, 
however, “create the conditions in which they will arrange 
themselves in such a manner.”243 Hayek uses the example of the 
crystal to illustrate the important idea that in such a system, “the 
regularity of the conduct of the elements will determine the general 
character of the resulting order but not all the detail of its particular 
manifestation.”244 The outcome will depend on information “which 
will not be known in [its] totality to anyone.”245
Nonetheless, although it is now widely acknowledged that 
“language and morals” emerge through an evolutionary process, “in 
other fields many people still treat with suspicion the claim that the 
                                                     
236. Id. at 14. 
237. Id. (“Yet it is the utilization of much more knowledge than anyone can 
possess, and therefore the fact that each moves within a coherent structure most of 
whose determinants are unknown to him, that constitutes the distinctive feature of 
all advanced civilizations.”).
238. Id. at 12. 
239. Id.
240. Id. at 14. 
241. Id. at 39. 
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patterns of interaction of many men can show an order that is of 
nobody’s deliberate making.”246 They still “cannot conceive of an 
order which is not deliberately made.”247 Hayek argues that this is a 
“naïve” view rooted in “a deeply ingrained propensity . . . to interpret 
all regularity to be found in phenomena anthropomorphically, as the 
result of the design of a thinking mind.”248 Hayek says that “[i]t is to 
this philosophical conception that we owe the preference which 
prevails to the present day for everything that is done ‘consciously’
or ‘deliberately[,’] and from it the terms ‘irrational’ or ‘non-rational’
derive the derogatory meaning they now have.”249 And yet, the idea 
that “beneficial institutions [are due] to design, and that only such 
design has made or can make them useful for our purposes, is largely 
false.”250 Among the examples of spontaneous orders that Hayek 
provides is Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the market.251 “Morals, 
religion and law, language and writing, money and the market,” were 
once conceived to have been purposely designed by some planner, 
“or at least [to] ow[e] whatever perfection they possessed to such 
design.”252 Hayek doesn’t buy it,253 and neither do we. And yet many 
social institutions, Hayek says, are “the result of customs, habits or 
practices which have been neither invented nor are observed with 
any such purpose in view.”254
The United States has a Hayekian tradition of revering the text 
of our written Constitution and its amendments. U.S. constitutional 
law is a spontaneous system of order that has grown up around the 
planned system of order of the Constitution. The Tradition of the 
Written Constitution best explains why U.S. constitutional law has 
worked so well.255 In our tradition, we have periodic moments where 
like Protestants who follow only the Bible—sola scriptura—we 
purify the law of deviations from the text. Such moments have 
                                                     
246. Id. at 37. 
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248. Id. at 9. 
249. Id. at 11.
250. Id. at 9. 
251. Id. at 37. 
252. Id. at 10. Hayek says that this “intentionalist or pragmatic account of 
history found its fullest expression in the conception of the formation of society by a 
social contract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a 
direct follower of Descartes.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
253. Id. at 10-11.
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        255.   Steven G. Calabresi, Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment 
on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435 (1997). 
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occurred in 1937 with the New Deal;256 in 1954 with Brown v. Board 
of Education;257 in Engel v. Vitale,258 with school prayer; and in 
United States v. Lopez,259 with the revival of federalism. 
C. The Analogy of the Firm 
The difference between systems of planned order and systems 
of spontaneous order can be further explained through the well-
known analogy of the firm.260 Ronald Coase describes firms or 
businesses as “‘islands of conscious power’” in “‘ocean[s] of 
unconscious co-operation.’”261 We posit that another way of thinking 
of this is that firms are islands of planned order in oceans of 
spontaneous order—namely, free markets. In an “economic system,”
the “price mechanism” is used to “co-ordinate[]” the system, to 
“allocat[e] . . . factors of production between different uses.”262
However, in a firm, “the description does not fit at all.”263 Decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources are guided not by the “price 
mechanism,” but by an “entrepreneur-co-ordinator,”264 such as a 
CEO. When a worker moves from one department to another, Coase 
says, he moves not on the basis “of a change in relative prices, but 
because he is ordered to do so.”265 A different factor entirely is at 
play. 
Coase “attempt[s] to discover why a firm emerges at all.”266 He 
concludes that they arise because of the need of entrepreneurs to save 
on costs.267 Coase argues that “the operation of a market costs 
something and by forming an organisation and allowing some 
authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain 
marketing costs are saved.”268 They include “discovering what the 
                                                     
256. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
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257. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
258. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
259. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
260. See Coase, supra note 125, at 386-88.
261. Id. at 388 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85
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262. Id. at 387. 
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relevant prices are”269 and “negotiating and concluding a separate 
contract for each exchange transaction.”270 Another reason Coase 
offers for why firms come into being is that “exchange transactions 
on a market and the same transactions organised within a firm are 
often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with 
regulatory powers.”271 For example, “[i]f we consider the operation 
of a sales tax, it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not 
on the same transactions organised within the firm.”272 Moreover,
Coase says that firms facilitate long-term planning.273 In addition to 
Coase’s reasons for the existence of firms, we speculate that another 
may exist as well; certain decisions may be so crucial to an 
enterprise’s success that they must be insulated against the 
possibility that the market may fail to bring about the most efficient 
outcome. In other words, some things may be more important to get 
right than get done cheaply. The applicability of this last point to 
Waldron’s ius gentium is that we may prefer not to trust certain 
important legal questions to the market-like spontaneous order of the 
ius gentium when we have what we consider to be a reliable and 
tested domestic system for resolving them. U.S. courts have decided 
an untold, enormous number of common law cases over the course 
of our history.274
                                                     
269. Id. at 390. 
270. Id. at 390-91. 
271. Id. at 393. 
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273. Id. at 391 (“It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the 
supply of some article or service. . . . Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the 
longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the 
less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify 
what the other contracting party is expected to do.”).
274. Calculating even a rough estimate of the number of cases that have been 
decided by American state and federal courts is a monumental task. However, we 
can know for a fact that American courts have certainly decided millions of common 
law cases since 1789. In Fiscal Year 2012 alone, a total of 278,442 cases were filed 
in federal district courts. U.S. District Courts, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-district-courts.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015). Eighty-five thousand, seven hundred forty-two of these, 
or nearly 30.8%, were diversity of citizenship cases, which very often involve 
matters of state common law. Id. In Fiscal Year 2011, 101,366 diversity cases were 
filed in federal district courts, constituting over 35% of their caseloads. Id.
Moreover, state courts typically account for around 95% of all cases decided in the 
United States, and many of these must be common law cases. See E. Norman 
Veasey, A Response to Professor Francis E. McGovern’s Paper Entitled Toward a 
Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1897, 1898 (2000) (“Over 95% of all litigation and roughly the same 
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D. Common Law as Spontaneous Order 
Waldron identifies the common law’s “shared sense of a 
common legal heritage [as] something like what I have in mind when 
I talk about ius gentium, a body of law common to all humankind.”275
In his book, Hayek identifies the common law as an example of a 
system of spontaneous order.276 The common law was not planned by 
an original jurist, as Napoleon planned the civil code or as Justinian 
planned the Corpus Juris Civiles. According to Lord Mansfield, the 
common law “‘does not consist of particular cases, but of general 
principles, which are illustrated and explained by those cases.’”277
Hayek says that this in turn means that “part of the technique of the 
common law judge that from the precedents which guide him he 
must be able to derive rules of universal significance which can be 
applied to new cases.”278 We conclude from this that just as “the 
price mechanism operates as a medium of communicating 
knowledge,”279 the common law reflects the wisdom of many judges 
deliberating and applying common rules and weighing common 
standards over the course of history. 
The common law grows and changes over time even though 
there is no supreme judicial authority shared by those nations—
Britain, America, Australia, New Zealand, and others—that practice 
it. But contrary to the idea that law is “‘a command of a sovereign, 
                                                                                                               
percentage of resources are in the state courts.”). Even accounting for the facts that 
judicial caseloads have increased over time, that not all state court or diversity of 
citizenship cases involve matters of common law, and that many cases filed in 
district courts are not ultimately decided in court, it seems safe to say that American 
courts have indeed decided a massive number of common law cases. 
275. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 20. 
276. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 85 (defining the common 
law as “a law existing independently of anyone’s will and at the same time binding 
upon and developed by the independent courts; a law with which parliament only 
rarely interfered and, when it did, mainly only to clear up doubtful points within a 
given body of law. One might even say that a sort of separation of powers had 
grown up in England, not because the ‘legislature’ alone made law, but because it 
did not: because the law was determined by courts independent of the power which 
organized and directed government, the power namely of what was misleadingly 
called the ‘legislature’”).
277. Id. at 86 (quoting WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS FROM 
OUR LEGAL HISTORY 17 n.30 (1928)). 
278. Id.  
279. HAYEK, MIRAGE, supra note 111, at 125. 
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backed up by sanctions, and maintained by a habit of obedience,’”280
despite its lack of a central sovereign who promulgated it, there is no 
doubt that in America the common law is recognized as law. As the 
Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he common law . . . [is] the law of 
that State”;281 it is binding despite its not having been promulgated by 
a king, legislature, governor, or president. 
In light of the nature of the common law and Hayek’s 
explanation of spontaneous order, we suggest that common law is 
validated by both consent and by its own inherent goodness.282 The 
first proposition sounds suspect—how can society be said to have 
consented to obey law that nobody ever voted to adopt? Judges, who 
are often unelected, are the ones handing down the common law. 
However, we believe that the common law is in a sense 
democratically legitimated by virtue of having grown out of 
longstanding, widely shared expectations, made concrete in 
litigation. Hayek describes “the proper function of all law” as
“guiding expectations.”283 We posit that the common law has a 
degree of democratic legitimacy because it allows individuals, to 
quote Hayek, to “form expectations about the actions of their fellows 
which have a good chance of being met.”284 We feel that it thus 
expresses the customary expectations of those parties who brought 
litigation to court. Decisions that people objected to get challenged in 
new cases, and, we would argue, the common law clears itself 
accordingly of errors introduced in one or a few cases. 
The common law is not free of errors; first, it “is of necessity 
gradual and may prove too slow to bring about the desirable rapid 
adaptation of the law to wholly new circumstances.”285 Hayek 
acknowledges that it may “develop in very undesirable directions.”286
Sometimes “the spontaneous process of growth may lead into an 
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282. Hayek does not say this outright, but it seems implicit to us in his 
description of “the proper function of all law” as “guiding expectations” for 
members of society. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 89. 
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284. Id. at 95. 
285. Id. at 88. 
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impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its own forces or 
which it will at least not correct quickly enough.”287 Hayek compares 
the development of law to a “one-way street,” in that “when it has 
already moved a considerable distance in one direction, it often 
cannot retrace its steps when some implications of earlier decisions 
are seen to be clearly undesirable.”288 When this occurs, “correction 
by deliberate legislation may . . . be the only practicable way out.”289
However, Hayek’s discussion of when judge-made law requires 
legislative correction show that he thinks that such occasions 
constitute the exception, not the rule.290 In general, however, Hayek 
argues that “[t]he market order . . . is, nevertheless, the only way in 
which so many activities depending on dispersed knowledge can be 
effectively integrated into a single order.”291
The second proposition—that the authority of the common law 
is normatively validated by its inherent goodness—is easier to 
understand. Hayek argues spontaneous orders are good because they 
are capable of harnessing many discrete pieces of knowledge,
independently arrived at, “without this knowledge ever being 
concentrated in a single mind, or being subject to those processes of 
deliberate coordination and adaptation which a mind performs.”292 In 
a free market, 
each is made by the visible gain to himself to serve needs which to him are 
invisible . . . where only a few know yet of an important new fact, the 
much maligned speculators will see to it that the relevant information will 
rapidly be spread by an appropriate change of prices.293
The end result is “that all changes are currently taken account of as 
they become known to somebody connected with the trade.”294 In this 
process, “current prices . . . serve . . . as indicators of what ought to 
be done in the present circumstances,”295 even though they are not set 
by any one person. No government-commodity czar could so 




290. While Hayek does not say this outright, it seems implicit in his tone; 
consider the following: “The fact that law that has evolved in this way has certain 
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effectively gather, process, and act on all the information a market 
uses to produce a good to be sold. He could not produce a good as 
well as the market could, for “in a centrally directed system, it would 
be impossible to reward people in accordance with the value which 
their voluntary contributions have to their fellows, because, without 
an effective market, the individuals could neither know, nor be 
allowed to decide, where to apply their efforts.”296 A government 
czar might set production targets based on last year’s needs without 
measuring how this year’s needs might be different. On the other 
hand, in a market system, “the relevant information will rapidly be 
spread by an appropriate change of prices,” so that information is 
accounted for as soon as it “become[s] known to somebody 
connected with the trade”297—in an age of algorithmic trading, this 
can be instantaneous. The price of financial instruments changes 
minute to minute, as analysts and powerful computer algorithms 
measure changes in a large numbers of factors and weigh them 
against one another. An increase in demand for oranges in Colorado 
would be reflected in an increase in the price of oranges, sending a 
signal to the market to produce more oranges. 
We argue that just as free markets are more efficient than 
planned economies, the common law is superior to planned codes of 
law because it can harness many more discrete pieces of what Hayek 
calls “dispersed knowledge”298—this is because in order for the 
common law to satisfy “the expectations which the parties in a 
transaction would have reasonably formed on the basis of the general 
practices that the ongoing order of actions rests on,” it must have a 
strong sense of what those “common expectations” are, for these 
rules are “presumed to have guided expectations in many similar 
situations in the past.”299 This is a more substantive and persuasive 
argument than that the common law is binding simply because it 
“treat[s] like cases alike.”300 Hayek notes that although legal rules 
“will in the first instance be the product of spontaneous growth, their 
gradual perfection will require the deliberate efforts of judges . . . 
who will improve the existing system by laying down new rules.”301
When common law rules become socially outdated or cease to 
conform with popular expectations, they may be challenged in court 
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by litigants and either revised or discarded. Through this constant 
growing and pruning process, the common law stays up to date. To 
give an example, it is well-documented that a revolution in tort law 
occurred in the United States following World War II.302 We believe 
that this process was due to the fact that as Americans’ incomes rose 
after World War II, they came to prefer greater consumer safety at 
the cost of low prices for the products they consumed. This led to 
widespread changes in tort law, causing producers to display more 
warning labels and make products safer. 
The continuous development of the common law occurs 
through an iterative “process of evolution in the course of which 
spontaneous growth of customs and deliberate improvements of the 
particulars of an existing system have constantly interacted.”303 Paul 
F. Rubin argues that common law systems tend to discard inefficient 
rules over time and develop more efficient solutions to replace 
them.304 He has demonstrated that there is a relationship between “the 
presumed efficiency of the common law and the decision to use the 
courts to settle a dispute.”305 Rubin argues that “it is more likely that 
parties will litigate inefficient rules than efficient rules.”306 This is in 
part due to the fact that “efficient rules may evolve from in-court 
settlement, thereby reducing the incentive for future litigation and 
increasing the probability that efficient rules will persist.”307 In other 
words, “resorting to court settlement is more likely in cases where 
the legal rules relevant to the dispute are inefficient, and less likely 
where the rules are efficient.”308 Building on Rubin’s analysis, 
George Priest asserts that “efficient rules will be more likely to 
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endure as controlling precedents regardless of the attitudes of 
individual judges toward efficiency, the ability of judges to 
distinguish efficient from inefficient outcomes, or the interest or 
uninterest of litigants in the allocative effects of the rules.”309 In fact, 
the common law process “restrain[s] and channel[s] judicial 
discretion so that the legal rules in force will consist of a larger 
proportion of efficient rules.”310
Inefficient rules raise the stakes of litigation because 
“[i]nefficient assignments of liability by definition impose greater 
costs on the parties subject to them than efficient assignments.”311 If 
the cost of avoiding an accident increases, Priest argues, “the amount 
invested in avoidance generally will be lower.”312 For this reason, 
“the costs imposed by inefficient rules will always be higher than the 
costs imposed by efficient rules.”313 Priest suggests that because 
“inefficient rules impose higher costs than efficient rules on the 
parties subject to them,” and because “the value to the parties from 
overturning the judgments that result . . . is higher,” inefficient rules 
are likelier to be litigated than efficient rules because “they will 
come up in litigation more often.”314 Thus, Priest suggests, “if the 
disputes that proceed to judgment consist of a disproportionately 
large share which contest the appropriateness of inefficient rules, 
then the set of rules not contested . . . will consist of a 
disproportionately large share of efficient rules.”315 Interestingly, 
Priest says, this is true even if judges have a “preference . . . for 
inefficient outcomes.”316 As Priest explains, if inefficient rules are 
litigated more frequently than efficient ones, and the bulk of 
uncontested rules thus largely consists of efficient ones, then “[e]ven 
where the judiciary exercises a strong hostility to efficient outcomes, 
it will be unable to fully impose its bias on the total set of legal rules 
in force.”317 To us, this demonstrates the wisdom of the spontaneous 
order of the common law. Independent of the preferences of 
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individual judges, the common law approaches an efficient 
equilibrium.318
Judge Posner argues that “wealth maximization, especially in 
the common law setting, derives support from the principle of 
consent that can also be regarded as underlying the . . . approach of 
Pareto ethics.”319 For this reason, he says, the common law promotes 
efficiency.320 The reason is that “common law judges deal with 
problems, and by methods, in which redistributive concerns are not 
salient”; because the common law is not particularly well-suited to 
redistributive goals, “politically influential groups can do no better, 
in general, than to support efficient policies.”321 An allocation is 
“Pareto-superior,” Posner explains, “if at least one person is better 
off under the first allocation than under the second and no one is 
worse off.”322 According to Posner, the principle of Pareto superiority 
was developed “as an answer to the traditional problem of practical 
utilitarianism, that of measuring happiness across persons for 
purposes of determining the effect of a policy on total utility.”323
Because utility cannot be directly measured, however, Posner says 
that “the only way to demonstrate that a change in the allocation of 
resources is Pareto superior is to show that everyone affected by the 
                                                     
318. Id. at 70. 
319. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980) 
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320. Posner, Ethical and Political Basis, supra note 319, at 488. 
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Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 226 (1980) (providing a 
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323. Posner, Ethical and Political Basis, supra note 319, at 488; see also 
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change consented to it.”324 A related concept, the “Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion,”325 is somewhat, but not entirely, more workable; it requires 
“not that no one be made worse off by the move, but only that the 
increase in value be sufficiently large that the losers could be fully 
compensated.”326 However, the problem Posner identifies with both 
“the Pareto criterion itself” and “the utilitarian imperative underlying 
the Pareto criterion” is that “there is no way of knowing whether the 
utility to the winners of not having to pay compensation will exceed 
the disutility to the losers of not receiving compensation.”327
Posner argues that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion can be justified 
not according to utilitarianism but “by reference to the idea of 
consent”328—specifically, “what economists call ex ante 
compensation.”329 The idea is that “the return to entrepreneurial 
activity will include a [risk] premium to cover the risk of losses due 
to competition,” so that in a sense “the entrepreneur is compensated 
for those losses ex ante.”330 Posner illustrates this principle with the 
example of a lottery: If you purchase a ticket and lose, he says “so 
long as there is no question of fraud or duress, you have consented to 
the loss.”331 We are not arguing that all types of legal decisions lend 
themselves to Kaldor-Hicks analysis—we feel it would be 
inappropriate to settle issues of fundamental justice by trying to 
maximize total efficiency at the expense of someone’s basic rights—
but when the goal is to maximize utility, we agree that Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency is a useful measuring stick to use.332 However, Posner 
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STUD. 457, 464 (1979); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory 
of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 438-40 (1980). For a related 
economic argument (that the undertaking of public projects satisfy the Pareto 
superiority criterion so long as it is sufficiently likely that a given individual will 
benefit from public projects over the long run, even if he does not benefit from this 
particular project), see generally A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation 
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332. Posner discusses the objection that a wealth-maximizing principle, as 
applied to the common law, could justify slavery “if A’s labor is worth more to B
than to A,” but says “[s]uch cases must be very rare.” Id. at 500. Should conditions 
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argues, and we agree, that the common law is efficient because “a
rule or institution that satisfies the principle of consent cannot readily 
be altered . . . in a way that will redistribute wealth toward some 
politically effective interest group.”333
Although both Hayek and Posner extol the efficiency of the 
common law, their views on the nature of law differ strongly. 
Professors Todd J. Zywicki and Anthony B. Sanders assert that 
Posner is a legal positivist, who “views law as an order consciously 
made through the efforts of judges and legislators”;334 in contrast, 
they say, Hayek sees “law as a spontaneous order—of which the best 
example is the common law—[that] contains and transmits 
knowledge that no one person or committee could ever know and, 
thus, regulates society better than a person or committee could.”335
Posner believes that judges “should examine an individual rule and 
come to a conclusion about whether the rule is the most efficient 
available.”336 In contrast, Hayek “conceives of law as a purpose-
independent set of legal rules bound within a larger social order.”337
We have pushed the argument that the common law is efficient 
in part because it is a spontaneous order that draws from a wide pool 
of knowledge and dispersed information. But in fact, we think that 
Posner’s argument for the efficiency of the common law in turn 
means that the first justification for a source of law’s legitimacy, 
which we raised earlier—the premise that it is inherently 
consensual—is more justifiable than it appears at a glance. Posner 
argues that the “Kaldor-Hicks criterion can sometimes be applied 
without violating the principle of consent.”338 Though the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion is not identical to the Pareto criterion, he says, it can 
                                                                                                               
arise where slavery would be “a more efficient [way] of organizing production than 
any voluntary system,” Posner says, “they either arise under such different social 
conditions from our own as to make ethical comparison difficult, or involve highly 
unusual circumstances (e.g., military discipline) to which the term slavery is not 
attached.” Id. at 501 (footnote omitted). Overall, Posner says that “while the 
theoretical possibility exists that efficiency might dictate slavery or some other 
monstrous rights assignment, it is difficult to give examples where this would 
actually happen.” Id. at 502. Ultimately, Posner concludes that “it is possible to 
deduce a structure of rights congruent with our ethical intuitions from the wealth-
maximization premise.” Id.
333. Id. at 504. 
334. Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the 
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“function as a tolerable and, more to the point, administrable 
approximation of the Pareto-superiority criterion.”339 Moreover, the 
“wealth-maximization norm in the common law setting” can be 
understood in terms of consent, Posner argues, “because common 
law judges deal with problems, and by methods, in which 
redistributive [concerns] are not salient. This means that consent to 
efficient solutions can be presumed.”340 Finally, Posner argues that 
the notion of consent both “is highly congenial to the Kantian 
emphasis on autonomy”341 and “is the operational basis of the 
concept of Pareto superiority.”342 “Wealth maximization as an ethical 
norm has the property of giving weight . . . to consent,” Posner 
says.343 In this way, market transactions can be justified in a way 
“that is unrelated to their effect in promoting efficiency,” but “on 
Kantian grounds”344 of “individual autonomy.”345 For these reasons, 
we think that the common law can in a way be described as 
something similar to consensual. 
E. Legal Positivism Meets Natural Law 
In the separate unpublished article co-written with Professor 
Gary Lawson in May 1983 to which we previously alluded,346
Professors Calabresi and Lawson offer the view that the common 
law unifies the contrasting theories of law put forth by the famous 
legal positivist H.L.A. Hart and by the famous natural law proponent 
Lon Fuller.347 In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart argues that laws 
are merely rules created by human beings and that there is no 
necessary relationship between man-made law and morality.348
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348. HART, supra note 128, at 228-29 (“The rules of . . . law . . . are often 
morally quite indifferent. A rule may exist because it is convenient or necessary to 
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According to Hart, the “starting-point” of John Austin’s analysis is 
that the “essence of law” is a “situation where one person gives 
another an order backed by threats, and, in this sense of ‘oblige[,’]
obliges him to comply.”349 In contrast, H.L.A. Hart conceives the 
structure of law as a system of “primary rules of obligation with [the] 
secondary rules . . . ‘of recognition.’”350 Primary rules are those that 
control human behavior, prohibit actions, and create obligations.351
Secondary rules “specify some feature or features possession of 
which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative 
indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social 
pressure it exerts.”352 They identify primary rules “by reference to 
some general characteristic possessed by the primary rules.”353 In 
addition, “where more than one of such general characteristics are 
treated as identifying criteria, provision may be made for their 
possible conflict by their arrangement in an order of superiority, as 
by the common subordination of custom or precedent to statute, the 
latter being a ‘superior source’ of law.”354 For example, Title III of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which prohibits 
individuals from discriminating on the basis of disability with regard 
to public accommodations and commercial facilities, is a primary 
rule—it is a rule of conduct, telling owners of public 
accommodations what they are legally obligated to refrain from 
doing.355 The secondary rule of recognition would be that valid laws 
must be passed through the process of bicameralism and presentment 
laid out in Article I, § 7.356
The most important aspect, for our purposes, of H.L.A. Hart’s
theory is its stubborn positivism.357 According to H.L.A. Hart, there 
                                                                                                               
because any moral importance is attached to the particular rule. It may well be but 
one of a large number of possible rules, any one of which would have done equally 
well.”).
349. Id. at 6. For more on the Austinian view of law, see generally JOHN 
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 
1995).
350. HART, supra note 128, at 94 (emphasis omitted). 
351. Id. at 81. 
352. Id. at 94. 
353. Id. at 95. 
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355. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 302, 
104 Stat. 327, 355-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2012)). 
356. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
357. HART, supra note 128, at 185 (“There are many different types of 
relation between law and morals and there is nothing which can be profitably 
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is no necessary relationship between the law and morality.358 A rule 
need not be moral to be valid as a matter of law.359 This does not 
mean that the law must be immoral, for a valid law can 
coincidentally align with just standards of decency, but it is not 
necessary that it do so.360 According to H.L.A. Hart, moral, morally 
neutral, and wicked laws alike are all equally valid so long as they 
meet the standards laid out by the secondary rules of recognition.361
Waldron characterizes Hart’s view of legal positivism as the idea of 
“there being a practice among a group of officials to recognize it and 
use it in their work.”362
We believe that if the ius gentium is defined as a system of 
positive law, as Waldron tries to do,363 it is not incompatible with the 
H.L.A. Hartian conception of positive law.364 Indeed, because H.L.A. 
Hart says that rules of recognition “may take any of a huge variety of 
forms, simple or complex,”365 citation of foreign law may be 
emerging in America as a legitimate source of law for judges to 
consider. Alternatively, on the other hand, “[w]e may be at a 
relatively early stage in America with the citation of foreign law in 
constitutional case[s],” as Waldron says, “and it is possible that 
American judges as a community will repudiate some of these ideas; 
if they do, what I am calling the ius gentium might cease to be law in 
the United States.”366
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In The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller presents a natural law 
theory that contrasts sharply with H.L.A. Hart’s positivism.367 We 
read Fuller to assert that man-made laws must conform to specific 
moral principles if they are to possess binding authority.368 Namely, 
he identifies eight routes of failure for legal systems.369 Legal 
systems lack legitimacy and laws are not laws, Fuller says, whenever 
the following conditions occur: 
[(1) A] failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided 
on an ad hoc basis. . . . (2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make 
available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the 
abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, 
but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them 
under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules 
understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that 
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing 
such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action 
by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as 
announced and their actual administration.370
According to Fuller, a “total failure in any one of these eight 
directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all.”371
Ultimately, then, he intimates that the legitimacy of law to some 
degree depends on its morality.372
Lon Fuller’s natural law views had a big impact on his student 
Ronald Dworkin, who went on to become Fuller’s “successor . . . as 
the leading exponent of what most jurisprudes call a ‘natural law’
theory.”373 Dworkin, in turn, is a major influence on Jeremy 
Waldron.374 Lon Fuller’s views and his disagreement with H.L.A. 
Hart are thus very relevant for our Article. 
Calabresi and Lawson suggest in their unpublished 1983 
working paper that the common law bridges the gap between legal 
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positivism and natural law theory.375 Law is not necessarily created 
with moral purposes in mind, they argue—it can be motivated by any 
number of factors, including several that contradict one another.376 In 
the common law, however, those laws that persevere over time are 
those that best conform to popular expectations and notions of 
justice.377 In this way, “bad” law is eventually weeded out and 
“good” law—law in accordance with general prevailing values—
survives and grows.378 Laws that facilitate social harmony are 
preserved through time, while laws that cause discord are over time 
rejected and exit the common law system.379 Thus, the common law 
has both a positive and a natural law aspect.380 Individual laws 
themselves may be formulated without moral design, but the ones 
that get passed on through the ages are those that advance human 
well-being and are thus “good” in an objective sense.381
Of course, this is a simplification. Rather than weed out “bad”
law, it is more realistic to say that it allows that law to persist, which 
reflects widely held views in society—especially those of social 
elites, from which pool are drawn a disproportionate share of lawyers 
and judges, and who had greater means to pursue their interests in 
the legal system.382 It cannot be denied that the common law allows 
views to flourish even when they are repugnant.383 Slavery, racism, 
and gender inequality were all established legal norms in the United 
States and other common law jurisdictions at some point or 
another.384 Even assuming that the common law reflects popular 
rather than elite opinion, there are obvious problems with saying that 
laws which conform to popular expectations are “good” in any 
objective ethical sense—some consensuses, seen later in the light of 
history, are staggeringly immoral. One can argue that popular 
consensuses should not bear on moral judgments.385
However, there is in fact a meaningful relationship between 
consensus and morality when consensus is formed among a wide 
variety of people from various backgrounds, with different cultural 
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priors, who reason independently of one another.386 According to 
Professors Calabresi and Lawson, immoral legal norms, such as 
slavery, sustained themselves for so long because they existed in a 
demographically homogenous legal system dominated by affluent 
white men, a class that was unrepresentative of the full range of 
American society, and because powerful, persisting cultural and 
educational forces sustained them.387 There is reason to be skeptical 
that legal norms, which are the product of a narrow set of similar 
minds, are actually evidentiary of ethical truths.388 However, when 
people from a multitude of backgrounds and contexts all arrive 
independently at the same conclusion, then there is more reason to 
believe that they are guided by the force of the more compelling 
argument, rather than just self-interest, social pressure, or 
conformity.389
In this way, the development of the common law is truly 
analogous to Darwinian evolution.390 As Jonathan Weiner wrote in 
The Beak of the Finch, organisms do not choose the adaptations their 
species will develop through the evolutionary process.391 Biological 
developments that enhance an organism’s ability to survive are 
likelier to be passed on to its offspring than those that hinder its 
survival.392 In the Galapagos Islands, Darwin’s finches did not evolve 
those adaptations that the birds instinctively knew would be 
necessary for survival.393 The process by which natural selection 
operates is altogether different.394 “These cactus finches,” Weiner 
writes, 
all eat more or less the same food when the food is cheap, but in times of 
famine they tend to specialize. Those with significantly longer beaks can 
hammer open the fruits of the cactus and probe the cactus flowers. Those 
with longer and deeper beaks can crack the big, tough cactus seeds. Those 
that have significantly deeper beaks than the others can strip the bark from 
the trees to get at the bugs beneath. . . . [S]light variations can help decide 
who lives and who dies . . . . [F]avorable variations will be more likely to 
be passed down. They will spread through the population, from one 
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generation to the next, while variations that hurt individuals in the 
population will tend to dwindle and die out.395
Obviously, the common law is not the only legitimate source of 
law.396 Nicholas Terrell, in yet another unpublished paper—on law 
and Hayek, written under Professor Calabresi’s supervision and 
suggestion—presents a Hayekian analysis of the law linking private 
law, of which common law is one form; public law or legislation; 
and constitutional law.397 This private law, he says, deals with the 
interactions of individuals in society,398 while legislation regulates 
the organization and undertakings of government.399 Constitutional 
law, meanwhile, “create[s] and constrain[s] the agencies of 
government.”400 It is superior to (or supreme over) legislation and 
cannot be altered through ordinary legislative channels.401 These 
three forms of law serve distinct functions, he says, and in their 
distinctiveness they complement one another.402
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Terrell claims that the authority of the common law, which is a 
form of private law, “exists independent[ly] of the authority of 
legislatures.”403 Because common law “derives its rules from the 
shared expectations of individuals in society,” it can be “dangerous 
to attempt to alter established rules at will through Legislation.”404
All three forms of law are necessary, Terrell says,405 and each “serves 
a distinct function in promoting efficiency in the legal system.”406
However, “the optimal distribution between Common Law, 
Legislation, and Constitutional Law,”407 he says, will recognize that 
the common law “will drive the bulk of legal rules toward efficiency 
even as circumstances change.”408 Terrell argues that though 
inefficient rules will be discarded or modified over time, “these 
changes will increase efficiency by continuously updating the rules 
in light of new information. . . . [S]pontaneous orders such as the 
Common Law are self-correcting and inherently efficient . . . .”409
Legislation, meanwhile, “injects planned order when the 
evolutionary path of Private Law has become stuck in an inefficient 
local maximum, removing it to a path that may seek the global 
maximum.”410 It should generally be left to situations where “some 
changes to the social and legal landscape may be [sic] require such 
divergence from current law that incremental changes would not 
suffice,” where “the path dependence of the Common Law may 
result in dead ends.”411 Legislation also creates a framework for the 
administration of central governance.412 Constitutional law, 
meanwhile, is justified to “provide a floor to the evolutionary 
progress of Private Law and the enacted changes of Legislation by 
prohibiting some potential sets of legal rules . . . [and] define[] the 
boundaries of each branch of government authority and their 
relationships.”413
Like Terrell’s conception of the three types of law,414
Waldron’s conception of the ius gentium rejects a purely positivist 
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Austinian or Hartian conception of law as a system of commands or 
rules laid down by sources of sovereign authority.415 Both Terrell and 
those who would recognize the validity of the ius gentium
understand the law to contain certain elements beyond the power of 
legislatures to alter.416 Both Terrell and Waldron believe that law can 
float freely and independently of legislative authority, legitimized by 
its embodiment of recognized and accepted societal customs, norms, 
and practices.417 Like Terrell, Waldron argues that an important 
quality of law that is not created through legislation is its integrity 
with existing legal conventions.418 Waldron emphasizes the ius 
gentium’s coherence with global legal practices;419 Terrell stresses 
the common law’s fidelity to prevailing social expectations.420
Like the common law, the ius gentium is justified on grounds 
other than the authority of its creator, for there is no sole creator in 
either case. The common law is justified because it “arises 
spontaneously from the expectations of the individuals in society,”421
which allows people to “successfully . . . pursue their plans because 
they can form expectations about the actions of their fellows which 
have a good chance of being met.”422 The ius gentium obviously is 
not justified by the authority of the sovereign who promulgated it, 
since it was not promulgated by any one sovereign. Waldron says it 
is justified because it “represents the accumulated wisdom of the law 
on certain recurrent problems, in much the way that science reflects 
the accumulated results of experiments in hundreds of different 
laboratories checking out and building upon each others’ work.”423
We do not disagree with Waldron on this count, but we would also 
point to another justificatory characteristic of the ius gentium, which 
we believe it shares with the common law. Hayek describes the 
virtue of spontaneous order law in evolutionary terminology: 
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[G]roups which happen to have adopted rules conducive to a more 
effective order of actions will tend to prevail over other groups with a less 
effective order. The rules that will spread will be those governing the 
practice or customs existing in different groups which make some groups 
stronger than others. And certain rules will predominate by more 
successfully guiding expectations in relation to other persons who act 
independently. Indeed, the superiority of certain rules will become evident 
largely in the fact that they will create an effective order not only within a 
closed group but also between people who meet accidentally and do not 
know each other personally.424
We think that, if citation of foreign law catches on among 
American judges to a sufficient degree, the ius gentium would 
similarly facilitate the diffusion and adoption of legal rules shown to 
be efficient in societies that have developed them, as the common 
law already does. 
Of course, constitutional law is unlike common law in that a 
written constitution like the U.S. Constitution is planned at the
outset, and thus, it is doubtful that constitutional orders can ever be 
described as being purely systems of spontaneous order in that 
sense.425 Terrell believes that only private law, such as the common 
law,426 can be formed through systems of spontaneous order;427 if this 
were true, then the Hayekian argument for the ius gentium would 
have no application to constitutional law, as constitutions would be 
wholly systems of planned order that cannot be characterized by 
spontaneous order processes in the first place.428 In fact, however, we 
would argue that the planned order of the Constitution can certainly 
give rise to systems of spontaneous order. Over time, the 
development of jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment as to 
what types of punishment are cruel and unusual, or under the Fourth 
Amendment as to what types of searches or seizures are 
unreasonable, has occurred in an iterative, evolutionary manner, 
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shaped by discourse between actors such as courts, legislatures, 
academics, and common people.429 We would characterize the 
unfolding of this process as a type of spontaneous order, played out 
over time. Although various parts of the Constitution’s text have 
been affixed at different points in time,430 the need to define and fill 
out their meanings have over the centuries given rise to a rich, 
spontaneous jurisprudential order involving the courts, elected 
policymakers, scholarship, and even the people themselves.431
Just as firms—planned orders that buy goods in the 
spontaneously developing free market, characterized by “the 
supersession of the price mechanism,”432—are “‘islands of conscious 
power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter 
coagulating in a pail of buttermilk,’”433 so too, we feel, can 
constitutions be described as planned legal orders whose general 
clauses may give rise to evolutionary or spontaneous systems of 
order construing them.434 Systems of planned order and systems of 
spontaneous order in human society are endlessly intertwined.435
Social ordering requires both kinds of order in different 
circumstances, and it is thus perhaps not very surprising that the two
kinds of order would often coexist.436
F. Empirical Evidence of the Common Law’s Efficiency 
A final, unsurprising point that we will make on the subject of 
the common law for now is that there appears to be empirical 
evidence that the common law does produce efficient economic 
outcomes, and that common law countries fare better economically 
than civil law countries.437 An examination of the G-20 nations finds 
that common law countries have generally a higher GDP per capita 
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than civil law countries.438 When the G-20 countries are ranked 
according to this metric, common law countries, such as the United 
States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, are clustered 
near the top of the list.439 Closer to the bottom are the civil law 
nations Argentina, Russia, Mexico, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia.440
One notable exception to this pattern is India, a common law country 
that is ranked 129th worldwide in terms of GDP per capita, the 
lowest of the G-20 nations.441
Common law jurisdictions may produce superior economic 
outcomes because the common law promotes economic efficiency.442
According to the “interest group” theory of public policy or the 
narrower “producer protection” theory, redistributive government 
actions are commodities that are allocated on the basis of supply and 
demand.443 Compact, organized interests will “outbid” diffuse, “rival 
claimants” for redistributive property—such as “the public”—
because of their greater ability to “overcome free-rider problems”
that impede successful political mobilization.444 Judge Posner says 
that “common law doctrines that satisfy the Pareto-superiority 
criterion . . . are plausible candidates for survival even in a political 
system otherwise devoted to redistribution.”445 Thus, the common 
law is a particularly ineffective method of redistributing wealth.446
For this reason, despite the oft-heard criticism that the common law 
is biased toward the rich and powerful,447 it is actually unlikely to be 
dominated by special interest groups even when legislatures are.448
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Professor Paul G. Mahoney argues that common law legal 
systems experience faster economic growth than those with civil law 
systems.449 Examining the period of time from 1960 through 1992, he 
concludes that even accounting for other variables, GDP grew at a 
more rapid pace in common law countries than in civil law 
countries.450 Mahoney attributes this difference to the common law’s
association with limited government and greater security of property 
and contract rights.451 The common law and the civil law, Mahoney 
argues, are based on fundamentally different conceptions of the roles 
of individuals and the state in economic matters.452 These systems, 
developed in response to specific political challenges of earlier eras, 
have continued to affect institutional arrangements.453 “At an 
ideological or cultural level, the civil-law tradition assumes a larger 
role for the state, defers more to bureaucratic decisions, and elevates 
collective over individual rights. It casts the judiciary into an 
explicitly subordinate role,” Mahoney says.454 “In the common-law 
tradition, by contrast, judicial independence is viewed as essential to 
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the protection of individual liberty.”455 English common law, 
Mahoney argues, was developed during the seventeenth century to 
protect landed aristocrats and merchants against “the Crown’s ability 
to interfere in markets.”456 In contrast, the French civil law, 
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the 
revolutionary generation in France and by Napoleon afterward, 
sought to use the power of the state to modify property rights, 
redistribute wealth, and prevent judicial interference in these 
endeavors.457
This difference, Mahoney says, is reflected in the distinct roles 
of judges in each system.458 “Judges are invested with greater 
prestige and insulated more from political inÀuence in common-law 
systems,”459 he notes; the common law judge “is an independent 
policy maker occupying a high-status office, whereas in the civil-law 
system, the judge is a (relatively) low-status civil servant without 
independent authority to create legal rules.”460 In contrast to the 
common law, for which “security of economic rights was the 
motivating force in [its] development,” Mahoney argues that
“security of executive power from judicial interference was the 
motivating force in the post-Revolution legal developments that 
culminated in the Code Napoleon.”461 This means that common law 
judges have a greater ability to curb government meddling in 
economic matters than their civil law counterparts.462
Building on Mahoney’s insights, others have noted that free-
market relations stand on “safer judicial ground” in common law 
countries for several reasons.463 Common law judges tend to be legal 
practitioners, rather than civil administrators or bureaucrats.464 In 
addition, legal institutions in common law systems evolve gradually 
over time rather than in fits and spurts, and are characterized by the 
development of institutional checks and balances to support private 
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property rights.465 Glaeser and Shleifer trace the divergence in 
outcomes between common law and civil law societies all the way 
back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when England adopted 
the jury system and France adopted Romano-canonical procedure, in 
which justice is more centralized.466 In response, Klerman and 
Mahoney argue that, prior to the French Revolution, justice was 
more centralized in England than in France, and that the divergence 
occurred from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries due 
to political choices.467 Others dispute the relative efficiency 
superiority of common law over civil law, arguing that such 
conclusions are based on “cherry-pick[ed]” information.468 Sarkar, 
meanwhile, finds that common law countries provide better creditor 
protection relating to credit contract and insolvency, while “civil law 
countries . . . provided [better] minority shareholder protection and 
creditor protection relating to debtors’ control.”469 He ultimately 
“questions the proposition that common-law countries provide more 
protection to their shareholders and creditors . . . .”470
The belief that the structure of a society’s legal system 
materially impacts its level of material or economic prosperity is 
borne out by a sizeable body of economic literature indicating that 
the efficiency of the common law produces superior economic 
outcomes in nations whose legal systems use it.471 The essential idea 
that common law produces economic benefits is widely shared.472
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One explanation for the common law’s economic superiority may be 
that it is a system by which “many activities depending on dispersed 
knowledge can be effectively integrated into a single order.”473 The 
common law system benefits from the ability to reach across broad 
temporal and geographic distances to capitalize on the collective 
wisdom of multitudes of jurists, as it does not suffer for “the 
unalterable ignorance of any single mind, or any organization that 
can direct human action, of the immeasurable multitude of particular 
facts which must determine the order of its activities.”474
We believe that the ius gentium, like the common law which 
Hayek describes as “existing independently of anyone’s will and at 
the same time binding upon and developed by the independent 
courts,”475 can be understood as a system of spontaneous legal order 
able to process larger amounts of disparate bits of information than 
any central planner could. The ius gentium may allow American 
judges to utilize knowledge from the global jurisprudential universe 
rather than the more limited set of knowledge within our domestic 
legal universe. The benefit of allowing American courts to access the 
information contained within foreign legal judgments may well be 
more efficient judicial decision-making. Hayek understood that 
while “[c]omplete rationality of action in the Cartesian sense 
demands complete knowledge of all the relevant facts,” the truth is 
that “the success of action in society depends on more particular 
facts than anyone can possibly know.”476 But although “the necessary 
and irremediable ignorance on everyone’s part of most of the 
particular facts which determine the actions of all the several 
members of human society”477 is an unavoidable reality, a 
spontaneous “order will utilize the separate knowledge of all its 
several members, without this knowledge ever being concentrated in 
a single mind, or being subject to those processes of deliberate 
coordination and adaptation which a mind performs.”478 Law,479 like 
language or free markets,480 is a spontaneously arising system of 
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order that makes “[t]he utilization of factual knowledge widely 
dispersed among millions of individuals . . . clearly possible.”481
There are today dozens of constitutional democracies with bills 
of rights and judicial review inspired by the American examples. 
These countries have separately and independently written bills of 
rights, and their supreme courts, or constitutional courts, have 
separately interpreted national constitutions in deciding cases. We 
believe that all the preconditions for a Hayekian, constitutional 
spontaneous order may very well have been met. The ius gentium 
thus has many of the attributes that Hayek attributes to systems of 
spontaneous order. 
III. THE IUS GENTIUM AS SPONTANEOUS ORDER
The relevance of Hayek’s theory of spontaneous order to the 
ius gentium should be clear. The emerging global ius gentium on 
constitutional and human rights issues that Waldron identifies may 
be itself to some extent a spontaneous system of order.482 It is 
emerging spontaneously and independently in different courts in 
sovereign nation states all over the world, unguided by any global 
sovereign or supreme court proclaiming it.483
We posit that the ius gentium’s development is analogous to a 
spontaneous order in that it “constantly adapts itself, and functions 
through adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety are 
not known to anybody.”484 For this reason, as Hayek makes clear, it
may be information and knowledge superior in the way that a market 
is superior to a Soviet-style planned economy.485 In such a state-run 
economy, prices do not “serve . . . as indicators of what ought to be 
done in the present circumstances”486 because a planner or 
government czar determines prices. In free market systems, however, 
they are signals that summarize millions, billions, even, of highly 
diffused pieces of information.487 This is why prices can effectively 
coordinate economic activity in free markets, but are virtually 
useless for doing so in planned economies.488
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We believe there is also an element of democratic consent 
when so many different countries all arrive at such strikingly similar 
rules. The constitutions and bills of rights of Germany, India, South 
Africa, Canada, Israel, Japan, Brazil, and France, as well as the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms, were all 
adopted at different times, by different constitutional conventions, 
independently of one another. Germany’s Basic Law, for instance, 
was approved in 1949,489 four years after the end of World War II. 
The South African Constitution was ratified by the Constitutional 
Assembly in 1996 and took effect in 1997.490 In accordance with the 
Harrari Decision, Israel’s Constitution is technically a work in 
progress, though the country has enacted several Basic Laws since 
then.491
And yet, despite differences in constitutional origin, nations 
often reach remarkably similar conclusions on issues of 
constitutional significance. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect the right to assistance in committing 
suicide.492 Many other constitutional courts, or their equivalents, have 
reached similar judgments on the merits with regard to the right to 
euthanasia, including Canada (Rodriguez v. British Columbia),493
Hungary (Decision 22/2003),494 and the European Court of Human 
Rights (Pretty v. United Kingdom).495 Likewise, constitutional court 
decisions protecting the right to homosexual sexual intimacy have 
been handed down in the United States (Lawrence v. Texas)496 and 
South Africa (National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. 
Minister of Justice & Others),497 as well as by the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations (Toonen v. Australia)498 and the 
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European Court of Human Rights (Dudgeon v. United Kingdom).499
Numerous constitutional courts around the world have either found 
or recognized some form of a right to counsel appointed and paid for 
by the state for criminal defendants, including courts in South Africa 
(State v. Wessel Albertus Vermaas),500 Japan (Ogawa et al. v. Japan 
[Defense Rejection Case]),501 India (Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot 
v. Maharashtra),502 Australia (Dietrich v The Queen),503 and the 
United States (Powell v. Alabama, Gideon v. Wainwright, Brewer v. 
Williams).504
In 2011, ruling that “it is not fair or just that a criminal case 
should be decided against an accused in the absence of a counsel,”505
the Indian Supreme Court cited Powell, Gideon, and Brewer506 and 
noted that the right to counsel has long roots and “has existed in 
England for over three centuries.”507 It noted that in ancient Rome, 
there were “great lawyers e,g, [sic] Cicero, Scaevola, Crassus, etc. 
who defended the accused,” and that “[e]ven in the Nuremberg trials 
the Nazi war criminals, responsible for killing millions of persons, 
were yet provided counsel.”508 It concluded that, in affirming an 
accused’s right to be provided counsel, the Court was “not bringing 
into existence a new principle but simply recognizing what already 
existed and which civilized people have long enjoyed.”509
Obviously, very few legal norms find expression in the laws of 
all the countries of the world. Unanimous consent on issues of 
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fundamental constitutional questions is rare, if not nonexistent. Even 
broad global consensuses that fall just short of unanimity, such as 
that which the Supreme Court found to exist with regard to the 
juvenile death penalty in Roper,510 are very uncommon. Nonetheless, 
when a large number of nations agree on a legal approach to a 
common problem, perhaps we ought to pay attention and at least take 
their judgments, as well as the processes of reasoning by which those 
decisions were reached, into consideration. When a diverse body of 
nations from across the globe, with different histories, languages, 
economic systems, social orders, religious practices, and cultural 
traditions, reaches the same conclusion on a matter of fundamental 
constitutional importance, the result is characterized by something 
resembling democratic consent. The common aspect of so many 
different legal systems can be compared to the outcome of an open 
democratic election with participation by a diverse cross-section of 
citizens. The fact that so many nations, markedly different in other 
respects, all reach the same legal outcome may indicate that there is 
something inherently wise, just, or efficient about it. 
A. A Hayekian Argument for the Ius Gentium
Spontaneous systems of order are able to absorb and to utilize 
large quantities of dispersed knowledge to reach better outcomes 
than any planner could preordain and design.511 On the basis of this 
principle, we believe that when an American court examines the laws 
and judicial decisions of foreign sovereign nation states, it gains 
knowledge of sorts that it did not possess before by learning about 
how other societies dealt with a problem similar to that which 
confronts it now. If we believe, as Posner and Sunstein do, that the 
“the practices of others provide relevant information, and that courts 
ought not to ignore such information,”512 then we would argue that 
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same effect occurs when an American court looks at the laws and 
rules of the fifty U.S. states for guidance in deciding a case.513 This is 
something U.S. courts do all the time, including in the decision of 
constitutional cases.514
We argue that looking toward other countries’ laws and judicial 
decisions gives us a broader base of knowledge from which point we 
can then make our own decisions. The ius gentium may thus be smart 
in the way that free markets are smart.515 Market economies are 
efficient because they “enable[] each individual to gain from the skill 
and knowledge of others whom he need not even know and whose 
aims could be wholly different from his own”;516 we would argue that 
likewise, by borrowing or perusing the works of other competent 
courts, the ius gentium allows a court to outsource the intellectual 
labor necessary to reach a fuller understanding of the issue then 
before it. Waldron already acknowledges that when foreign courts do 
cite each other’s judgments, they do so because “[t]hey share a sense 
of drawing down from the same body of intellectual legal resources, 
a sense that each country is contributing to a common storehouse, 
and they cannot imagine doing without it.”517 In this sense, his 
argument embraces the wisdom and virtue of spontaneous orders,518
though we think he would do well to elaborate on this point and 
express it more clearly.519
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519. Although Waldron speaks of “shar[ing] a sense of drawing down from 
the same body of intellectual legal resources,” he seems more focused on the idea of 
a shared methodology, a “lawyer’s method—analysis, abstraction, analogy,” rather 
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According to neoclassical theory, free market outsourcing often 
occurs because the cost of foreign labor is cheaper than the cost of 
domestic labor.520 Another reason it might occur, however, is if there 
is simply too small a supply of domestic labor on hand, in which 
case it may become necessary to hire foreign workers to perform part 
of a larger task.521 In law, the task of reaching a fully informed 
understanding of the relevant legal issue and principles in a 
particular case is so immense that only Dworkin’s fictitious Judge 
Hercules could perform it perfectly.522 In reality, judges are called 
upon to approximate this task to the best of their ability given the 
limited resources, including time and knowledge, they possess. It is 
understood that they may never reach the goal to which they strive—
a perfect balancing of facts, laws, and principles that produces the 
perfect result in a given situation—but strive they must nonetheless, 
for the metric by which their aptitude as jurists is measured is how 
close they come to this ideal. The ideal is the judge’s asymptote, 
something she can approach but never quite actually touch. 
Here, the purpose of outsourcing an American court’s
intellectual work is not that the U.S. court is less capable of reaching 
a fair decision than one of its foreign counterparts. Rather, it is that 
the task before it may be too immense for any one body to complete 
on its own. Can two, or three, or more? Probably not—it is an 
impossible task. But the more knowledge is shared—the more 
information the court takes in—the better it may perform this task as 
the economic transactions of individuals in a market sync up with 
each other, without formal coordination, to maximize total welfare.523
It has been observed in recent decades that Americans are 
similarly sorting themselves along demographic lines, through no 
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central planning, to form homogenous communities compatible with 
their preferred values, beliefs, and lifestyles.524 Bill Bishop chronicles 
these trends in self-selection in The Big Sort, the thesis of which is 
that “[o]ver the past thirty years, the United States has been sorting 
itself, sifting at the most microscopic levels of society . . . in every 
corner of society, people [are] creating new, more homogenous 
relations.”525 Demographic sorting, Bishop suggests, is producing 
remarkably homogeneous communities not just at the regional level, 
but also within cities and even in neighborhoods.526 “As Americans 
have moved over the past three decades, they have clustered in 
communities of sameness, among people with similar ways of life, 
beliefs, and, in the end, politics.”527 This sorting does not merely 
involve decisions such as where to live, Bishop argues, but even 
what churches and civic organizations to join.528 While this wide-
scale demographic sorting may contribute to an increase in political 
polarization as people become less able to understand those who are 
unlike them,529 we argue that it has the undeniable benefit of 
efficiently distributing social goods to those for whom they produce 
the greatest utility. In much the same way, we feel that legal 
borrowing may enhance courts’ abilities to locate and capitalize on 
relevant and illuminative information contained in foreign judgments 
to reach the best and most efficient legal outcomes.530
We feel there is also something inherently capitalistic and 
democratic about the idea of allowing different approaches to 
compete in the marketplace of ideas, with those approaches that are 
most attractive tending to wind up widely adopted or copied. In the 
words of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, “‘[i]deas are ideas . . . and 
whatever their source, whether they come from foreign law, or 
international law, or a trial judge in Alabama . . . if it persuades 
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you . . . then you’re going to adopt its reasoning. If it doesn’t fit, then 
you won’t use it.’”531 When there is a problem that many nations face 
in some form or another, then as Posner and Sunstein say, “the 
practices of other states provide valuable information. . . . [W]hen 
many courts have adopted a course of action, it makes a great deal of 
sense to attend to their shared practice.”532 We believe, as Waldron 
does, that a legal approach found in other countries may sometimes 
be part “of a common stock of doctrine and principle that we draw 
from . . . [that] has established itself as a tried and tested result.”533
Otherwise, why would it be so widely adopted? 
Information may be valuable, but as Calabresi and Terrell 
observe, it “is expensive to obtain in both time and money . . . [and] 
must be acquired through the expenditure of scarce resources, 
particularly time and effort.”534 The term “rational ignorance” refers 
to the idea that “[o]nce the marginal cost of acquiring additional 
information becomes greater than its marginal value, . . . [one] has 
no incentive to learn more.”535 In Knowledge and Decisions, Thomas 
Sowell argues that a primary advantage of contemporary civilization 
over more primitive eras is “not necessarily that each civilized man 
has more knowledge but that he requires far less.”536 We posit that 
one virtue of the ius gentium is that it is, as Sowell describes 
civilization, “an enormous device for economizing on knowledge.”537
As Sowell notes, today “the civilized accountant or electronics 
expert, etc., need know little beyond his accounting or electronics.”538
We do not need to understand the complex web of “technical, 
economic, and political intricacies” that explain, to use Sowell’s
examples, how “food reaches [our] local supermarket,” or how our 
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homes are constructed, or the “mechanical and electrical principals”
by which our electronic devices work, which we “neither 
understand[] theoretically nor can cope with as a practical matter.”539
Our frequent “complaints and scandals about appliance, automobile, 
and other repair services testify,” Sowell asserts, to our “utter lack of 
knowledge of the everyday apparatus on which [we] depend[].”540 In 
contrast, primitive humans had to understand “the production and 
use of spears, grass huts, . . . which berries are poisonous, which 
snakes dangerous, or the ways and means of coexistence in the same 
jungle with lions, tigers, and gorillas.”541 As Sowell makes clear, 
modern individuals have less general knowledge but more 
specialized, complex knowledge than their ancestors.542
Modern individuals, Sowell intuits, have farmed out the task of 
acquiring certain specific bits of knowledge to others.543
Specialization minimizes “[t]he time and effort (including costly 
mistakes) necessary to acquire knowledge . . . through drastic 
limitations on the amount of duplication of knowledge among the 
members of society.”544 Today, a “relative handful of civilized people 
know how to produce food, a different handful how to produce 
clothing, medicine, electronics, houses, etc.”545 Accordingly, “[t]he 
huge costs saved by not having to duplicate given knowledge and 
experience widely through the population makes possible the higher 
development of that knowledge among the various subsets of people 
in the respective specialties.”546
In order to understand how decisions are made, Sowell says, it 
is necessary to first understand “decision-making units,” the “various 
combinations of individuals repeatedly and habitually mak[ing] 
certain classes of decisions.”547 Though we often ascribe various 
decisions to “society,” the fact is “[t]here is no one named ‘society’
who decides anything.”548 Decisions are made by smaller groups,549
“which may range from a married couple to a police department to a 
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national government.”550 Decision-making units, Sowell says, “are 
highly diverse” and are characterized by “the specific, respective sets 
of constraints and incentives within which each operates.”551
“Constitutionalism . . . in effect acknowledge[s] and 
underscore[s]” the “substantial advantages and disadvantages” to 
different decision-making units and “decision-making relationships, 
institutionally coexisting within even the most monolithic 
societies.”552 Accordingly,  
[c]onstitutional political and legal systems attempt to limit their own scope 
to areas in which they have a relative advantage as decision-making 
processes, leaving other areas to other decision-making processes, whose 
advantages may be either in the quality of the decisions or in the personal 
dignity implied by free choice.553  
They do not attempt to define the legal particulars of “other areas in 
which the discretion and flexibility of individual choice[s] and 
interpersonal negotiation may achieve whatever arrangements are 
deemed mutually satisfactory by the individuals concerned.”554 Some 
constitutional provisions are structured as “determinate rules”;555 for 
example, the requirements that the President be at least thirty-five 
years old.556 In contrast, under the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”557 We posit that the discretion provided by the Tenth 
Amendment to states capitalizes on “the persistence of knowledge 
advantages by . . . subordinate units”—i.e., states—which are more 
“immediately in daily contact with the relevant facts [and] can much 
more easily and more cheaply synthesize the knowledge and draw 
inferences.”558 The whole Constitution itself is remarkable for its 
brevity. The original unamended document, including signatures, is 
only 4,543 words long.559
The ius gentium lowers the cost of attaining information by 
relying on disparate pieces of knowledge that have been aggregated 
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from a multitude of sources.560 Although individual societies know 
far more than individual people do, we argue that there may still be 
conditions under which nations can profit from the “knowledge”
found in the experiences of other nations. We believe the ius gentium
may allow courts to effectively outsource the task of acquiring 
knowledge to foreign judiciaries for less than the cost of acquiring 
that information themselves. By expanding the scope of knowledge 
American courts may take into account when deliberating over 
decisions, the ius gentium may reduce the cost to the American legal 
system of acquiring knowledge. 
“Courts which devote the time and effort required to reach the 
highest possible standard of judicial decisions,” Sowell writes, “can 
develop a backlog of cases.”561 Sowell says this with respect to 
“minor cases,”562 but it seems to be true of major decisions as well. 
The judicial search for information that may bear on a trial’s
outcome is a difficult and unending undertaking that involves costs 
of its own; Sowell writes that “[l]ofty intellectual standards, rigidly 
adhered to, may mean rejection of evidence and methods of analysis 
which would give us valuable clues to complex social phenomena—
leaving us instead to make policy decisions in ignorance or by guess 
or emotion.”563 We believe that the consideration of relevant 
information from foreign legal sources may in some circumstances, 
where the constitutional text permits it, facilitate the attainment of 
just outcomes. Strict adherence to judicial nativism—rejecting useful 
knowledge that pertains to a particular domestic legal query simply 
because it is of foreign origin—could force American courts to make 
judicial decisions in part on the basis of ignorance because they lack 
all relevant information. 
We feel that basing decisions on greater quantities of 
knowledge contained in the ius gentium, acquired at little cost, is 
more efficient than limiting ourselves to examining only the subset 
of that total knowledge found only in American sources of law, and 
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ought to produce better legal outcomes. When the cost of legal 
information is reduced and courts have a wider base of knowledge on 
which to reach judgments, they ought to produce wiser decisions. 
Applying Sowell’s framework to the ius gentium, we think that when 
foreign legal decisions are readily available to provide useful and 
instructive knowledge to domestic courts, we can achieve “drastic 
limitations on the amount of duplication of knowledge among the 
members” of the international community.564
Sowell notes that “decision-making units” also differ in terms 
of the “authentication processes and . . . feedback mechanisms,”
which allow us “to modify decisions already made.”565 In economic 
systems, consumer behavior can provide “incremental” feedback, as 
Sowell says, “[t]he consumer, by choosing among firms to patronize, 
implicitly weighs the effectiveness of different sets of workers and 
managers, rewarding some with fuller, more sustained employment, 
and forcing others to work less or not at all . . . for lack of consumer 
demand can force the institution itself out of business.”566
“[E]conomic transactions often involve repeated satisfaction of 
the same desires,” Sowell observes; therefore, “there is continual 
feedback from those most knowledgeable about the extent to which a 
given product or service is satisfactory—namely, the consumers.”567
The judicial system, we would argue, is itself one gigantic 
“knowledge process, based on estimation and feedback,”568 for 
reexamining the law. In this respect as well, we feel that the ius 
gentium may also be beneficial, for it might improve the overall 
efficiency of the feedback process. The inclusion of information on 
the effects of alternative legal rules, and of specific legal rules in 
certain contexts, into decision-making deliberations could optimize 
the fit and quality of the legal outcomes that the judicial feedback 
process produces. 
B. Limits on the Hayekian Approach
Obviously, the ius gentium will not illuminate the meaning of 
the text of the U.S. Constitution in all or even in most circumstances. 
There are common controversies that sovereign nations settle very 
differently from one another, so that it is not clear that any sort of 
                                                     
564. Id. at 7. 
565. Id. at 17. 
566. Id. at 34. 
567. Id. at 35. 
568. Id. at 70. 
Hayek and the Citation of Foreign Law 77
international consensus has emerged, and indeed, the issue may just 
not be the sort of issue that lends itself to consensus. But when the 
bulk of nations does favor one approach over another, it is at least 
worth asking the question, why this way? In free markets, the best 
products—those that are the cheapest, most efficient, and best able to 
satisfy consumers’ demands—tend to win out over inferior products, 
which die out altogether if few people find them attractive. Why 
should the same principle not apply to judge-made law as well where 
the Constitution uses language that is ambiguous? 
Let us go back briefly to Coase’s theory of the firm.569
Essentially, Coase argues that the cost of coordinating resources 
using the market is sometimes so high that it outweighs the benefits 
of doing so, so that “certain marketing costs are saved.”570 When this
is so, “forming an organisation and allowing some authority . . . to 
direct the resources” makes more sense.571 One can make an analogy 
between Coase’s theory of the firm and Waldron’s ius gentium.
There are many areas of a country’s law where the cost of 
coordinating through the global marketplace of legal ideas may “cost 
something”—such as the ability to account for various “tastes, 
conditions, and preferences”;572 promote international “competition”
for “the optimal governmental bundle of public goods”;573 or “lower 
monitoring costs”574—or where the benefits may be too low. For 
example, our tripartite structure of government, with separation of 
powers, checks and balances, and multiple levels of federalism, 
would not be something we would wish to alter or abolish even if 
most other nations followed the Westminster system—we might find 
that the cost of such a change would be too high.  
Likewise, it might not make sense for us to drive on the left 
side of the road even if most other nations did; Suri Ratnapala notes
that people drive on the left side of the road in Australia and on the 
right in the United States, “[y]et each law is valid within its own 
sphere of operation.”575 He says that “the laws of one nation may 
contradict laws of another nation without invalidating them.”576 We 
would add that this is so in part because the paltry benefits of 
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adopting a uniform rule for driving do not seem to be worth it. 
Likewise, it might not be worth it to replace our adversarial legal 
system of procedure even though many other sovereign nations have 
inquisitorial systems of procedure—not necessarily because the costs 
are exceedingly high, but because the benefits such changes would 
bring seem quite low. Certainly, there is more coordination that a 
nation must perform internally through its own legal system than a 
typical firm does through its structure. 
With this qualification in place, however, we believe that there 
are times when a country, like a firm, can benefit from coordinating 
certain activities through an external spontaneous order, especially 
when the question is one of “general knowledge” rather than 
“specific knowledge.”577 Sowell notes that most people cannot 
produce food, clothing, electronics, medicine, or houses on their 
own;578 we believe that likewise, no country on its own possesses 
enough knowledge of the different choices available when a legal 
question is posed to a court and the consequences thereof, legal and 
practical. When facing a matter that has never been raised in an 
American court before but has been raised elsewhere, we think there 
will be times when an American judge cannot just look to his own 
country’s court decisions for guidance, for there just may not be 
enough information available to make any sort of informed choice. 
In these circumstances, as Justice Breyer has explained, an 
American judge might learn something about a certain issue by 
considering how “‘a judge, though of a different country, has had to 
consider a similar problem’” to the one before him.579 Even though 
the foreign judge’s reasoning will not be binding on the American 
judge, Justice Breyer reasons, the American judge may still “‘learn 
something.’”580 Another way to think of this is that such a judge 
would be drawing on the spontaneous order of the ius gentium to 
coordinate an action that the planned order of the U.S. legal system 
is on its own incapable of performing well. Sowell notes that in a 
“civilization,” individuals can rely on others for knowledge they do 
not themselves have, such as that which pertains to the “technical, 
economic, and political intricacies” through which his home is 
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built.581 We would extend Sowell’s point further and argue that by
borrowing the knowledge of those with different experiences from 
ours, experiences that may be relevant to our own current situation 
and therefore useful to know, we use the external spontaneous order 
to take advantage of knowledge that we do not currently possess 
ourselves. We think that sovereign nation states may benefit from 
using the ius gentium to coordinate certain actions, just as “[o]utside 
the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated 
through a series of exchange transactions on the market.”582 We 
believe that at least at some level, there may indeed be what Waldron 
calls “a body of law emerging from legal systems in general”583 and 
that it may in some respects be a spontaneous order of rules. 
Waldron’s theory would be greatly strengthened by taking this 
Hayekian argument into account. 
Of course, Justice Breyer acknowledges that even where a 
foreign court grapples with “‘a legal problem, often similar to 
problems that arise here,’” he believes “‘that the decisions of foreign 
courts do not bind American courts.’”584 Justice Breyer, while 
debating the appropriateness of learning relevant information from a 
foreign judge about an analogous case with a U.S. Congressman, was 
allegedly told, “‘Fine. You are right. Read it. Just don’t cite it in your 
opinion.’”585 If looking to sources of foreign law is valuable because 
they may contain useful information that may help us resolve what 
Justice Breyer says are “‘difficult questions without obvious 
answers, where much is to be said on both sides of the issue,’”586 it 
seems to us that this information—whether it be fact, logical 
deduction, or something else—also exists independently of the actual 
foreign court decision in which it is invoked, such that the decision 
itself needn’t be cited. This seems to have been the Congressman’s 
point.587 Perhaps it is acceptable for American courts to look to the 
decisions of foreign courts but not cite them directly; maybe 
American courts should instead simply rely on the same strength of 
reasoning that those courts use. This is an attractive proposition to 
us, since it would require domestic legal judgments to stand or fall 
on the basis of their own inherent strength and reasonableness 
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without relying on the borrowed credibility of a foreign court like a 
crutch. Ultimately, however, we think it is a good idea for domestic 
courts “to be open about the reasons they use,” as Waldron says, 
because having “transparent citation of reasons for arriving at a 
decision is one of the most important aspects of adjudication—not 
least because it enables counsel appearing before a court to know 
what sort of arguments they should make.”588 We strongly agree that 
courts should be honest about the reasons they use to arrive at the 
conclusions they reach. If U.S. courts can, and ought to, cite 
Blackstone589 and legal academics,590 neither of which have 
“‘democratic provenance,’” according to Justice Breyer,591 or 
“treatises”592 and “law review articles,”593 both of which Justice 
Breyer reads,594 it is hard to see why citing the ius gentium is more 
objectionable. 
We also would say that Sowell’s theory also cautions against 
some possible negative implications of the validity of the ius 
gentium. There is asymmetry of knowledge between higher- and 
lower-level decision-making units, Sowell says, in the sense that 
although “[t]he powers of the higher units may encompass all the 
powers of the subordinate units, . . . they almost never encompass all 
the knowledge.”595 Higher-level decision-making units will often lack 
knowledge that lower-level units possess, Sowell says, because there 
may be “a prohibitive cost to the higher unit of independently 
acquiring the same knowledge . . . there are differences in their 
respective costs of acquiring knowledge . . . which vary according to 
the kind of knowledge in question.”596  
Higher-level units, Sowell says, have a “cost advantage” with 
respect to the acquisition of “[g]eneral knowledge,” such as 
“expertise[ or] statistics”—knowledge that is broadly applicable in a 
variety of settings and conditions, because they can draw from a 
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broader pool of information.597 However, subordinate decision-
making units have a comparative cost advantage regarding the 
acquisition of “specific knowledge”—information on “the local life 
style, the reliability of particular suppliers, [or] the level of skill of a 
given executive”—because they are “in daily contact with the 
relevant facts[, they] can much more easily and more cheaply 
synthesize the knowledge and draw inferences.”598 Sowell says that  
most decisions involve mixtures of the two kinds of knowledge, so that the 
net advantages of the larger and smaller units vary with the kind of 
decision, and [that] the effectiveness of hierarchical subordination varies 
with the extent to which the subordinate unit has knowledge advantages 
over the higher unit.599  
For example, Sowell says, agricultural production relies to a great 
extent on specific knowledge—about the characteristics of particular 
plot of land, local weather, and specific crops—that changes from 
season to season or even more often.600 Sowell’s contrasting example 
is steel manufacturing, which he says is more amenable to central 
planning because the knowledge that is required—the proper 
combinations of ore and coal at certain temperatures—is far more 
general.601
Many questions that courts address depend on highly context-
specific information where knowledge gleaned from foreign 
judgments may not be useful.602 If a domestic court is hearing a case 
whose circumstances are distinctly American, we are concerned that 
the introduction of foreign legal materials may be counterproductive, 
leading it to draw inappropriate legal conclusions. Of course, 
circumstances in which very general, rather than specific, legal 
knowledge is dispositive to a particular domestic legal outcome may 
on the other hand require that efficient decision-making pay heed to 
a global, cross-border judicial order, because the international legal 
community faces lower costs in collecting extensive general 
knowledge. When this is so, we believe we may benefit from the 
adoption and application of foreign decisions in our courts.603
However, we suspect that courts will usually need more specific, 
rather than more general, information. When this is true, the ius 
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gentium may result in an overreliance by domestic judges on general 
information from foreign legal sources rather than more relevant 
local, specific information. 
Second, more information does not necessarily translate into 
more knowledge. Sowell distinguishes between “ideas,” or “raw 
information,” and “knowledge,” or ideas that have been 
“authenticated.”604 Like physical matter, which consists of “mostly 
empty space,” Sowell says that “specks of knowledge are scattered 
through a vast emptiness of ignorance.”605 Yet just as these 
microscopic “specks of matter . . . have such incredible density and 
weight, and are linked to one another by such powerful forces” that 
they produce the properties of physical substances, discrete pieces of 
genuine knowledge can also be “powerfully linked and 
coordinated.”606
However, the “superabundance” of ideas “makes the 
production of knowledge more difficult rather than easier.”607 A large 
number of ideas, Sowell says, “will have to be discarded somewhere 
in the process of producing authenticated knowledge.”608 Sowell’s
process of authentication filters out “facts”609 from “visions,”610
“theories,”611 “myths,”612 “illusions,”613 and “falsehoods.”614 Given the 
variety of types of information, “[a]uthentication is as important as 
the raw information itself.”615 Sometimes the unavailability of a 
proper authentication process can make it difficult to distinguish 
valuable facts from rubbish; an example Sowell provides is the 
inability of the War Department to anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack 
despite “knowledge of the impending attack.”616 Sometimes lack of 
authentication can be dangerous, Sowell says, such as when a flock 
of geese picked up on an “American warning system to detect 
incoming nuclear missiles . . . could have ended in World War III.”617
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By giving judges access to the whole of human legal thought across 
all nations, the ius gentium may blur the lines between relevant 
knowledge and irrelevant information, swamping the capacities of 
judges to differentiate the two. When there is so much information 
available, it can in our opinion become more difficult to tell what is 
important and what is not. The ius gentium aspires to allow judges to 
use “such information as is available in the world to inform these 
unavoidable speculations.”618 If judges lack the ability to distinguish 
the “specks of knowledge” from the “vast emptiness of ignorance,”619
we worry that the ius gentium may lead to worse judicial outcomes. 
Finally, the ius gentium presents a problem of democratic 
responsiveness: Foreign sources of law are obviously much less 
responsive to the will of U.S. citizens than American law. Self-
determination in governance is the hallmark of a free and sovereign 
people; American legislatures, including Congress, are accountable 
to voters. For this reason, we would expect that American laws tend 
to reflect the policy preferences of American citizens. We feel that 
the problem of democratic responsiveness with respect to the ius 
gentium is twofold. Sowell worries that “the size of government 
affects the ability of the citizens to monitor what it does.”620 We 
similarly worry that expanding the scope of materials that courts may 
consider raises the costs to citizens of monitoring what the courts do. 
When courts have more sources of information at their disposal that 
are unfamiliar to our own customs and traditions, it becomes harder 
for observers to understand precisely what they are doing. 
Second, the use of foreign legal materials reduces the 
responsiveness of the courts to public opinion by making judicial 
decisions dependent on laws in which Americans have no say in 
creating. Though Americans determine the substantive content of our 
law through the electoral process, we have no control over foreign 
law. Sowell is concerned that “[e]ven within democratic nations, the 
locus of decision making has drifted away from the individual, the 
family, and voluntary associations of various sorts, and toward 
government.”621 And even within governments, he says, “it has 
moved away from elected officials subject to voter feedback, and 
toward more insulated governmental institutions, such as 
bureaucracies and the appointed judiciary.”622 We recognize the 
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legitimacy of the fear that just as the centralization of official power 
in administrative agencies and the judiciary may reduce the 
democratic responsiveness of government to citizen opinions,623
expanding the role of foreign legal materials, for which no American 
has voted, in our own judicial process could further reduce the 
institutional responsiveness of courts to democratic opinion. 
IV. PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE AND THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
Waldron rightly mentions “the accumulated wisdom of the 
world” as an argument in favor of consulting the ius gentium,624 an 
idea we touched upon briefly before but will now explore in greater 
depth. We believe that “the wisdom of crowds”625 is one possible 
justification for the reliance on the law of foreign sovereign nation 
states by American courts as part of the ius gentium.626 What we are 
talking about is the idea “that many minds and many bases for 
perception are better than a few and that consideration of the 
‘wisdom of the multitude’ provides a good justification” for some 
kinds of decisions.627 As Aristotle wrote, 
For the many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, 
when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not 
individually but collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are 
better than feasts provided at one person’s expense. For being many, each 
of them can have some part of virtue and practical wisdom, and when they 
come together, the multitude is just like a single human being, with many 
feet, hands, and senses, and so too for their character traits and wisdom. 
That is why the many are better judges of works of music and of the poets. 
For one of them judges one part, another another, and all of them the 
whole thing.628
Aristotle was not talking about the citation of foreign law here, but 
like Waldron,629 we see relevance in Aristotle’s argument that a 
multitude of experiences with regard to a decision at hand may be 
helpful to charting a correct course of action. 
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From this, Waldron has derived the following proposition: 
“The people acting as a body are capable of making better decisions, 
by pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight, than any 
individual member of the body, however excellent, is capable of 
making on his own.”630 As Waldron notes, this claim is actually more 
modest than Aristotle’s initial supposition, since it argues for the 
many against the monarch and not for the many against the 
aristocracy, a more difficult argument given the possibility for crowd 
wisdom to apply to the aristocracy’s decisions as well.631 Waldron 
restates it, however, as follows: “The people acting as a body are 
capable of making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, 
experience, and insight, than any subset of them acting as a body and 
pooling the knowledge, experience, and insight of the members of 
the subset.”632
The justification for this argument goes beyond merely the 
virtue of variety. After all, as Waldron points out, a potluck dinner 
may not always be better than a carefully planned one.633 In any case, 
this metaphor seems a little trite as a defense for the broader point 
that groups are likely to make wiser decisions than any given subsets 
of their members.634 But as Waldron points out, Aristotle makes 
another analogy that does strike closer to the core of the case for the 
wisdom of the multitude: “‘[T]he many are better judges than a 
single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and 
some another, and among them they understand the whole.’”635 Many 
circumstances that require the making of a decision are of a 
“multifaceted character,” Waldron says, “and no one man, however 
wise, can be trusted to notice” every aspect of the situation.636 “This 
is obvious enough in the case of policy decisions,” Waldron says,
such as whether to go to war—
[O]ne citizen may be familiar with the Sicilian coastline; another with the 
military capacities of the Sicilians; a third with the cost and difficulty of 
naval expeditions; a fourth with the bitterness of military failure; a fifth 
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with the dangers to a democratic state of successful military conquest; and 
so on.637
More interestingly, Waldron notes that this logic applies to ethical 
concerns as well, such as to judgments based on equity.638 When a 
public policy is proposed, a “merchant may not realize how much 
some measure he is initially inclined to support may prejudice the 
situation of a farmer until he hears it from the farmer’s own 
mouth.”639 When large groups deliberate over policy choices, 
Waldron suggests, they might discover “how each person’s well-
being may be affected by the matter under consideration.”640 Perhaps 
if Waldron’s merchant learns that a policy he had been inclined to 
favor will have a deleterious impact on the farmer, he may be less 
inclined to support it.641 Waldron’s implication is that through 
deliberation, participants are able to do more than just voice their 
perspectives; as they do so, they can also shape and alter the views of 
their peers.642
The label that is “traditionally used for the doctrine—’the 
summation argument’” implies that deliberation consists merely of 
the mechanical “aggregation of what each person brings to the 
argument,”643 the already fully formed experiences and ideas that 
each person brings to the table. However, this is too simple—
according to Waldron,  
[D]eliberation among the many is a way of bringing each citizen’s ethical 
views and insights . . . to bear on the views and insights of each of the 
others, so that they cast light on each other, providing a basis for 
reciprocal questioning and criticism, and enabling a position to emerge 
which is better than any of the inputs and much more than an aggregation 
or function of those inputs.644  
Waldron seems to be saying, in other words, that the value of 
deliberation is that it enables individuals to alter their views in light 
of new information shared by others.645 To paraphrase him a bit, what 
emerges from this process are new, organic, hybrid ideas that draw 
                                                     
637. Id.
638. Id. at 567-68. 




643. Id. at 569. 
644. Id. at 569-70. 
645. See id.
Hayek and the Citation of Foreign Law 87
on the combined wisdom of all deliberative participants and are 
greater than the sum of their parts.646
An important implication of Waldron’s summation argument, 
which he points out, is that if one connects it to a “forward-looking 
view of merit,” we see that “merit [is] not a backward-looking 
concept,” nor is it “necessarily an individualized concept.”647 What 
this means, he says, is that the doctrine of the wisdom of the 
multitude holds even when new participants in the deliberative 
process are not particularly wise.648 Waldron offers the following 
hypothetical:
Take two individuals, Brown and Jones, the former a man of modest virtue 
and pedestrian judgment, the latter a man of excellence so far as the 
political virtues are concerned. Considered in terms of their respective 
individual abilities, Jones merits higher office than Brown; perhaps Brown 
considered by himself does not merit any office at all. But . . . [a] group 
including Brown along with Jones may be collectively wiser than Jones 
himself or any group comprising only Jones and his peers. It will of course 
almost certainly be true that a citizen body which included Jones but not 
Brown [] would be collectively wiser than a citizen body that included 
Brown but not Jones []. However, if [the group including only Jones] is 
collectively inferior in wisdom to a body that includes both of them [], 
then the difference in merit between Jones and Brown . . . may be of 
limited relevance so far as political office is concerned. A person’s merit 
is a matter of the collective political capacity of a group of which he might 
be a member.649  
Of course, the principle here articulated may allow for the possibility 
that the best outcome may be achieved by “accord[ing] greater 
weight to the votes of people like Jones.”650 But on the other hand, 
the best possible answer may also be achieved by aggregating their 
individual judgments together “only in the light of a deliberative 
procedure that treats the two of them formally as equals.”651 We will 
soon discuss some of the conditions under which large groups are 
likelier to reach wise conclusions.652 However, what is important at 
the moment is that a decision-making group will be wiser with 
Brown’s participation even if he is not as wise as others in the 
group.653
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This principle may explain why consulting and citing the ius 
gentium without being bound by it may lead to wiser judicial 
outcomes regardless of whether, or the degree to which, relevant 
foreign legal decisions are wise.654 As judges have more “available 
information, experience, and insight”655 on which to draw, we think 
the likelihood that they can “synthesiz[e] that reasoning into a 
superior position for ourselves”656 grows. A judge who is limited to 
consulting only the set of legal materials native to his own country 
will have less knowledge upon which to draw than one who can 
consult the entire worldwide body of legal knowledge.657 In the worst 
case scenario, an American court will be no worse off for having 
considered the judgment of a foreign court, even if that judgment 
ultimately turns out to be of little value.658 A capable American 
judge, exercising the sort of proper discretion that all good judges 
necessarily develop, will know when to discard foreign legal 
judgments as irrelevant and when to allow them to weigh upon his 
consideration. In those cases where legal materials from a foreign 
country prove especially applicable and insightful, however, he “may 
learn something from an array of . . . judiciaries when their 
accumulated experience is taken into account.”659
In Waldron’s mind, for the “summation argument” to mean 
more than simply adding up the knowledge of several individuals, 
speech and rhetoric must play an important role in the deliberative 
process.660 Conversation is significant in the process of deliberation 
because it enables us to “communicate to another experiences and 
insights that complement those that the other already possesses . . . it 
enables the group as a whole to attain a degree of wisdom and 
practical knowledge that surpasses even that of the most excellent 
individual member.”661 It is not enough for each person to merely 
state his knowledge, for we “could be little more than animals” if all 
that mattered was the “aggregation of expressions of individual 
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utility”;662 what matters is the “new synthesis” that emerges when 
“different views com[e] together in deliberation to contribute 
dynamically.”663 The open flow of ideas between different parties to 
a discussion is a central component of what makes larger groups 
likelier to produce wise decisions than individuals or smaller 
groups.664 Without speech and debate, it is difficult for ideas to be 
conveyed and received. 
One implication of this fact for the citation of the ius gentium is 
that obviously legal judgments cannot “speak” in the way that 
individuals can, nor can they converse with one another in a literal 
sense.665 If domestic and foreign legal materials can communicate 
with one another, it must be in a figurative sense. Waldron’s
“summation argument,” applied to the ius gentium, may mean that 
the communication between domestic and foreign sources of law 
occurs primarily in the presiding judge’s mind as he deliberates with 
himself over the proper course of action to take in a case, using the 
different legal materials  
to bear on the views and insights of each of the others, so that they cast 
light on each other, providing a basis for reciprocal questioning and 
criticism, and enabling a position to emerge which is better than any of the 
inputs and much more than an aggregation or function of those inputs.666  
As the judge turns over different legal judgments in his mind, we 
imagine, he metaphorically examines each one in light of the others 
to piece together a coherent and whole solution for the case at hand. 
We argue that it is up to a capable judge to view each source of 
legal knowledge in light of one another in such a way as to allow 
them to “converse” with one another, so that the full legal wisdom 
that is only manifested when disparate legal materials come into 
concert with one another can be revealed. Fortunately, this is a task 
for which judges already ought to be well-equipped. Synthesizing 
different legal materials—precedents, statutes, common law, etc.—
constitutes a good deal of the craft of judging. Looking to foreign 
sources of law would not change the nature of the judge’s task in any 
fundamental way—it would just give him access to a greater quantity 
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of knowledge upon which to draw, and thus improve his likelihood 
of reaching a wise judgment. It is for this reason that the U.S. 
Supreme Court regularly consults head counts of the fifty states’
laws to see what doctrines prevail in the states and why.667
When courts cite the ius gentium in good faith, they should not 
self-servingly “do it one jurisdiction at a time, and . . . justify it . . . 
one jurisdiction at a time.”668 This indeed would be, as Justice Scalia 
has called it, “sophistry.”669 A “piecemeal,”670 pick-and-choose 
approach—selecting those foreign judgments that support a 
particular outcome rather than making a contextual and holistic 
inquiry into the global body of jurisprudence on a subject and 
appraising the relevance or suitability of individual decisions for 
comparison to American law—would indeed, as Waldron 
acknowledges, fail to account for the fact that we “declared . . . 
independence from Britain 230 years ago”671 when we cite British 
law, or that “dismal human rights” abuses have occurred under 
Robert Mugabe672 when we cite the words of “a wise Zimbabwe 
judge.”673 Invoking foreign law, rather, should mean “tak[ing] into 
consideration the consensus that has emerged among them all.”674 We 
agree with Waldron that we should not just cite the law of one 
country in one case and the law of another country in another.675 We 
are interested in the “consensus in world legal opinion”676 on an 
issue—the “opinion of the world community,”677 not just one legal 
system. 
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A similar phenomenon is famously expressed by Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem.678 Essentially, the Theorem states that “under certain 
conditions, a widespread belief, accepted by a number of 
independent actors, is highly likely to be correct.”679 Therefore, as 
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein say, if one is deciding between 
different options, and a “large majority of states make a certain 
decision based on a certain shared belief, and the states are well 
motivated, there is good reason to believe that the decision is 
correct.”680 Moreover, “the probability of a correct answer, by a 
majority of the group, increases toward 100% as the size of the group 
increases,” assuming “that the probability that each voter will answer 
correctly exceeds 50%, and that these probabilities are 
independent.”681 According to Posner and Sunstein, Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem provides a justification, based on a simple mathematical 
truism, for sometimes looking to the legal judgments of other nations 
when confronting similar problems because it suggests that foreign 
judgments sometimes contain important information that American 
courts should not ignore.682
Posner and Sunstein write that “the decisions of other courts 
provide relevant information . . . [i]f the high courts of Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain, and Australia have all decided that the free 
speech principle includes commercial advertising, there might seem 
to be reason for the Supreme Court of Ireland to reach the same 
conclusion.”683 Condorcet’s Jury Theorem also offers an intellectual 
“foundation” for individual U.S. states “following the practices of 
other states,”684 which is “a routine and uncontroversial feature of the 
jurisprudence of state courts.”685 Posner and Sunstein’s idea is that “if
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a majority of states has answered that question a certain way, the 
court has some reason to believe that the majority view is correct.”686
Comparative law, they say, is an ordinary feature of state-court 
jurisprudence.687 Nobody worries that when the one state court cites 
sister-state judgments, it is allowing “foreign governments . . . to 
dictate what [its] laws and [its] Constitution mean, and what [its] 
policies . . . should be,”688 or that it “may be slowly losing control 
over the meaning of [its] laws.”689 Yet this is precisely the fear that 
Texas Senator John Cornyn expressed with respect to the citation of 
foreign law.690
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem does not perfectly express 
Waldron’s “summation argument,” as Waldron makes clear.691 For 
one thing, it assumes that all participants in crowd deliberation have 
a probability of producing a “correct[]” decision that “exceeds 
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REV. 453, 462 (1996); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An 
Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 
1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 389-91 (1977); Richard A. Mann, The 
North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 39, 58 (1979); David Blumberg, Influence of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court on State High Court Decisionmaking 1982-1997: A Study in 
Horizontal Federalism, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1583, 1583 (1998); Lawrence M. Friedman 
et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 
796-98 (1981); James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial 
Federalism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 783, 790 (2003); 
Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 
835, 838 (1997); Douglas A. Hedin, The Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting 
Minnesota’s Constitutional Past, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 256-61 (2003) 
(discussing out-of-state citations by the Minnesota Supreme Court in interpreting 
provisions of the Minnesota Constitution derived from out-of-state constitutions). 
686. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 142. 
687. Id. at 135; see also Caldeira, Legal Precedent, supra note 514, at 52; 
Caldeira, State Reputation, supra note 514, at 87-94.
688. 151 CONG. REC. S3109 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Cornyn). 
689. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 138. 
690. 151 CONG. REC. at S3109.  
691. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 86-87. 
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50%.”692 As Waldron wryly notes, “critics . . . may not accept that 
foreign courts are, on average, more likely than not to get it right 
about important constitutional issues.”693 In contrast, Waldron’s
“summation argument” holds that the level of wisdom of a group 
decision increases on average as the group expands, regardless of 
whether individual participants themselves have “extensive” or 
“limited insights.”694 We think the Brown/Jones example695
demonstrates the essential difference between the two paradigms. If 
Brown is a bad judge—if his probability of reaching a good decision 
is below 50%—then according to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, his 
participation in group deliberation will actually be detrimental to its 
likelihood of producing a good judgment; as Waldron notes, a 
decision maker’s better-than-even likelihood of getting the answer 
right is “a crucial presupposition of Condorcet’s theorem. []If it fails, 
the Condorcet effect goes into reverse.”696 Waldron, in contrast, 
would posit that Brown can still contribute wisdom to group 
decision-making.697 We think that Waldron has the better argument 
here than Posner and Sunstein—that the level of wisdom embodied 
in legal judgments of the foreign nation need not be especially high 
for them to be of value to American judges in helping them 
understand indeterminate legal provisions.698 The point, though, is 
that Posner and Sunstein are correct in asserting that the likelihood 
that a group will reach the right decision “increases toward 100% as 
the size of the group increases,”699 and that this principle counsels in 
favor of reference to sources of foreign law.700
James Surowiecki convincingly argues in his popular book, 
The Wisdom of Crowds, that under the proper conditions crowds tend 
to produce better decisions than their most intelligent individual 
members so long as those decisions are arrived at independently as 
happens in Comparative Constitutional Law.701 A classic example of 
group intelligence, which Surowiecki notes, is the experiment where 
participants are asked to guess the number of jellybeans in a jar.702
                                                     
692. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 141. 
693. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 86-87. 
694. See Waldron, supra note 630, at 573. 
695. Id. at 572-73. 
696. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 87. 
697. Waldron, supra note 630, at 573. 
698. See id.
699. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 141. 
700. See id. at 143. 
701. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at xiii. 
702. Id. at 255. 
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The average guess of the group is consistently more accurate than the 
overwhelming bulk of individual guesses.703 Anecdotal examples of 
this phenomenon include the television program Who Wants To Be A 
Millionaire, where when given a multiple-choice question with four 
possible answers, the audience would pick the right answer 91% of 
the time, whereas an “expert[]” would only make the right choice 
around 65% of the time.704 Studies conducted by sociologists and 
psychologists between the 1920s and 1950s demonstrated that the 
concept of group intelligence stands up to scientific scrutiny.705
Waldron would have done well to discuss Surowiecki’s thesis more 
thoroughly; instead, it is relegated to a single lowly footnote.706
Collective wisdom is more than a simple matter of “nose 
counting”;707 it should be invoked where there is consensus, not 
simply a bare numerical majority.708 Justice Kennedy’s reliance on 
foreign law in Roper was criticized by some as being “all about 
noses, not reasons.”709 Collective wisdom also does not mean that 
individuals will never outperform the group as a whole, Surowiecki 
notes.710 Oftentimes, “there will be a few people who do better than 
the group.”711 However, he says, there is no reason to believe that any 
specific individuals are likely to “consistently outperform the 
                                                     
703. See id.; see also Jack L. Treynor, Market Efficiency and the Bean Jar 
Experiment, 43 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 50, 50 (1987). 
704. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 4. 
705. Id. at 4-5. There have been many studies on “group intelligence”; some 
of the most consequential and illuminating are Richard S. Bruce, Group Judgments 
in the Fields of Lifted Weights and Visual Discrimination, 1 J. PSYCHOL. 117 (1935); 
Kate Gordon, Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 398 (1924); Herbert Gurnee, Maze Learning in the Collective Situation, 3 
J. PSYCHOL. 437 (1937); Marjorie E. Shaw, A Comparison of Individuals and Small 
Groups in the Rational Solution of Complex Problems, 44 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 491 
(1932). 
706. See WALDRON, supra note 75, at 241 n.42. 
707. Id. at 85; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 346 (2002) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“What we have looked for in the past to ‘evolve’ the Eighth 
Amendment is a consensus of the same sort as the consensus that adopted the Eighth 
Amendment: a consensus of the sovereign States that form the Union, not a nose 
count of Americans for and against.” (emphasis omitted)).
708. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 89 (“For my purposes, perhaps its most 
important implication is to move us away from a nose-counting approach that looks 
only to the accumulat[ed] outputs . . . .”).
709. Young, supra note 72, at 152; see also WALDRON, supra note 75, at 85; 
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 681-82 (2009). 
710. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 5. 
711. Id.
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group.”712 This means that “if you run ten different jelly-bean-
counting experiments, it’s likely that each time one or two students 
will outperform the group.”713 What matters is that “they will not be 
the same students each time.”714
A. Why Crowds Can Sometimes Reach Better Decisions than 
Individuals
Posner and Sunstein similarly offer several necessary 
conditions for Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to apply.715 First, a foreign 
legal material “must reflect a judgment based on that state’s private 
information about how some question is best answered.”716 Second, 
the foreign legal material “must address a problem that is similar to 
the problem before the domestic court.”717 This refers both to the 
“facts” and the “legal principles, institutions, and values of the 
foreign” nation.718 Most importantly, they say, foreign law “must 
reflect an independent judgment; it must not be a matter of merely 
following other states.”719 If a foreign nation is just following another 
sovereign nation’s judgment, then its courts are participating in a 
“cascade effect.”720 If these conditions are not met, foreign legal 
materials are “not analogous to a vote that aggregates 
information.”721 In addition, judges must be able to “interpret foreign 
[legal] materials both easily and adequately”;722 information from 
foreign legal judgments must be taken as “relevant information for 
resolving disputes” without any inherent precedential value;723 and 
third, the Court must be straightforward in its explanations for using 
foreign law and not engaged in “judicial rhetoric.”724
                                                     
712. Id.  
713. Id.
714. Id.
715. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 143-44.




720. Id. at 145 (emphasis omitted); see also infra Section IV.B.
721. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 144. 
722. Id. at 137. 
723. Id.
724. Id.
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Surowiecki similarly expresses the belief that wise crowds are 
distinguished from mobs (which are after all unwise crowds)725 by 
four important conditions.726 First, for a crowd to be wise it must 
possess a genuine “diversity of opinion,” so that each person 
contributes some “private information, even if it’s just an eccentric 
interpretation of the known facts.”727 Second, for a crowd to be wise 
it must be decentralized, so that people may “specialize and draw on 
local knowledge.”728 Third, he says, it is vitally important that 
individuals’ opinions are determined independently of one another 
and are not controlled by those of their peers.729 And, fourth, there 
must be an aggregating “mechanism . . . for turning private 
judgments into a collective decision.”730 When these conditions are 
all met, the crowd’s judgment will likely be accurate.731
The theory of crowd wisdom assumes that it is critical that 
group members are allowed to reach their own choices individually 
and are not forced to adopt a single group position.732 If this element 
is not in place, the likelihood of the group yielding a superior 
decision is diminished; crowd wisdom assumes that “our opinions 
are, in some sense, our own.”733 Collective wisdom expresses itself in 
“[d]iversity and independence . . . disagreement and contest, not 
consensus or compromise.”734
We posit that this is because the process by which groups make 
decisions is a process of spontaneous order.735 Systems of 
                                                     
725. Cf. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 256 (“A market, in other words, 
turns into a mob.”); id. at 257 (“Baiting crowds are, of course, relatively rare. But 
the dynamic that drives them seems very similar to the behavior of rioting mobs.”).






732. Cf. id. at 10, 41 (“Independence doesn’t mean isolation, but it does 
mean relative freedom from the influence of others. If we are independent, our 
opinions are, in some sense, our own. . . . [A] group of people—unlike a colony of 
ants—is far more likely to come up with a good decision if the people in the group 
are independent of each other.”).
733. Id. at 41. 
734. Id. at xix. 
735. Cf. id. at 71-72. Says Surowiecki:  
What you’d like is a way for individuals to specialize and to acquire local 
knowledge—which increases the total amount of information available in 
the system—while also being able to aggregate that local knowledge and 
private information into a collective whole . . . . To accomplish this, any 
“crowd”—whether it be a market, a corporation, or an intelligence 
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spontaneous order are able to absorb more “dispersed knowledge”
than can “organization.”736 Surowiecki says that for group decision-
making, one basis of collective wisdom is that each member 
independently contributes his or her own “tacit knowledge,” which 
he defines as “knowledge that can’t be easily summarized or 
conveyed to others, because it is specific to a particular place or job 
or experience,” to the group’s overall deliberations.737 Collective 
wisdom works when each group member contributes “new 
information rather than the same old data everyone is already 
familiar with.”738 Crowds are likelier to reach good decisions when 
they “are made up of people with diverse perspectives who are able 
to stay independent of each other.”739 It is for this reason that under 
some circumstances the group’s “average answer will often be at 
least as good as the answer of the smartest member.”740
Independent decision-making by all participants “is important 
to intelligent decision making . . . [because] it keeps the mistakes that 
people make from becoming correlated.”741 When individuals depend 
on one another for information, errors can “wreck the group’s
collective judgment.”742 Independence also ensures that each member 
contributes new information to the group, Surowiecki says, rather 
than that one is relying solely on older information.743 Making people 
                                                                                                               
agency—needs to find the right balance between the two imperatives: 
making individual knowledge globally and collectively useful (as we 
know it can be), while still allowing it to remain resolutely specific and 
local.  
Id. Says Hayek: “We shall see that it is impossible, not only to replace the 
spontaneous order by organization and at the same time to utilize as much of the 
dispersed knowledge of all its members as possible . . . .” HAYEK, RULES AND 
ORDER, supra note 111, at 51. Compare SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 72 
(aggregating and utilizing “local knowledge and private information” and turning it 
“into a collective whole”), with HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 51 
(emphasizing spontaneous order’s utilization of “dispersed knowledge”).
736. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 51. 
737. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 71 (noting that Surowiecki borrows the 
phrase “tacit knowledge” from Hayek).
738. Id. at 41. 
739. Id.
740. Id. at 11. 
741. Id. at 41. 
742. Id. (“Errors in individual judgment won’t wreck the group’s collective 
judgment as long as those errors aren’t systematically pointing in the same direction. 
One of the quickest ways to make people’s judgments systematically biased is to 
make them dependent on each other for information.”).
743. Surowiecki says that “independent individuals are more likely to have 
new information rather than the same old data everyone is already familiar with. The 
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“dependent on each other for information” will “make people’s
judgments systematically biased.”744 In order to ensure that group 
members reach their individual decisions separately, Surowiecki says 
that certain conditions must be in place.745 For one, he says, 
individuals make better decisions when members “pay much less 
attention to what everyone else is saying.”746 Members should also 
make their decisions “simultaneously (or close to it)” at least “as
much as possible.”747 A good deal of background planning is also 
necessary to ensuring that crowds produce wise decisions in addition 
to merely guaranteeing the independence of individual choices. This 
may sound strange, since we have spent much time commending 
spontaneous orders, not planned ones. By planning, though, we mean 
something more specific; there must be “a means of aggregating all 
those different opinions,” so that “the group’s collective solution . . . 
[is] smarter than even the smartest person’s solution.”748
Likewise, Surowiecki identifies three categories into which 
collective wisdom problems are likely to fall.749 The first covers what 
he calls “cognition problems,” which “have or will have definitive 
solutions.”750 The jellybean experiment is an example of this type of 
problem because there is, without a doubt, an exact number of 
jellybeans in the jar. Problems that have no “single right answer, but 
to which some answers are certainly better than others”—for 
example, whom one should marry—also fall in this category.751 The 
second category is that of “coordination problem[s],”752 which 
involve getting “members of a group . . . to coordinate their behavior 
with each other, knowing that everyone else is trying to do the same” 
                                                                                                               
smartest groups, then, are made up of people with diverse perspectives who are able 
to stay independent of each other.” Id. He cautions that independence does not 
“imply rationality or impartiality,” but stresses that “as long [as] you’re independent, 
you won’t make the group any dumber” even if you are “biased and irrational.” Id.
744. Id.
745. Id. at 63-65.
746. Id. at 65. 
747. Id. at 64. 
748. Id. at 75. 
749. Id. at xvii-xviii. 
750. Id. at xvii. Surowiecki says that a cognition problem may not have “a 
single right answer,” but “some answers are certainly better than others.” Id. Other 
examples of cognition problems that Surowiecki lists include “What would be the 
best place to build this new public swimming pool?” and “How likely is it that this 
drug will be approved by the FDA?” Id.
751. See id.
752. Id. at xvii-xviii. 
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thing.753 The third category involves “cooperation problem[s],”
which involve getting individuals who may not trust one another 
initially “to work together, even when narrow self-interest would 
seem to dictate that no individual should take part.”754 Paying taxes,
Surowkiecki says, is a cooperation problem.755
B. Information Cascades and the Madness of Crowds
But are crowd decisions always wise? Many spontaneous 
groups are ignorant and poorly organized, more akin to mobs than 
wise collectives. It seems that crowds sometimes descend into mobs, 
whose decisions are not wise but are foolish or even dangerous.756
Sometimes, “we could become individually smarter but collectively 
dumber.”757 “Men, it has been well said, think in herds,” wrote 
nineteenth-century journalist Charles Mackay in Memoirs of 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds; “it
will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their 
senses slowly, and one by one.”758 He feared that “nations . . . like 
individuals . . . have their whims and their peculiarities; their seasons 
of excitement and recklessness, when they care not what they do.”759
Sometimes, he says, a nation will not “recover[] its senses until it has 
shed rivers of blood and sowed a harvest of groans and tears, to be 
reaped by its posterity.”760
James Madison had similar misgivings. In The Federalist No. 
55, Madison says “[h]ad every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, 
                                                     
753. Id. at xviii (“Coordination problems require members of a group 
(market, subway riders, college students looking for a party) to figure out how to 
coordinate their behavior with each other, knowing that everyone else is trying to do 
the same.”). Other examples of such problems are “companies organiz[ing] their 
operations” and “driv[ing] safely in heavy traffic.” Id. 
754. Id. (“As their name suggests, cooperation problems involve the 
challenge of getting self-interested, distrustful people to work together, even when 
narrow self-interest would seem to dictate that no individual should take part.”). 
755. Id. Other examples are “dealing with pollution” and “agreeing on 
definitions of what counts as reasonable pay.” Id.
756. Surowiecki gives an example of a crowd that baited a woman into 
jumping off a bridge in Seattle in 2001. “‘Get it over with!’ they cried. ‘Just jump, 
bitch! Just do it!’” Id. at 256. 
757. Id. at 42. 
758. CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS 
AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 6 (Project Gutenberg 2008) (1852), available at
http://www.cmi-gold-silver.com/pdf/mackaych2451824518-8.pdf.  
759. Id.  
760. Id.
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every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”761 The 
Framers believed in crowd wisdom and democracy, but thought that 
it must be filtered through multiple layers of institutions, including 
representation,762 bicameralism,763 presidential veto,764 and judicial 
review.765 They feared that sudden bursts of popular passion or 
enthusiasm could erupt and cause great harm—think lynchings in the 
South, or the mass use of the guillotine during the French 
Revolution. 
Is Mackay and Madison’s pessimistic view of crowd behavior 
correct? In some circumstances it may be, but not necessarily all the 
time. Crowds may be likelier to produce unwise decisions when they 
lack  
the four conditions that characterize wise crowds: diversity of opinion 
(each person should have some private information, even if it’s just an 
eccentric interpretation of the known facts), independence (people’s
opinions are not determined by the opinions of those around them), 
decentralization (people are able to specialize and draw on local 
knowledge), and aggregation (some mechanism exists for turning private 
judgments into a collective decision). If a group satisfies those conditions, 
its judgment is likely to be accurate.766  
While Mackay referred to the “Madness of Crowds,”767 Surowiecki 
argues that the failure of crowds to make wise decisions is in fact 
often the result of what economists call “information cascade[s],”768 a
phenomenon whose basic idea is that “when individuals see past 
signals only through a crude discrete filter—for example, whether an 
action was adopted or rejected—then learning is surprisingly 
imperfect and can quickly become completely blocked.”769
                                                     
761. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 288 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
762. Id.
763. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 761, at 269 (James Madison). 
764. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 761, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton). 
765. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 761, at 401-02 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
766. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 10. For a more in-depth discussion of
these conditions and their importance to wise (or unwise) decision-making, see id. at 
40-65.
767. MACKAY, supra note 758. 
768. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 53; see also Sushil Bikhchandani, 
David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, 
Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 151, 154 
(using the term “informational cascade,” but the concept is substantively the same). 
769. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, supra note 768, at 159. 
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Surowiecki says that “when people’s decisions are not made all at 
once but rather in sequence,”770 there is an information cascade.771
Information cascades begin when a crowd is faced with a 
choice.772 He presents the following example: 
Assume you have a large group of people, all of whom have the choice of 
going to either a new Indian restaurant or a new Thai place. The Indian 
restaurant is better (in an objective sense) than the Thai place. And each 
person in the group is going to receive, at some point, a piece of 
information about which restaurant is better. But the information is 
imperfect. Sometimes it will be wrong—that is, it will say the Thai place 
is better when it’s not—and will guide a person in the wrong direction. So 
to supplement their own information, people will look at what others are 
doing.773
The problem, Surowiecki explains, “starts when people’s
decisions are not made all at once but rather in sequence, so that 
some people go to one of the two restaurants first and then everyone 
else follows in order.”774 In his example, some people go to the Thai 
place, acting on imperfect information.775 Under “the cascade model, 
everyone who follows assumes—even if they’re getting information 
telling them to go to the Indian restaurant—that there’s a good 
chance, simply because the Thai place is crowded, that it’s better.”776
The end result is that everybody winds up making the wrong choice 
because the first restaurant-goer received bad information.777
Information cascades occur, Surowiecki says, when and 
because individuals wrongly believe they are learning from the 
information of others.778 At some point, they stop listening to their 
own private knowledge altogether.779 However, he says that once 
individuals stop relying to some degree on their own knowledge, the 
cascade is no longer informative; “[i]nstead of aggregating all the 
information individuals have, the way a market or a voting system 
                                                     
770. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 53. 
771. Id. at 54. 
772. Id. at 53-54.  
773. Id. at 53; see also Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, supra note 768,
at 152. 
774. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 53. 
775. Id.
776. Id. at 54. 
777. Id. at 53-54 (“Remember, the information people have is imperfect. So 
if the first couple of people happen to get bad information . . . everyone ends up 
making the wrong decision, simply because the initial diners, by chance, got the 
wrong information.”).
778. Id. at 54. 
779. Id.
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does, the cascade becomes a sequence of uninformed choices, so that 
collectively the group ends up making a bad decision.”780 That is, 
instead of making decisions independently based on what they know, 
people make choices based on what they believe their predecessors 
knew.781 Often, “a cascade is not the result of mindless trend-
following, or conformity, or peer pressure. . . . People fall in line 
because they [wrongly] believe they’re learning something important 
from the example of others.”782
According to Surowiecki, “[i]f everyone has the same 
likelihood of making the right choice, and everyone before you has 
made the same choice, then you should do what everyone else has 
done.”783 At this point, he says, “[e]veryone thinks that people are 
making decisions based on what they know, when in fact people are 
making decisions based on what they think the people who came 
before them knew.”784 The spontaneous order is no longer 
aggregating the information that individuals possess; the decision-
making process becomes a “sequence of uninformed choices” so that 
the collective decision the group ends up reaching is a bad one.785
Market bubbles and economic crises can be the results of 
information cascades, Surowiecki says.786 To loosely paraphrase 
Surowiecki, they frequently occur when otherwise-rational 
individuals overlook what common sense would indicate are warning 
signs that the market value of an investment no longer seems to be 
related to what value it possesses in the real world.787
Sometimes, Surowiecki says, participants in a bubble ignore 
their own “doubts” about whether their performance expectations for 
an investment are unrealistic because “not investing seem[s] 
tantamount to suicide.”788 Only after the bubble collapses do they 
realize that “the conventional wisdom was seriously questioned and 
                                                     
780. Id. at 55. 
781. Id. at 54-55.
782. Id. at 54. 
783. Id.  
784. Id. at 54-55.
785. Id. at 55 (“Instead of aggregating all the information individuals have, 
the way a market or a voting system does, the cascade becomes a sequence of 
uninformed choices, so that collectively the group ends up making a bad 
decision . . . .”). 
786. Id. at 57. Surowiecki uses the example of the Internet bubble of the late 
1990s; a more relevant example today might be the subprime mortgage crisis of the 
late 2000s that was one of the first indicators of a global financial recession. See id. 
787. Id. at 57-58. Consider Surowiecki’s example of the Internet bubble.
788. Id. at 57. 
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found wanting.”789 Information cascades, Posner and Sunstein note, 
undermine an essential assumption of the application of the theory of 
crowd wisdom to the citation of foreign law; when a state appears to 
be “contributing to information about what must be done,” but “is 
actually [just] following the relevant [legal] judgments of others,”790
their judgments are not independent,791 and thus contribute little, if 
anything, to the pool of existing information. 
Of course, it must be remembered that information cascades are 
not inevitable. Where the four conditions for collective wisdom 
Surowiecki lists are met—diversity of opinion, independence, 
decentralization, and aggregation792—cascades are avoidable. In such 
cases, crowd madness is less likely and one can hope that groups will 
make shrewd predictions. 
C. Crowd Wisdom and the Ius Gentium 
The obvious relevance of this to Waldron’s theory is that we 
would characterize the ius gentium as the application of crowd 
wisdom (or folly) to international law. The worldwide scientific 
consensus “stands as a repository of enormous value” and serves as a 
“prescriptive starting point” to scientists seeking to explore natural 
and social phenomena,793 Waldron says; using his words, we would 
say that judges should not “try to proceed without drawing on that 
repository [of legal knowledge] to supplement their own individual 
research.”794 Legal precedents may not always be dispositive, and 
they may only serve as a starting point, but as Waldron illustrates, it
would be absurd for judges to make legal judgments without at least 
considering the body of existing jurisprudence,795 just as, Waldron 
says, in the public health context “[i]t would be ridiculous to say that 
because the problem had arisen in the United States, we should look 
only to American science to solve it—as if to say, ‘We must never 
                                                     
789. Id. at 58. 
790. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 145. 
791. Id. at 144-45. 
792. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 10. 
793. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 100. 
794. Id.
795. For example, Waldron says, even if American conditions are different,
we would want to “ensure that [we] respond[] rationally to those differences, 
identifying conditions that called for an approach unlike those tried in other 
countries and having some detailed sense of how to measure and respond 
proportionately to [those] differentiating factors.” Id. at 102. 
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forget that this is an American epidemic we are fighting.’”796 This 
logic, Waldron argues, applies to foreign sources of law in addition 
to domestic law.797 We argue that Waldron’s ius gentium tackles a 
“cognition problem[]”—which are the best laws and practices out 
there on which “collective intelligence can be brought to bear”798 by 
serving as a mechanism by which normatively superior laws might 
be discovered and applied as broadly as possible? We call this a
cognition problem because it assumes that some legal approaches 
“are certainly better than others,” despite there not always being “a
single right answer,” and the fact that individuals may disagree over 
which approaches are “better than others.”799 It may be, however, that 
the ius gentium may sometimes be able to address a “coordination
problem” seeking to harmonize the laws of different nations to 
produce efficient outcomes,800 or “cooperation problem[s],”
attempting to foster collaboration among nations to achieve a 
common goal.801
There is a normative bent to this goal—after all, the 
determination of which laws are superior to others will necessarily 
involve value judgments. We propose that such judgments be made 
through a mechanism, the ius gentium, that utilizes the collective 
wisdom of different sovereign nations. Waldron argues that when “a
global consensus” reveals the “prevalence of certain moral attitudes 
which are quite strikingly different from our own,” then “[t]here is 
some learning to be done here.”802 We agree. Legal norms across 
different sovereign nations may indicate a rule’s essential goodness,
and there may be something to be said for a law if so many disparate 
cultures have adopted it. 
The ius gentium could potentially be wise in the way that large 
crowds are wise. We hope that dozens of constitutional courts spread 
across the world hearing judicial cases would be more likely to 
demonstrate wisdom than madness. We hope such courts would 
                                                     
796. Id. at 101. 
797. Id. at 102. 
798. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at xvii. 
799. Id.
800. Id. at xvii-xviii. 
801. Id. at xviii. 
802. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 93 (“There is some learning to be done 
here, if not about moral truth itself, then about the nature and prevalence of certain 
moral attitudes which are quite strikingly different from our own and about the 
significance of [that] disparity. Again, the argument is not that we should simply fall 
into line with a global consensus. But awareness of difference can sometimes be the 
beginning of wisdom . . . .”).
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make decisions independently incorporating their own unique legal 
knowledge. We feel the system of spontaneous order through which 
the ius gentium would work could, in theory, meet all four of 
Surowiecki’s criteria for wise group decision-making.803 It could 
possess “diversity of opinion,”804 for individual constitutional courts 
would have unique knowledge on the social, cultural, and legal 
landscape of their countries. Second, the ius gentium would be 
characterized by “decentralization,” allowing courts “to specialize 
and draw on local knowledge.”805 Third, one could hope that 
constitutional courts would render their judgments with 
“independence”806 from one another, looking toward each other for 
guidance on occasion, but leaning mostly on their own private 
intelligence and knowledge of their own sovereign nation’s laws. 
Finally, the ius gentium could, in theory, provide an “aggregation . . . 
mechanism” for divining the “collective decision” out of each court’s
“private judgments.”807 We agree with Waldron that listening to 
“judges socialized [not only] in America but also . . . socialized 
elsewhere” should in theory enhance “the range of available 
information, experience, and insight” that goes into decision-
making,808 and we think this increases the odds that the global 
community of jurists will collectively reach “right” decisions.
The argument about the wisdom of crowds relates to Hayek’s
argument about the general superiority of spontaneous systems of 
order over planned systems of order, with the former being better 
able “to utilize as much of the dispersed knowledge of all its 
members as possible,” and the latter being unable “to improve or 
correct this order by interfering in it by direct commands.”809 In both 
cases, what is at issue is the amount of socially dispersed knowledge 
that is made available to a judicial decision maker. We think a 
system of spontaneous order is likeliest to produce good outcomes 
when people’s decision-making is characterized by Surowiecki’s 
four conditions: diversity, independence, decentralization, and 
aggregation.810 We also think spontaneous systems of order are 
                                                     





808. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 88. 
809. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 111, at 51. 
810. This is because we believe they are likelier to be characterized by the 
conditions Surowiecki lays out. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 10. 
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usually information superior to crowds and will thus be more likely 
to reach the right decisions. 
One may object to Waldron by noting that although crowds 
may be wise, there is something wrong with arguing for the wisdom 
of a crowd containing roughly 150 global supreme court justices 
when it strikes down an American statute passed by Congress and 
the President, who are the democratically elected representatives of 
over 310 million people. Crowd wisdom, one could say, points in the 
direction of greater democracy and less judicial review. 
This argument is clever, but is not as persuasive as it at first 
seems. It compares apples to oranges, for America already has a 
supreme judicial authority—the U.S. Supreme Court—that 
invalidates legislation that has been democratically enacted by a 
majority of the American people acting through their elected 
representatives. A better comparison might arguably be between not 
the wisdom of 310 million Americans versus that of 150 
international jurists, but between the wisdom of 310 million 
Americans against that of seven billion global citizens. Likewise, 
there may be greater crowd wisdom in the judgments of 150 jurists 
than in that of nine. Of course, this counterargument only holds up to 
the extent that the decisions of foreign judiciaries do in fact reflect 
democratic sentiments to some degree. Because this is not always the 
case, foreign court rulings may not always be as democratically 
legitimate as those of our Supreme Court since some foreign 
supreme courts play a role in picking their successors, though the 
size and nature of this role varies from country to country.811 This 
leads to a self-perpetuating feudal juristocracy that may be quite 
undemocratic; its courts may not be like our Supreme Court in 
following the election returns. 
Constitutional court judges and academics who specialize in 
this field are increasingly in constant contact with one another. They 
have come to care about what they think of each other, and this 
reduces the extent to which their judgments are the result of 
independent use of their own particularized knowledge about their 
own legal systems. These developments undermine the wisdom-of-
                                                     
811. See Mary L. Clark, Judges Judging Judicial Candidates: Should 
Currently Serving Judges Participate in Commissions to Screen and Recommend 
Article III Candidates Below the Supreme Court Level?, 114 PA. ST. L. REV. 49, 
109-18 (2009). India has been criticized as having a “self-selecting” judiciary, see
Sanford Levinson, Identifying ‘Independence,’ 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297, 1304-05
(2006), while judicial selection in Israel has been described as “effectively 
dominated” by the chief justice, id. at 1306. 
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crowds argument. Additionally, the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem 
argument assumes that “the judgment embodied in the practice of the 
other state is independent,”812 Posner and Sunstein say; when “a law 
was adopted out of imitation and not as a result . . . of independent 
judgment, an American court should discount the law of another 
state.”813 When these conditions are met, crowds may actually 
produce worse decisions than individuals because one bad judge can 
taint the deliberations of others. If foreign court X derives its 
judgment on a matter based on the fact that foreign courts Y and Z
judged in a certain way, its judgment is not truly independent. 
There is another problem with the knowledge argument that 
Professor Rosenkranz brings out admirably in his reply to Professors 
Posner and Sunstein.814 His contention, somewhat paraphrased, is 
that searching for crowd wisdom among other nations’ legal 
materials to answer American legal questions is foolish because the 
political theory undergirding American constitutionalism is 
fundamentally at odds with the logic of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.815
According to Rosenkranz, “the Framers’ vision” of the Constitution 
was more “localist” in nature, pointing to an emphasis on 
“decisionmaking mechanisms that harness multiple collective bodies 
with distinctly varied geographic and institutional perspectives, each 
answering subtly different questions.”816 Condorcet corresponded 
with and was known by several influential American Framers, 
including Benjamin Franklin,817 Thomas Jefferson,818 and James 
                                                     
812. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 71, at 136. 
813. Id. at 163.
814. See generally Rosenkranz, supra note 135. 
815. Id. at 1283 (“[T]he Constitution that the Framers ultimately wrote 
demonstrates a conception of governmental structure sharply different from that of 
Condorcet. In short, Condorcet’s ideas can usefully inform constitutional 
interpretation—but primarily by way of contrast.”).
816. Id.
817. Id. at 1288-89; see also Letter from the Marquis de Condorcet to Doctor 
Benjamin Franklin (Dec. 2, 1773), in 20 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 489-91
(William B. Willcox ed., 1976); Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Marquis de 
Condorcet (Mar. 20, 1774), in 21 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 151-52
(William B. Willcox ed., 1978); Gerald Stourzh, Reason and Power in Benjamin 
Franklin’s Political Thought, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1092, 1092 (1953) (stating 
Condorcet wrote that Franklin’s “‘politics were those of a man who believed in the 
power of reason and the reality of virtue’” (quoting 3 OEUVRES DE CONDORCET 420 
(A. Condorcet O’Connor & M.F. Arago eds., 2d ed. 1847))); PAUL MERRILL 
SPURLIN, THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TIMES OF THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS 124 (1984); SPURLIN, supra, at 185 n.26 (citing Letter from 
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Madison.819 Moreover, his writings were familiar to a number of 
educated American readers at the time the Constitution was 
adopted,820 a necessary precondition of originalist relevance to the 
task of constitutional interpretation.821 Condorcet’s works “were 
indeed becoming familiar to Americans during this period.”822 In 
fact, “[h]e was . . . made a member of Franklin’s [American] 
                                                                                                               
Benjamin Franklin to the Marquis de Condorcet, supra, at 151-52); EDMUND S.
MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 245 (2002). 
818. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1289-90; see also WILLARD STERNE 
RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 431 (1993); Introduction to CONDORCET:
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY 15 (Iain McLean & Fiona 
Hewitt eds. & trans., 1994) (“Condorcet was even closer to Franklin’s successor, 
Jefferson . . . .”); SPURLIN, supra note 817, at 122, 129; Arnold B. Urken, The 
Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social Choice Theory, 72 PUB.
CHOICE 213, 215, 218 (1991) (“Jefferson’s library included copies of [the Essai,] 
Lettres d’un Citoyen des Etats Unis (1788) and Sentiments d’un républicain sur les 
assemblées provinciales et les états généraux (1788) as well as Reflexions sur 
l’esclavage des nègres (1788), and Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de 
l’esprit humain (published posthumously in 1795).”).
819. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1290-91; see also Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
210, 212 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977); SPURLIN, supra note 
817, at 122; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 12, 1789), in 11
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 413 (“We have lately had three books 
published which are of great merit in different lines. . . . The second is a work on 
government by the Marquis de Condorcet . . . . I shall secure you a copy.”); Iain 
McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet’s 
Theory of Social Choice?, 73 PUB. CHOICE 445, 447-48 (1992) (noting that Madison
possessed at least three works by Condorcet, including work in which the full Jury 
Theorem appears). 
820. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1291-92. 
821. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (“I will consult the writings of some men . . . Hamilton[] and 
Madison[] . . . for example . . . because their writings, like those of other intelligent 
and informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was 
originally understood. . . . What I look for in the Constitution is . . . the original 
meaning of the text . . . .”); see also BARNETT, supra note 201, at 89 (“[T]he words 
of the Constitution should be interpreted according to the meaning they had at the 
time they were enacted.”).
822. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1291; see also SPURLIN, supra note 817,
at 121-29. 
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Philosophical Society”823 and an honorary citizen of New Haven, 
Connecticut.824
But Condorcet’s theories, Rosenkranz argues, are at odds with 
those contained within the U.S. Constitution, having been “either 
expressly rejected or substantially refined by the Framers.”825
Condorcet scorned bicameralism, preferring unicameralism 
instead.826 In fact, he said that bicameral legislatures reflect “fear of 
innovation, one of the most fatal scourges of the human race.”827 He 
did not remain silent in this criticism, but complained directly to 
Franklin.828 Condorcet’s rejection of bicameralism reflects his 
particular theory of political decision-making that undergirds the 
Jury Theorem: 
Condorcet approached politics as an exercise in the revelation of truth by 
sampling from individuals’ beliefs that were more or less enlightened. . . . 
[W]hen political decision making is viewed in Condorcet’s terms, 
bicameralism amounts to splitting the sample information and results in a 
reduction in the effective sample size, rather than any improvement in the 
process.829
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, Rosenkranz reminds us, relies on 
asking a number of people “the same question.”830 In contrast, the 
Framers understood that each chamber of the legislative body would 
answer “two slightly different questions.”831 The very purpose of 
                                                     
823. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1291-92 (citing Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Christian Frederick Michaelis and Others (Feb. 4, 1787), in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 111, 111 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955)). 
824. See id. at 1292; see also Max M. Mintz, Condorcet’s Reconsideration of 
America as a Model for Europe, 11 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 493, 494 (1991). 
825. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1292 (“[S]ome of Condorcet’s most 
central theories of constitutional design were either expressly rejected or 
substantially refined by the Framers.”).
826. Id. at 1293; see also McLean & Urken, supra note 819, at 450 
(“Condorcet was opposed to bicameralism, which he believed had no theoretical 
justification; he believed that checks on tyrannical legislatures and executives were 
better achieved by appropriate criteria for the franchise and a suitable voting rule 
involving qualified majorities.”).
827. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PLAN PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION (1793), reprinted in CONDORCET:
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 678, at 143, 156-57. 
828. See JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE 
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 242 (1992). 
829. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Bicameralism and Majoritarian 
Equilibrium, 74 PUB. CHOICE 169, 177 (1992) (emphasis added). 
830. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1297. 
831. Id. at 1295; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 761, at 269 
(James Madison) (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily 
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having a bicameral legislature is rooted in “the Great Compromise, 
under which one House was viewed as representing the people and 
the other the states, [which] allayed the fears of both the large and 
[the] small states.”832 Rosenkranz explains that the House “would ask 
one question (‘is X good for the people?’), and the Senate would ask 
a different question (‘is X best implemented by the federal 
government rather than by the states?’). Only if a majority of both
Houses answered their respective questions affirmatively could the 
measure become law.”833
Condorcet also rejected federalism as well as bicameralism, 
writing that “a nation which holds the purest principles of reason and 
justice, but which is alone in holding such principles, needs to be 
very closely united.”834 At “the French National Convention in 1793, 
Condorcet proposed primary assemblies that” would “address 
national—not local—concerns.”835 “[T]hese assemblies in which the 
citizen votes not for himself but for the whole nation,” he said, “are 
absolutely different, in form and in the territory to which they 
correspond, from those to which the same citizens could be called to 
deliberate as members of a particular territorial division. . . . [T]he 
primary assemblies do not act each for itself as a portion of the 
whole . . . .”836 Condorcet conceived of “politics as an exercise in the 
revelation of truth by sampling from individuals’ beliefs”;837 as such, 
he believed that questions of policy should be answered in one voice 
at the national level.838
                                                                                                               
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into 
different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election, and different 
principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their 
common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit.”).
832. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950 (1983); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964) (“A prime reason for bicameralism, modernly considered, 
is to insure mature and deliberate consideration of, and to prevent precipitate action 
on, proposed legislative measures.”).
833. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1295 (footnotes omitted). 
834. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING 
THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION (1793), reprinted in CONDORCET: FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 818, at 190, 191. 
835. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1296. 
836. CONDORCET, supra note 827, at 151. 
837. Brennan & Hamlin, supra note 829, at 177 (emphasis added). 
838. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1296 (“Thus, Condorcet designed these 
primary assemblies to connect ‘the particular places in which citizens empirically 
lived’ with politics at the national level.” (quoting Nadia Urbinati, Condorcet’s 
Democratic Theory of Representative Government, 3 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 53, 67 
(2004))). 
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Compare this to the text of the Tenth Amendment, which reads, 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”839 The Framers recognized that some 
policy questions are “inherently local,” relying on the particular 
circumstances, values, and conditions present in different 
jurisdictions.840 A policy can be neither “wise [n]or unwise in some 
abstract sense,” Rosenkranz says, but being “inherently local, turning 
on the special conditions of a place and the particular values and 
priorities of a people,” wise in some contexts and unwise in others.841
“In short,” Rosenkranz says, “bicameralism recognizes that different 
legislative bodies may usefully ask subtly different questions about 
the same public policy, and federalism builds on this insight by 
recognizing that these subtly different questions may usefully reflect 
distinctly local concerns and mores.”842 In contrast, Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem requires that all jurors share the same circumstances and be 
asked precisely “the same question.”843
Finally, Condorcet’s conception of the role of juries as organs 
whose purpose is to produce “correct” outcomes844 is at odds with the 
localist vision of juries under the Constitution845—what Rosenkranz 
refers to as “its reification of juries.”846 Three of the original 
amendments in the Bill of Rights enshrine the right to a jury trial.847
According to the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”848 The Seventh 
Amendment, in turn, ensures that  
[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
                                                     
839. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 




844. Id. at 1298 (“From [Condorcet’s] perspective, the great advantage of a 
jury is that it increases the chance of a ‘correct’ decision—guilty people found 
guilty, liable people found liable, and so forth.”).
845. Id. at 1299 (“[T]he Framers . . . contemplated subtly different questions 
asked from place to place, questions that could not be disaggregated from the 
conditions of the place and the mores of the people.”).
846. Id. at 1297. 
847. U.S. CONST. amends. V-VII. 
848. Id. amend. V. 
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tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.849
The Sixth Amendment, Rosenkranz says, captures the 
sentiments of the Framers regarding the inherently local function and 
role of juries.850 It corrects Article III, which guarantees only that 
“[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be 
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed,” but not a local jury.851 The Sixth 
Amendment promises that jurors themselves shall be “of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”852 That 
this oversight was considered so grave as to merit its own 
correctional amendment is revealing toward the attitudes of the 
Framers regarding the jury as a local institution.853
A proponent of a jury trial for King Louis XVI,854 Condorcet 
argued that “the trial must be based on sound social choice 
procedures to insure that the jury would have a high probability of 
making a correct decision.”855 However, Rosenkranz makes clear that 
the rationale in the United States for having juries extended beyond 
their likelihood of reaching “correct” decisions or their truth-seeking 
abilities—it closely relates to the principle of federalism.856 Juries do 
not ask merely whether the accused has broken the law in an 
objective, national sense, Rosenkranz says, but ask whether the 
accused has broken the law by particular local standards specific to 
that state.857 Akhil Amar sums it up by saying, “[T]he jury would be 
composed of citizens from the same community, and its actions were 
expected to be informed by community values.”858 Or, says 
Rosenkranz, “to put the point another way, under the Bill of Rights, 
even guilt or innocence in the eyes of God is a local question.”859
                                                     
849. Id. amend. VII. 
850. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1298-99. 
851. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
852. Id. amend. VI. 
853. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1298-99. 
854. Id. at 1298. 
855. See Urken, supra note 818, at 221. 
856. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1299. 
857. See id.
858. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 88-89 (1998) (emphasis added). 
859. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1299; see also AMAR, supra note 858, at 
34 (“The original establishment clause . . . is not antiestablishment but pro-states’ 
rights; it is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus 
nonestablishment and simply calls for the issue to be decided locally.”).
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The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were familiar with the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem,860 and they knew that Condorcet thought it 
meant the ideal constitution should have a one-house legislature.861
Condorcet disliked separation of powers,862 bicameralism,863 and 
federalism,864 but the Framers did not share his views.865 They, 
Rosenkranz concludes, “self-consciously rejected many of 
Condorcet’s most central notions of constitutional structure, and the 
Constitution itself refutes the use of foreign law in its 
interpretation.”866 Madison and others wanted a democratic 
constitution that would protect citizens from transient passions of the 
moment and that would lead to more deliberative democracy.867 The 
Madisonian system of checks and balances harnesses crowd wisdom 
but filters it through many institutions to guarantee that the crowd 
wisdom is arrived at independently and is not just a passing fad.868
The U.S. Constitution is thus built on the “self-conscious[]”
repudiation of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with respect to “some of 
[Condorcet’s] most central theories of constitutional design.”869 This 
suggests that the Condorcet Jury Theorem, as Condorcet understood 
it, is inapplicable to U.S. constitutional law. 
V. CRITICISMS OF THE HAYEKIAN IUS GENTIUM
Throughout this Article, we have tried to strengthen and 
improve upon Professor Waldron’s theoretical justification of the ius 
gentium with an appeal to the virtues of a Hayekian system of 
spontaneous order. Nonetheless, Waldron’s ius gentium remains 
vulnerable to a variety of criticisms, even beyond those to which we 
have alluded thus far. In this Part, we will acknowledge some of the 
                                                     
860. See Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1293 (“Condorcet reluctantly 
accepted American-style separation of powers, but about bicameralism, he was 




864. Id. at 1295 (“Condorcet apparently opposed federalism, at least for 
France.”).
865. Id. at 1308 (“But text, history, and structure show that the Framers 
either expressly rejected or significantly refined many of Condorcet’s most central 
ideas.”).
866. Id. at 1286. 
867. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 761, at 269-70 (James 
Madison). 
868. See id.
869. Rosenkranz, supra note 135, at 1300. 
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additional criticisms that might militate against even a Hayekian ius 
gentium, and in the next Part we try to address these criticisms and 
respond to them. 
A. The Difficulty of Knowing Which Lines to Draw
One practical difficulty with the ius gentium is determining the 
extent to which we should treat courts of different countries alike. 
Which factors should judges take into account when weighing the 
legal materials of one nation against those of another? There must be 
some basic principles guiding the judge on this matter, lest the 
invocation of foreign law becomes a screen for lawmaking from the 
bench.870
This is certainly the fear of Justice Scalia, who said with regard 
to the citation of foreign law by American judges: 
“I mean, it lends itself to manipulation. It invites manipulation. You know, 
I want to do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have to write 
something that—you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to cite 
something. . . . I can’t cite a prior American opinion because I’m
overruling two centuries of practice. . . . So my goodness, what am I going 
to use? . . . I have a decision by an intelligent man in Zimbabwe or 
anywhere else and you put it in there and you give the citation. By God, it 
looks lawyerly! . . . And it lends itself to manipulation. It just does.”871
At his confirmation hearing for Supreme Court Chief Justice, John 
Roberts likened citing foreign legal materials to “‘looking out over a 
crowd and picking out your friends.’”872
Scalia says his colleagues cite foreign law “‘[w]hen it agrees 
with what the justices would like the case to say . . . [but] when it 
doesn’t agree we don’t use it.’”873 He repeated this charge in his 
Roper dissent, accusing the majority of citing foreign law only when 
doing so supports the outcomes they seek.874 “To invoke alien law 
                                                     
870. Waldron says that “[t]he objection is that the use of foreign law is 
undisciplined by any jurisprudence more scrupulous than [cherry picking].” 
WALDRON, supra note 75, at 171. 
871. Dorsen, supra note 137, at 531 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia). 
872. Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, WASH.
POST (Sept. 13, 2005, 3:55 PM) (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301210.html; see also Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Roberts Fields Questions on Privacy and Precedents,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A1 (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts). 
873. Dorsen, supra note 137, at 521 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia). 
874. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law 
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when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is 
not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry,” he writes.875
Even Justice Breyer, who believes that foreign law may 
sometimes be relevant to American cases, worries that “‘[o]nce we 
start to refer to foreign opinions, how do we know we can keep 
matters under control? How do we know we have referred to 
opinions on both sides of the issue?’”876
How much should an Italian precedent weigh against an 
Australian precedent? Is the ruling of an Israeli court of less or 
greater value to an American judge than a South African decision? 
Which countries should we exclude from consideration altogether? 
Surely Professor Waldron does not advocate that North Korean law 
should influence American jurisprudence. Do we reject nations with 
poor human rights records? Should we assign greater weight to the 
laws of countries with similar legal institutions to ours? Perhaps 
American judges should give greater consideration to common law 
nations than nations with civil law, mixed legal systems, or Sharia 
legal systems. With respect to foreign judiciaries, should more 
weight be accorded to constitutional courts than lower courts? 
Another question is whether weight should be given to 
decisions rendered by foreign courts in proportion to the degree of 
responsiveness of those courts to democratic opinion in their 
countries. In the United States, the executive and legislative branches 
check the judicial branch in several important ways. The President 
appoints Supreme Court Justices and federal judges with the advice 
and consent of the Senate,877 a process that tends to ensure that over 
time the ideological bent of the Supreme Court eventually 
corresponds in a rough way to national election results.878 While the 
threat of judicial impeachment is a blunt tool that has been rarely 
                                                                                                               
should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of 
hand. In fact the Court itself does not believe it.”). Justice Scalia then goes on to 
describe the many ways in which the Supreme Court has declined to adopt foreign 
legal practices. Id. at 624-27. “The Court,” he says, “should either profess its 
willingness to reconsider all these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else 
it should cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its 
decisions.” Id. at 627. 
875. Id. at 627. 
876. Dorsen, supra note 137, at 523 (quoting Justice Stephen Breyer). 
877. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
878. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme 
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-85 (1957); see also 
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 13 (1991). 
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used—since 1789 only fifteen federal judges have been impeached, 
and only eight have been removed from office in this way879—it is 
nonetheless an option Congress may theoretically exercise in 
extreme cases.880 For these and other reasons, Yale political scientist 
Robert Dahl argued that the U.S. Supreme Court is in fact responsive 
to national, if not regional, majority opinion.881
In contrast, many global courts are not nearly so responsive to 
popular opinion in their home countries. Supreme court justices in 
the United Kingdom, India, and Israel play a large role in selecting 
their own successors, and these courts are therefore highly 
unresponsive to democratic sentiments.882 In some countries, the 
constitutional court may even strike down constitutional amendments 
as unconstitutional.883 This lack of democratic accountability is even 
more problematic given that a global ius gentium cannot be checked 
by a global executive or global legislature. In other countries, 
constitutional courts are arguably too political. German and Italian 
constitutional court judges are selected through very political 
processes; in comparison, the system of presidential nomination and 
senatorial advising and consent is decidedly meritocratic. French and 
Japanese constitutional court justices tend to be political elder 
statesmen who serve short terms and cannot be considered insulated 
from the political process. In Germany, settled custom dictates that 
half of the court’s justices come from the left and half from the right. 
When deciding how much weight to accord the legal judgments of 
foreign nations, should we not consider how their processes for
judicial selection differ from ours and the problems these can pose? 
Foreign constitutional courts are also often fundamentally 
different from both the U.S. Supreme Court and one another in 
several other important ways. Unlike our Supreme Court, many 
European constitutional courts have justices who are selected in a 
political way, serve staggered terms, and issue opinions that are 
binding on all of society, not just the parties to a case. When the U.S. 
Supreme Court strikes down a statute, it remains on the books but is 
unenforceable, ready to come back to life should the decision that 
                                                     
879. History of the Federal Judiciary: Impeachments of Federal Judges,
FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments. 
html (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
880. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 1. 
881. Dahl, supra note 878, at 281, 294. 
882. See Clark, supra note 811, at 114, 118.  
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ruled it unconstitutional be overturned in the future. In contrast, 
many European constitutional courts strike the offending statute 
from the books entirely. Should American judges give equal weight 
to decisions by politically insulated courts and more overtly political 
courts? To democratically responsive and unresponsive courts? To 
courts that strike laws from the books and courts that merely render 
them unenforceable? These are but some of the practical questions 
which supporters of the ius gentium must address that arise with the 
citation of foreign legal materials. 
B. The Economics of Federalism 
In addition to these practical challenges, there are economics-of 
federalism advantages to not having an ius gentium that Professor 
Waldron does not sufficiently address. Uniformity in the law is not 
always a good thing, and there are often gains to be realized from 
competition among jurisdictions and experimentation with legal 
rules.884 Indeed, there are several economics-of-federalism arguments 
that weigh powerfully against a centralized, globally uniform ius 
gentium, even if developed as the result of a spontaneous system of 
order. 
First, as Professor Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell show, “tastes, 
conditions, and preferences” vary from country to country in ways 
that sometimes make uniformity in the law a bad thing.885 For 
example, people in Portugal may have a different idea about whether 
drugs should be criminalized than people in Singapore.886 Federalism, 
decentralization, and perpetuation of the Westphalian sovereign 
nation state allow both of these peoples to be happy by recognizing 
                                                     
884. See generally Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 34; Steven G. 
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886. Cf. Wiebke Hollersen, “This Is Working”: Portugal, 12 Years After 
Decriminalizing Drugs, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 27, 2013, 11:32 AM), 
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idUSBRE9AD0BG20131114 (“The wealthy city-state of Singapore has for the first 
time lifted the death penalty given to a drug trafficker . . . .”).
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that tastes differ.887 Indeed, imposing the legal tastes of one 
jurisdiction on another could easily be intolerant and even 
totalitarian. Just as the fact that “tastes, conditions, and preferences 
vary geographically is a powerful argument for state power in the 
United States,” so is variance in the tastes and preferences of nation 
states important.888 While certain fundamental rights, such as the 
right not to be murdered, are universal, there should be a large 
“margin of appreciation,” or “federalism discount,” to permit nations 
“to vary from the approach followed by other regions in the 
enforcement of rights,”889 owing to varying differences in tastes, 
preferences, and conditions. 
In this regard, the imposition of a global ius gentium would 
undesirably take away the freedom of exit.890 Federalism is an 
important structural feature of American constitutional government; 
it allows the states to offer a diverse variety of bundles of policy 
goods to satisfy different citizens’ tastes.891 The world is large and 
diverse, even as compared to large federations like the United States 
or the European Union. Because different individuals have different 
tastes and preferences, and because these different tastes and 
preferences correlate with geography, “[b]y devolving some power 
from the national to the sub-national level, constitution writers can 
hope to maximize social welfare and utility.”892 If the main flaw of 
democracy is tyranny of the majority, as Madison feared it would 
be,893 federalism provides at least a partial solution by allowing 
minorities whose interests would otherwise go unrealized to exercise 
meaningful political power without being outvoted by the majority 
every time.894 In this respect, uniform central lawmaking cannot 
achieve the degree of efficiency maximization as federalism, as 
Professor McConnell illustrates with an example: 
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 
each. Assume further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of 
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State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are 
opposed. If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority rule, 110 
people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate decision is made 
by majorities in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. 
The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in State A 
decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to 
move to State A.895
Second, the lack of a globally enforced ius gentium allows for 
competition among jurisdictions with regard to the “bundles of 
public goods”896 they offer citizens.897 “Citizens and businesses will 
vote with their feet for the optimal bundle, and states will experiment 
and compete vigorously with one another as a result.”898 This is good 
for the same reason that competition is good in the marketplace;899
we should be wary of surrendering competition to a global judicial 
monopoly provider. If “government is the surest source of 
monopoly,” we may be reluctant to allow the judiciaries of foreign 
governments to bind us.900 This concern is keenly felt by Americans, 
many of whom came to this country to escape from bad governments 
in Europe and elsewhere. 
Third, a universally enforced ius gentium would stifle 
experimentation among jurisdictions by imposing a standardized set 
of legal rules, preventing them from, as Calabresi and Terrell said in 
a different context, “competing with one another to offer their voters 
the optimal bundle of public goods.”901 When countries experiment 
with different bundles of public goods, they attempt to lure people 
and global capital to their shores, who “will vote with their feet.”902
Experimentation is as good a thing in law as it is in science and 
economics, and a Hayekian ius gentium would reduce 
experimentation and jurisdictional competition. 
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Finally, a universally enforced ius gentium would raise the 
agency costs of monitoring and checking what supreme courts and 
constitutional courts are actually doing with their judicial-review 
power all over the world.903 In democracies, “[v]oters will experience 
lower costs monitoring their politicians in smaller democracies, and 
they will be better able to rein in their elected agents.”904 Citizens can 
more easily monitor their national courts than foreign courts 
“because they are closer to home, easier to . . . see . . . and are 
generally more accessible.”905 Synthesizing and distilling the 
judgments of the world’s jurists into a coherent and sensible 
conclusion is a monumental task, one that grows in difficulty in 
proportion to the number of nations whose legal judgments must be 
consulted.906 “[M]onitoring cost[s], of course, rise[] when the agent is 
further removed from the principal,” Calabresi and Terrell say.907
“‘In respect to the use of foreign law itself, I would say that I 
understand that a judge cannot read everything,’” Justice Breyer 
said.908 It is difficult enough to keep track of what the U.S. Supreme 
Court does; it would be impossible to keep track of what every 
constitutional court in the world is doing. Even American judges can 
occasionally experience difficulty keeping track of American rulings. 
If under the ius gentium judges would in fact strive to examine all 
sides of an issue and not just selectively choose the foreign decisions 
that suit their own thinking—”‘would refer to materials that support 
positions that the judge disfavors as well as those that he favors,’” as 
Justice Breyer says909—the difficulty of monitoring dozens and 
dozens of foreign supreme courts could be a problem. 
C. The Argument That the United States Is a Shining City on a 
Hill910
Waldron also fails to account for the fact that, as Professor 
Calabresi has argued elsewhere, the United States is truly different 
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from Europe and Canada in some ways that may help explain why 
other nations should and do cite our Constitution, but we do not cite 
theirs.911 First, the United States is the third largest country in the 
world in terms of population size,912 is the third largest in terms of 
geographic area,913 and has the world’s highest GDP.914 Some of the 
other countries whose judicial decisions Waldron would have us 
examine are tiny population wise, are tiny geographically, or have 
low economic output. New Zealand, a country Waldron mentions 
several times,915 ranks 127th in terms of global population.916 South 
Africa, which he likewise discusses several times,917 ranks 26th in the 
world in terms of GDP.918 Canada is culturally similar to us in many 
ways and is geographically large, but it has only approximately one-
tenth our population and thus has fewer residents than does the state 
of California.919 Nations such as Denmark are more comparable in 
size, population, and GDP to Minnesota than they are comparable to 
the United States of America.920 None of the countries that have 
judicial review that Waldron compares to America are remotely 
comparable to us in terms of population, geographic size, or 
economic output. Notable exceptions include the European Union, 
which does not really have a government and suffers from a severe 
democracy deficit, as well as India, which is much poorer than the 
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United States.921 Germany is large and prosperous, but it has only 
about one-quarter of the population of the United States.922
Moreover, our Constitution is by far the oldest democratic 
constitution in the world still in use,923 and the constitutions Waldron 
would compare it with may not stand the test of time. 
The United States of America is exceptional not necessarily 
because we are better than other countries, but because we are also 
very different.924 “For almost four hundred years, Americans have 
defined the United States as an exceptional nation with an 
exceptional mission in the world,” Professor Calabresi has written.925
“This self-definition is a part of the ideology of what it means to be 
an American, and it is quite literally un-American to think the United 
States is not a special place.”926 We are a nation of immigrants who 
fled other countries to get away from their laws and tyrannies. This is 
not true of most other nations. countries like India and Germany 
contain few immigrants and have cultures, which date back centuries 
if not millennia, that are often quite different from ours. Ronald 
Reagan described America “as a beacon of freedom for the whole 
world”;927 we are not confident that all foreign countries understand 
themselves this way. 
Moreover, there is no requirement of comity that, just because 
the courts of other sovereign nations cite American law with 
regularity, we are therefore obligated to do the same. Nations such as 
South Africa with young constitutions and limited experience928
grappling with difficult jurisprudential issues that the United States 
has faced over the course of centuries may have much to learn from 
our experiences, but this does not imply that their own experiences 
are in turn valuable to us. “America is a forerunner in constitutional 
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analysis and [perhaps should] not take lessons from those who are 
haltingly following its example.”929
In his critique of Posner and Sunstein, Nicholas Rosenkranz 
asserts that “Condorcet’s vision of law and politics was distinctly 
‘universalist,’ imagining all people everywhere seeking the correct 
answer to questions of law and policy.”930 Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem, Rosenkranz says, “assum[es] that all jurors are answering 
the same abstract question.”931 In contrast, Rosenkranz says, “the 
Framers’ vision, as reflected in many of the Constitution’s textual 
and structural features, was distinctly more localist”;932 the 
Constitution “evinces a clear vision that most questions of law and 
policy are inherently local.”933 According to this view, the premise on 
which the argument for citing foreign law is based is flawed; 
international legal uniformity is, according to this view, not a good to 
be pursued at all.934 In fact, Rosenkranz says, the concept is wholly 
antithetical to our Constitution, which “favors decisionmaking 
mechanisms that harness multiple collective bodies with distinctly 
varied geographic and institutional perspectives, each answering 
subtly different questions.”935
While supporters of the ius gentium may note that other 
countries already cite our Constitution but that we do not cite theirs, 
there is good reason for this phenomenon. First, as we just 
mentioned, our Constitution is considerably older than any other 
written constitution in the world and has inspired other countries’
constitutions, whereas no foreign constitution inspired our own. Just 
as the English Bill of Rights is historically important to our 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment,936 our Constitution is 
similarly relevant to the French, German, Japanese, and South 
African constitutions, all of which were inspired to some degree or 
another by ours. Our Constitution is, if you will, part of the 
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legislative history that informed the drafting of the French, German, 
Japanese, and South African constitutions. These constitutions do 
not, however, illuminate the original meaning or legislative history 
of our own Constitution. Therefore, it may well make a lot of sense 
for the rest of the world to cite American law, but not for us to cite 
theirs. 
From a cultural standpoint, as Professor Calabresi has argued, 
American exceptionalism is defined by a belief that “this land is a 
beacon of liberty and hope to oppressed seekers of freedom from all 
over the world.”937 The struggles of “World War II, the Cold War, 
and McCarthyism were all efforts to save the world from 
totalitarianism.”938 The idea that the United States should aspire to be 
“a shining city on a hill” goes back to a speech given by John 
Winthrop, the leader of the Massachusetts Bay colony.939 Therefore, 
perhaps we 
ought to reject Supreme Court citation of foreign law on the grounds that: 
(1) the American people, whose Constitution is at issue, think America is 
an exceptional place, which by definition should have exceptional laws; 
and (2) America has in fact become an exceptional place to which it would 
not be appropriate to apply European or Canadian laws.940
Put another way, today “American popular culture 
overwhelmingly rejects the idea that the United States has a lot to 
learn from foreign legal systems, including even those of countries to 
which we are closely related like the United Kingdom and 
Canada.”941 Because we seek to be a “shining city on a hill,” one 
might say, we should not submit to “a legal, political, and social 
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culture quite different from our own.”942 According to Professor 
Calabresi, this puts American culture, which presumes that “the 
United States is an exceptional country that differs sharply from the 
rest of the world and that must therefore have its own laws and 
Constitution,” at odds with those who say that American courts have 
much to learn from the law of sovereign, foreign nation states.943
Moreover, says Professor Calabresi, “not only do Americans 
think of the United States as an exceptional country, but it has 
actually become an exceptional country as it has attracted 
immigrants with a unique constellation of ideological beliefs.”944
Americans are much “more individualistic, more religious, more 
patriotic, more egalitarian, and more hostile to unions and Marxism 
than are the people of any other advanced democracy.”945 As he 
notes, all of this casts doubt on the “practicality and wisdom of our 
Supreme Court imposing foreign ideas about law on us.”946
In his Roper dissent, Justice Scalia said, with regard to the 
importation of British law into American constitutional law, that  
[i]t is beyond comprehension why we should look, for that purpose, to a 
country that has developed, in the centuries since the Revolutionary 
War—and with increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s recent 
submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated by 
continental jurists—a legal, political, and social culture quite different 
from our own.947
Elsewhere, he has said: 
“[W]e don’t have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the 
world, and never have. If you told the framers of the Constitution that 
we’re to be just like Europe, they would have been appalled. If you read 
the Federalist Papers, they are full of statements that make very clear the 
framers didn’t have a whole lot of respect for many of the rules in 
European countries. Madison, for example, speaks contemptuously of the 
countries of continental Europe, ‘who are afraid to let their people bear 
arms.’”948
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D. Foreign Law and American Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is an essential characteristic of nationhood. Critics 
of the ius gentium, such as Donald Kochan, note that “[w]hen 
authorities begin to allow the piercing of the veil of sovereignty—
allowing outside sources to pierce the boundaries of domestic law—
there is a surrender of the legislative autonomy a Nation holds in a 
Westphalian system.”949 Kochan concludes that the “right to exclude, 
the right to include, and the methods for determining lie at the heart 
of sovereign authority.”950 Waldron’s ius gentium, as he 
acknowledges himself, is liable to accusations of democratic 
illegitimacy951 and to the claim that it infringes on American 
sovereignty.952 “In virtue of what is the principle about the juvenile 
death penalty law for us?” Waldron rightly asks.953 Americans have 
not consented to be governed by foreign law nor submitted to its 
authority, and we could not democratically overturn a foreign law 
even if we wanted to. “Nobody made it law for us; nobody laid it 
down as such,” Waldron says.954 One can argue that the citation of 
non-American law by American courts is antidemocratic and 
undermines the notion of American sovereignty by subjecting the 
American people to law they did not approve—an idea that seems 
incompatible with the notions of sovereignty and of self-
government.955 “Citing foreign decisions,” says Richard Posner, “is 
best understood as an effort to mystify the adjudicative process and 
disguise the political decisions that are the core of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional output.”956 To quote Felix Cohen’s criticism of 
legal unreality, “[O]ne may suspect that a court would not 
consistently hide behind a barrage of transcendental nonsense if the 
grounds of its decisions were such as could be presented without 
shame to the public.”957 If foreign law imposes constraints on the 
ability of Americans to make their own law, Waldron asks, aren’t
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judges putting something over on them “via some sneaky, self-
serving academic theory”?958
Under our Constitution, a valid federal law must be passed in 
identical form by both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
and be presented to the President for his signature.959 The arduous 
process of passing a bill through two legislative chambers and 
presenting it to the President (or governor, in the case of state 
legislation) for his or her possible veto endows domestic statutes 
with an authority and a legitimacy that other sources of law lack.960
This is even truer of constitutional amendments, which must pass 
both Houses of Congress by two-thirds majorities and then be 
ratified by three-quarters of the States.961 Under H.L.A. Hart’s theory 
of legal positivism, a law is not valid unless it is recognized as such 
by society’s relevant “rules of recognition.”962 Foreign laws 
obviously are not valid under our “rules of recognition,”963 which are 
laid out respectively in Article I and in Article V of the 
Constitution.964 American laws may not always be wise—that is a 
subjective question—but at least they are American laws, created by 
our elected representatives through the standard democratic process. 
“Americans are, after all, Americans, not New Zealanders, 
South Africans, or Europeans,” Waldron acknowledges.965
“Foreigners have their views . . . and we have ours.”966 In his 
explanation of why he opposes the citation of foreign law, Justice 
Scalia says that his theory of constitutional interpretation involves 
“‘try[ing] to understand what it meant, what it was understood by the 
society to mean when it was adopted. . . . It should be easy to 
understand why, for someone who has my theory of interpretation, 
why foreign law is irrelevant.’”967 One need not be an originalist to 
be troubled by the application of the law of other sovereign nations 
by American courts. Why should American courts apply laws that 
have been neither created nor explicitly adopted by the American 
people? How can such laws ever have binding legal force over 
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American citizens? For this reason, it can be argued American courts 
should not utilize foreign law. One might argue that because the 
American people have not democratically approved foreign laws 
through the Article I or Article V processes, they do not possess 
legitimacy within the context of America’s legal and political system 
under H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. At least, this practice may 
require stronger justification than the dubious wisdom of crowds. 
A central premise of the U.S. Constitution is that sovereignty 
rests in “We the People of the United States.”968 To better understand 
the significance of this, let us first examine the constitutional 
tradition of England that had developed there over several centuries, 
a tradition to which most Americans considered themselves heirs.969
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the English Constitution is
largely unwritten, as Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen et al. point 
out.970 It includes some important written documents, including the 
Charter of Liberties of King Henry I in 1100; the Magna Carta in 
1215; the Petition of Right of 1628; the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679;
the English Bill of Rights of 1689; and the Act of Settlement of 
1701.971 Although they serve as “elements” of the English 
Constitution, “none of these documents purported to establish a 
comprehensive, supreme written constitution as the definitive 
instrument of government. Nor did any of them recognize the 
sovereignty of We the People.”972 Indeed,  
[p]arliamentary sovereignty arose out of the idea that the king, the House 
of Lords, and the House of Commons together represented all three of the 
great estates of the realm––the Monarchy, the Aristocracy, and the 
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Common People––and that together they were sovereign and could alter 
even the English Constitution.973  
Together, the “King-in-Parliament” wielded total and absolute 
sovereignty and could alter even the English Constitution at will.974
What restrictions did exist on the King’s power existed by virtue of 
“agreements by the king to limit, or to restrain, what initially 
remained the sovereignty of the king”; though “later agreements 
embod[ied] the division of sovereignty between king and 
Parliament . . . they were never––as the Constitution of the United 
States would be––delegations of power made by the sovereign 
people.”975 The English customary Constitution set up “what . . . 
Aristotle and Polybius would have called a Mixed Regime.”976 It was 
partly monarchical, partly aristocratic, and partly democratic.977
On the other hand, “[t]he premise of the written U.S. 
Constitution is the exact opposite of the premise of the current 
unwritten English Constitution.”978 Under our Constitution, “We the 
People” are sovereign, and “the federal government and all its 
officers––including the Congress, the president, and the justices of 
the Supreme Court––have limited and enumerated powers that flow 
directly from the people.”979 Our Constitution reflects the idea that 
for a government action to possess legitimacy, it “must find [its] root 
in some grant of power from the People in the written 
Constitution.”980
The Constitution cannot be altered except by the procedures 
outlined in Article V,981 even by “the president (Monarch?), the 
Senate and the Supreme Court (Aristocracy?), and the House of 
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Representatives (the Common People?) acting together as the three 
great estates of the American realm.”982 The idea is that it is not theirs 
to alter; “the sovereignty of We the People predates the Constitution 
. . . and is supreme over it.”983 Whereas “these English constitutional 
documents purport to be the one supreme law of the land like the 
U.S. Constitution, and it is even doubtful whether most of them were 
enforceable in court,” Paulsen et al. say, the U.S. Constitution clearly 
“recognize[s] the sovereignty of We the People.”984 An English 
subject needed “to prove the existence of a right against the king and 
had no remedy at all against an Act of Parliament”; under the U.S. 
Constitution, in contrast, “the burden of proof was, in theory at least, 
placed on the federal government and its officers to show that they 
have authority to act.”985
The problem with the ius gentium, one might charge, is that it 
would undemocratically subject Americans to laws they have not 
chosen for themselves; it would impose on them a rule of foreign law 
that they do not like, nor want, nor select in violation of the 
sovereignty of “We the People.” This does not sound like 
democracy. In the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson declares 
that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the 
governed”;986 his grievances against King George III include that 
“[h]e has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign 
to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his 
Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation.”987 Can consent of the 
governed be said to exist when the laws that bind a people have been 
imposed on them by an international judicial elite rather than 
selected by them through the democratic process? 
To put this argument in context, a brief and necessarily 
incomplete survey of historical development of the concept of 
sovereignty follows. The modern notion of sovereignty as an 
important political characteristic of nation states arose after and 
because of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century.988
Prior to that, there was in Western Europe a generally prevailing 
notion that the Pope was the natural arbiter of disputes among states 
and that he occupied a position of hierarchical supremacy over 
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kings.989 The idea of sovereign nation states with independent 
authority over their own geographic territory was not widely held. 
Instead, the distribution of authority was characterized by the quality 
of subsidiarity, with serfs owing allegiance to lords, who owed 
allegiance to kings, who owed allegiance to the Pope, who was 
subsidiary to God. There did not yet exist any real notion of the 
“divine right of kings,” or the idea that kings derive a right to rule 
directly from God and are not subject to earthly authority, which was 
an important point in the development of the concept of sovereignty. 
The kings of France and England were in some respects at least 
theoretically subsidiary to the Pope.990
One of the earliest proponents of the divine right of kings was 
the sixteenth-century French philosopher Jean Bodin, who asserted 
that God endowed kings with earthly authority.991 In Les Six Livres 
de la République, Bodin wrote that “a sovereign prince . . . is 
answerable only to God,”992 that “the prince [is] the image of God,”993
and that “there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than sovereign 
princes.”994 As such, Bodin reasoned, “a prince is not obligated by 
the common law of peoples any more than by his own edicts, and if 
the common law of peoples is unjust, the prince can depart from it in 
edicts made for his kingdom and forbid his subjects to use it.”995
Bodin also came up with the idea that sovereignty must be 
indivisible, housed all in one place.996 Bodin was thus an advocate of 
royal absolutism: “For if sovereignty is indivisible, as we have 
shown, how could it be shared by a prince, the nobles, and the people 
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at the same time?”997 This individualistic conception of the king’s 
sovereignty, we feel, is inconsistent with feudalism, as well as with 
federalism, the division of authority across layers of government, and 
with the Aristotelian and Polybian idea of the “Mixed Regime.”998
The Scottish notion of the divine right of kings arose when the 
Protestant King James VI of Scotland, later King James I of England 
and Ireland, attempted to explain his natural right to rule rather than 
submit to alternative theories of legitimacy such as 
contractarianism.999 In The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, James 
asserted an absolutist view of monarchical rule under which kings 
could create new laws by royal prerogative, so long as he is mindful 
of tradition and God, who could “stirre vp such scourges as pleaseth 
him, for punishment of wicked kings.”1000 According to James, 
“Kings are called Gods by the propheticall King Dauid, because they 
sit vpon GOD[‘s throne on] earth, and haue the count of their 
administration to giue vnto him.”1001 James asserted that kings own 
their realms in the same way that feudal lords owned their fiefs, as 
kings arose “before any estates or rankes of men . . . before any 
Parliaments were holden, or lawes made: and by them was the land 
distributed (which at the first was whole theirs).”1002 For this reason, 
“it followes of necessitie, that the kings were the authors and makers 
of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings.”1003 In Basilikon
Doron, King James I wrote that a king must “acknowledgeth 
himselfe ordained for his people, hauing receiued from God a 
burthen of gouernment, whereof he must be countable.”1004
Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, was also, like Bodin, an early proponent of the idea of 
sovereignty, although Grotius emphasized the role of the concept of 
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sovereignty in international law with respect to matters of war and 
peace, vis-à-vis the relations between nation states in a Westphalian 
global order.1005 Grotius said that “[t]hat power is called sovereign, 
whose actions are not subject to the controul of any other power, so 
as to be annulled at the pleasure of any other human will.”1006 “The 
term any other human will exempts the sovereign himself from this 
restriction, who may annul his own acts, as may also his successor, 
who enjoys the same right, having the same power and no other.”1007
Grotius believed that some states are of a natural disposition “to obey 
[rather] than to govern,” while “sometimes a state is so situated, that 
it seems impossible it can preserve its peace and existence, without 
submitting to the absolute government of a single person.”1008 Thus, 
“as property may be acquired by what has been already styled just 
war, by the same means the rights of sovereignty may be 
acquired.”1009 Grotius rejected social contract theory, noting that 
“though guardianships were invented for the benefit of wards, yet the 
guardian has a right to authority over the ward. Nor, though a 
guardian may for mismanagement be removed from his trust, does it 
follow that a king may for the same reason be deposed.”1010 Like 
Bodin, Grotius believed in virtually absolute sovereignty,1011 though 
not necessarily always monarchical sovereignty.1012 Notably, 
however, he appears to recognize the concept of popular sovereignty 
in distinguishing between usufructuary kingdoms, in which the king 
owns neither the land nor the subjects, but rules in accordance with 
conditions imposed upon him by the people, and patrimonial 
kingdoms, in which the land and subjects are the personal property 
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of the king, who rules absolutely.1013 In our opinion, the former are 
not exactly characterized by democratic self-government, but they do 
have some semblance of popular and constitutional rule, at least 
compared to patrimonial kingdoms. 
The famous English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
introduced the idea of indivisible sovereignty to England with 
Leviathan, published in 1651.1014 Thomas Hobbes’s formulation of 
the idea of indivisible sovereignty was notable because it constituted 
a significant step toward overcoming the problem that had defeated 
previous theorists: reconciling absolute sovereignty with the rights of 
“the People.”1015 Philosophers such as Anthony Ascham, John 
Rockett, and Henry Parker argued that the legitimacy of a 
government is dependent “not on any a priori views about the source 
of political authority but on the existence of a ‘a mutual relation of 
Protection and Allegiance,’” or that so long as the governing entity 
exercised power effectively they should be obeyed, and that this 
“‘mutual relation’” gave the ruling power the legal authority for all 
lawmaking for the political society.1016 They held that the exact 
identity of the ruler was less important than his possession of 
absolute and indivisible sovereign power, and that disputes over who 
in a regime was the holder of sovereignty “were of merely tactical 
significance.”1017
The novelty of Hobbes’s argument was not just that it denied 
all rights of “the People,” but that it denied the existence of a 
collective personality of “the People” altogether.1018 Hobbes 
completely abandoned the conception of a contract between the ruler 
and the ruled allowing the latter to hold the former accountable for 
behavior,1019 insisting instead that sovereignty must be made wholly 
indivisible and must be held in the hands of the ruler, rather than the 
people, lest there be “bellum omnium contra omnes,” or war of all 
against all.1020 Hobbes believed that “[t]o divide sovereign power is 
to create rival sovereigns and, thus, inevitably to initiate the kind of 
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strife that civil society is supposed to remedy and prevent.”1021 Thus, 
his “argument for the indivisibility of sovereignty” led him to “an 
utter rejection of any notion of a mixed regime.”1022 Hobbes was 
greatly affected by the English Civil War,1023 a brutal conflict 
between Parliamentarians (Roundheads) and the Royalists 
(Cavaliers), in which huge numbers of the English, Scottish, and 
Irish populations perished.1024 He “blame[d] Charles I’s councilors 
for legitimating the principle of mixed [regime] in the pre-civil war 
period,”1025 and believed that “a mixed government is no government 
at all.”1026 According to Hobbes, strong, centralized, authoritarian 
leadership was needed to prevent warfare and suffering:  
In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious 
building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require 
much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no 
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and 
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short.1027
The purpose toward which men endeavor in establishing 
statehood, Hobbes believed, was  
the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life 
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable 
condition of war, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been 
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shown . . . ) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power 
to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the 
performance of their covenants.1028
When the monarchy was restored after the interregnum of Oliver 
Cromwell, King Charles II, an ally and financial beneficiary of the 
French King Louis XIV, gave Hobbes a pension.1029
When King James II was overthrown in the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, Parliament invited William and Mary to ascend 
to the English throne and passed the English Bill of Rights,1030 which 
Jon Kenyon calls “one of the great founding documents of Western-
style democracy.”1031 Paulsen et al. write that English rule was 
characterized as a “Mixed Regime,” where power was exercised 
jointly by the monarchy, the House of Lords, and the House of 
Commons.1032 “Parliamentary sovereignty,” they note, “arose out of 
the idea that the king, the House of Lords, and the House of 
Commons together represented all three of the great estates of the 
realm . . . and that together they were sovereign and could alter even 
the English Constitution.”1033 The emphasis here is on the idea that 
sovereignty rested in the three estates “together”—not the king 
alone.1034 In the eighteenth century, William Blackstone wrote 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, a broad treatise on English 
common law and constitutionalism, attempting to reconcile the 
Hobbesian idea of indivisible sovereignty with the real life practice 
of the English “Mixed Regime” by saying that absolute sovereignty 
lies with the “King in Parliament,” or in the Crown, the House of 
Lords, and the House of Commons acting in concert.1035 By the 
eighteenth century, the supremacy of the Crown-in-Parliament had 
established itself as the dominant conceptual framework of British 
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politics.1036 Over time of course, Kings grew more irrelevant until 
they ultimately did become ciphers, and the House of Lords 
eventually followed suit, so that in practice today the House of 
Commons exercises nearly full sovereignty.1037
During the 1500s, France experienced significant conflict 
between Protestants and Catholics, including civil warfare prior to 
the coming to power of King Henry IV.1038 Though King Henry had 
been a Protestant, he converted to Catholicism in order to conquer 
Paris, his thinking reflected by the apocryphal quip “Paris vaut bien 
une messe”—“Paris is well worth a [m]ass.”1039 Later, King Louis 
XIV would take the notion of divine right of kings to the absolutist 
extreme: “French Parliaments were . . . subjected to vigorous 
repression at the hands of the king; they were stripped of their 
political power”1040 while the king also asserted independence from 
the Pope’s authority in temporal matters through the 1682 
Declaration of the clergy of France.1041 King Louis’s outlook that he 
possessed absolute sovereignty in France is well expressed by the 
apocryphal, though oft-quoted, remark “L’État, c’est moi”1042—“I am 
the State.” This is the man who helped indirectly to pay for Thomas 
Hobbes’s retirement by secretly funding King Charles II of England.
In the thirteen colonies that would become United States, 
“there existed only Mixed Regimes of the One, the Few, and the 
Many” until 1787.1043 Generally, power was divided “horizontally 
between royal governors and the popularly elected lower houses of 
colonial legislatures and vertically between the imperial government 
in London and the colonial governments in the thirteen original 
colonies.”1044 In 1787, however, the U.S. Constitution made clear in 
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its Preamble that indivisible sovereignty in the United States was in 
the hands of “We the People.”1045 The will of the sovereign people,
filtered through that of the Framers, who “hated concentrations of 
government power,” was expressed through a complex system of 
“checks and balances, separation of powers, bicameralism, and 
federalism [that] sought to preserve liberty by making it hard for 
government to act.”1046 France in 1789 had its own revolution, but it 
gave absolute sovereignty first to the National Assembly and then to 
the Emperor Napoleon. This proved over time to be a catastrophic 
mistake. 
One may argue that acceptance of foreign law, as being in any 
way binding, would violate the indivisible sovereignty of “We the 
People.” It is fair to say that when U.S. courts enforce the 
Constitution using the power of judicial review, they are checking 
“We the People’s” laws against “We the People’s” Constitution, 
which is the supreme law.1047 If courts were to start invalidating U.S. 
laws based on binding foreign law decisions, would they infringe on 
the indivisible sovereignty of We the American People?  
“‘[W]e don’t have the same moral and legal framework as the 
rest of the world, and never have,’” says Justice Scalia.1048 In the 
Eighth Amendment context, he says, judges should look to “‘[t]he 
standards of decency of American society—not the standards of 
decency of the world, not the standards of decency of other countries 
that don’t have our background, that don’t have our culture, that 
don’t have our moral views.’”1049 Other nations “may be willing to 
prostitute their legal traditions, but we shouldn’t give up our 
sovereignty so easily.”1050 Waldron acknowledges the sovereign 
nation-state problem with his ius gentium theory, but we feel he fails 
to sufficiently address it. 
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E. Perceived Incompatibility with Originalism 
Finally, the citation of foreign law is said to be inconsistent 
with the practice of originalism.1051 Justice Scalia’s objection to the 
citation of the legal materials from other sovereign, foreign nation 
states has already been noted.1052 Faithful originalists must consider 
the arguments for the ius gentium and wonder “why a poll of United 
Nations members today has any bearing on the meaning of a 
constitutional text that James Madison drafted in 1791.”1053 Posner 
and Sunstein acknowledge as much, admitting that if it is “correct to 
think that originalism, by itself, excludes reference to foreign 
precedents[, and] if the Constitution means what it originally meant, 
the contemporary practices of foreign nations are usually 
immaterial.”1054 Elsewhere, they write that “originalists might not be 
especially concerned about the practices of other courts in other 
nations, because those practices would not bear on the Constitution’s
original meaning.”1055
Rosenkranz argues that  
[t]he notion of unelected judges updating the Constitution to reflect their 
own evolving view of good government is troubling to some, in itself. But 
the notion that this evolution may be brought about by changes in foreign 
law raises even deeper issues of democratic self-governance. Again, to put 
the point most sharply, when the Supreme Court declares that the 
Constitution evolves, and declares further that foreign law effects [sic] its 
evolution, it is declaring nothing less than the power of foreign 
governments to change the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.1056
Article V already provides for a means for instigating constitutional 
change; foreign judges should not perform this task.1057
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VI. RESPONSES TO CRITICISMS
In Part V, we examined some of the objections that might be 
raised against Waldron’s idea of the ius gentium, as supplemented by 
us with the concept of Hayekian spontaneous orders. In this Part, we 
attempt to respond to the extent we can to the objections we just 
discussed. 
A. Drawing the Lines 
In the last Part, we posed some difficult questions that any 
proponent of the ius gentium must address in some way or another, 
including knowing how to create practical rules and guidelines for 
American judges to follow when citing the law of other foreign, 
sovereign nation states. In his book, Waldron offers some 
suggestions for how judges should evaluate foreign legal materials 
when a “consensus that is less than 100 percent” exists on a given 
issue.1058 Now, we will take the opportunity ourselves to offer 
additional general, common-sense guidelines to which American 
judges should adhere when or if they find themselves citing foreign 
sources of law, notwithstanding all the arguments just made against 
that practice.  
Our rules are not—not—hard and fast rules. There is no 
magical formula; these suggestions are standards and principles 
rather than rules, and should not be applied rigidly or in all cases. 
Furthermore, each proceeds on the assumption of ceteris paribus. A 
wise judge may conceivably find compelling reasons to assign less 
weight to one country’s court rulings than another even if the first is 
more politically open. Likewise, we suggest that there are no 
mathematical constants of correlation; an increase in population size 
of magnitude X does not result in Y degrees more judicial credibility. 
Nonetheless, we believe that general observance of these guidelines 
will tend to yield better judicial results. 
First, we suggest that, all other things being equal, foreign 
judicial decisions that are cited or discussed should at least be 
weighted proportionately to the size of the population of the 
democratic countries from which they originate. A large population 
is by no means a guarantee of a wise legal regime—China has the 
world’s largest population at over 1.3 billion and yet is far more 
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repressive than the United States in terms of civil, political, and 
economic rights.1059 However, we believe there is a fairly compelling 
argument for this rule simply on the basis of democratic legitimacy. 
When a greater proportion of the global population lives under a 
legal regime, we think it may merit heightened consideration in 
judicial deliberations within the ius gentium. If the ius gentium is to 
represent “the legal wisdom of the world,” it makes sense that those 
countries, which have larger populations and are democracies, and 
thus arguably have more “legal wisdom” to share, should have a 
stronger voice.1060
Second, we believe that, other factors aside, judges should 
prefer to look to countries with legal regimes that promote the 
prosperity and well-being of their people. One obvious measure of 
prosperity is, of course, GDP per capita; court opinions from 
countries with larger, rather than smaller, GDPs per capita should be 
paid somewhat more respect. There is something to be said for the 
inherent wisdom and goodness of a legal regime that is associated 
with greater prosperity and higher standards of living.1061 If the ius 
gentium has any interest maximizing “public welfare,”1062 GDP per 
capita is certainly as good a metric of this quality to employ. It seems 
to make more sense, after all, for courts to cite opinions from 
Argentina, which in 2010 saw a real GDP growth rate of 7.5%, than 
Bulgaria, which in 2010 experienced real GDP growth of only 
0.3%.1063 But, obviously, GDP per capita is not the only measure of 
well-being, or even necessarily the best. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, for instance, measures 
quality of life using a holistic index that accounts for environment, 
life satisfaction, safety, work-life balance, and community, among 
other metrics.1064 Countries that seek to maximize utility face trade-
offs between competing values; some countries may prefer more 
leisure time or less stress for lower economic growth.1065 Because 
there is nothing wrong with this, we believe the use of GDP per 
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capita should be supplemented by non-market measures of happiness 
and welfare as well. 
Third, the weight assigned to court decisions from countries 
that have poor human rights records or that regularly deny their 
citizens basic social, political, and economic opportunity should be 
discounted accordingly. Again, the purpose of the ius gentium is to 
harness the collective private knowledge of the many countries of the 
world.1066 One may question the wisdom that emanates from regimes 
that oppress their own people and intimidate their neighbors. In 
Saudi Arabia, “[d]etainees, including children, commonly face 
systematic violations of due process and fair trial rights, including 
arbitrary arrest, and torture and ill-treatment in detention. Saudi 
judges routinely sentence defendants to hundreds of lashes.”1067 In 
North Korea, “the government represses all forms of freedom of 
expression and opinion and does not allow any organized political 
opposition, independent media, free trade unions, civil society 
organizations, or religious freedom.”1068 We would not want to 
emulate these nations’ lead on human rights issues. The spontaneous 
order that the ius gentium represents would likely only be polluted by 
the “knowledge” that such nations might contribute. 
Fourth, we think it is appropriate if nations choose to pay 
relatively greater heed to the judgments of nations with legal systems 
that are more like their own. We expect that the challenges faced by 
countries with legal regimes similar to our own are likelier to 
resemble those that will confront this country. If, as Justice Breyer 
argues, the purpose of looking to foreign law for guidance is to learn 
how in a difficult case facing a U.S. court a “‘human being called a 
judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar 
problem,’”1069 it seems that the educational value of such knowledge 
is  greater the more similar the two countries are. “‘[W]hat is at 
issue[ is] [t]o what extent will learning what happens in other courts 
help a judge apply the Constitution of the United States,’” Justice 
Breyer says.1070 “‘[I]n today’s world where similar relevant 
experience becomes more and more common we are more likely to 
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learn from other countries.’”1071 We think this would be truer for 
countries that are in relevant ways more like our own. 
For example, the right to silence has come before the courts of
several common law nations.1072 In the United States, the Supreme 
Court in Miranda v. Arizona found that the privilege against self-
incrimination required law enforcement officers to notify suspects in 
custody of their rights to remain silent and obtain an attorney before 
interrogation.1073 In Griffin v. California, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a defendant’s refusal to testify cannot be construed by a judge or 
prosecutor as evidence of guilt.1074 In 1990, the Supreme Court of 
Canada issued a similar judgment when the issue of self-
incrimination came before it, finding in R. v. Hebert that the right to 
silence is a principle of fundamental justice and cannot be subverted 
through law-enforcement subterfuge.1075 In 1978, the India Supreme 
Court also declared a right against self-incrimination in Satpathy v. 
Dani.1076
Many common law countries also confront the issues of 
restrictions on admissible evidence, especially whether or not to 
adopt the exclusionary rule.1077 The U.S. Supreme Court established 
the exclusionary rule at the federal level in the 1914 case Weeks v. 
United States;1078 the Warren Court extended that rule to the states in 
the 1961 case Mapp v. Ohio.1079 New Zealand followed suit in 
Edwards v Police, in which the court acquitted a man arrested on his 
own property for operating a motorbike while intoxicated because 
the arrest had been unlawful, and thus the blood test to which he had 
consented following that unlawful arrest was inadmissible.1080
Another issue that confronts common law nations is whether 
defendants possess a right to have counsel provided by the state 
when they are unable to obtain representation themselves.1081 The 
U.S. Supreme Court established a right to counsel in the 1963 
decision Gideon v. Wainwright,1082 while the Canadian Supreme 
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Court did so in the 1995 case, R. v. Burlingham.1083 However, in 1995 
the South African Supreme Court explicitly declined to declare an 
absolute right to counsel in State v. Vermaas and in S v. Du Plessis,
calling itself “ill equipped for the factual findings and assessments 
which the enquiry entails” and saying that “[s]uch a decision is pre-
eminently one for the judge trying the case.”1084
We should note that the U.S. Constitution differs from “the 
monism of the British Westminister [sic] form” of parliamentary 
government because of our presidential, separation of powers,
judicial review tradition,1085 and our rejection of the whole concept of 
indivisible parliamentary sovereignty.1086 Because we believe that 
“existence of presidentialism and of the separation of powers in our 
Constitution is a praiseworthy feature of the document that should 
[sometimes] be emulated abroad,”1087 perhaps in this respect the 
French and Latin American constitutions are more relevant to us than 
are other common law analogues.1088 We do, however, share a 
tradition of constitutional federalism with Canada,1089 Australia,1090
India,1091 and Germany.1092 We believe Americans can learn 
something of value about federalism from looking at foreign law. 
Our fifth guideline is the one we believe to be most important 
for American judges to mind as they deliberate using foreign sources 
of law. American courts should rely to a greater extent on decisions 
reached by courts that are more open and responsive to the 
democratic sentiments of their people. It seems to us fair to say that 
courts possess democratic legitimacy in proportion to their 
democratic accountability. First, one criticism levied against the ius 
gentium is that it lacks democratic authority; as Justice Scalia says, 
“I doubt whether anybody would say, ‘Yes, we want to be governed 
by the views of foreigners.’”1093 A rule specifying that rulings by 
more democratic courts be accorded greater stature in American 
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judicial deliberations could help counterbalance the problems posed 
by this lack of democracy. Second, we believe legitimacy of the ius 
gentium is due to the fact that it meets all four of Surowiecki’s 
conditions for crowd wisdom: It is a consensus formed among a 
large and diverse group of people whose opinions are formed 
independently, and courts can successfully aggregate this 
information.1094 Thus, we expect that a democratically responsive 
court would be more successful in integrating information from a 
multitude of backgrounds rather than just the social elites or the 
ruling regime.  
All other things being equal, it makes sense for American 
courts to give more weight to opinions issued by the French or 
Japanese constitutional courts—whose appointees are superannuated 
government figures well known to the public through their political 
service and can thus be considered somewhat democratically 
accountable—than those of the India Supreme Court—whose 
appointees play a role in selecting their own replacements.1095 We
feel that the manner in which foreign judges are appointed is 
somewhat relevant to the degree of weightiness we should give their 
decisions. We also feel that the decisions of foreign constitutional 
courts should be given more weight than those of lower courts 
because a constitutional court ruling reflects the settled legal 
judgment of a particular society in a way that a lower-court ruling 
does not. However, it may still be appropriate to cite lower-court 
rulings in circumstances where the questions they consider are 
typically not encountered in rulings of higher courts, perhaps 
because they are usually settled at a lower level. 
Obviously, the list of rules we have offered is far from 
exclusive and should serve as only a rough suggestion. Indeed, a 
precise, mathematical application of them would be close to 
impossible. They may contradict one another in particular 
applications. Anyone looking for sharp, rule-like directives will be 
disappointed. At best, these rules are guidelines for American judges 
navigating the landscape of the law of foreign sovereign nation states 
on whether to cite such law or read it. Can unscrupulous judges 
misuse these rules to “‘look[] over a crowd and pick[] out . . . 
friends,’” as the late Judge Harold Levanthal said?1096 To cherry-pick 
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foreign decisions that support the positions they wish to take?1097 Of 
course. But judges can already choose between sister-state or sister-
circuit precedents and whether or how to distinguish cases before 
them from existing precedent. As Posner and Sunstein noted, the 
practice of state courts citing one another’s law is hardly 
uncommon.1098 “[I]f you’re just going to pick out the ideas and 
reasoning that you like, if you’re going to shove them in[to] your 
opinions, and give what you wrote decoration, well, that’s
dishonest,” said Michael Kirby, a former judge of the High Court of 
Australia.1099 “If judges want to be dishonest, then they’ll be 
dishonest.”1100
B. Economic Arguments for Greater Centralization
We previously listed four economic arguments for federalism 
that seem to argue against the existence of the ius gentium.1101 The 
citation of foreign law is obviously an area where America needs to 
tread carefully; we are not suggesting that we should cite the law of 
other nations in all matters. First, though, it is undoubtedly true that 
the ius gentium allows American courts to capitalize on the tendency 
of foreign legal systems, in the words of Sandra Day O’Connor, “to 
innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal 
problems that arise each day.”1102 Even while arguing against the 
domestic citation of foreign law generally, Richard Posner candidly 
acknowledges that “[j]ust as our states are laboratories for social 
experiments from which other states and the federal government can 
learn, so are foreign nations laboratories from whose legal 
experiments we can learn.”1103
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Moreover, arguments based on the economics of federalism cut 
two ways.1104 There are at least four powerful economics-of-
federalism arguments that may sometimes counsel in favor of 
international uniformity that should be taken into account alongside 
those against it. The first is that individual nations, like American 
states, face at least some “collective action problems with respect to 
[but not necessarily limited to]: (1) war and foreign affairs; (2) free 
trade; (3) correcting externalities imposed by state action; and (4) 
reaping the benefits of economies of scale,”1105 that we feel are best 
addressed by the existence of international rules. Citing foreign law 
could in theory help address collective-action problems presented by 
different standards in international criminal law or tax law—namely, 
the need to stop races to the bottom.1106 Tax law has already created 
such a race to the bottom: The IRS devotes extensive resources to 
cracking down on abusive tax shelters, as some nations compete to 
serve as tax shelters for individuals and corporations.1107 Meanwhile, 
the Supreme Court’s 2013 opinion for Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.1108 may have sharply limited the ability of foreign 
plaintiffs to “bring suits in U.S. courts against other foreigners, for 
human rights violations in foreign countries,”1109 but we feel it also 
raises the question of whether greater global uniformity in criminal 
law norms is needed to prevent opportunistic litigation. Perhaps 
fewer such suits would be filed if comparative criminal law provided 
greater consistency in dealing with criminal offenses. 
Another collective-action problem that may call for the creation 
of stronger international legal norms may be the “version of legal 
hell” that Professors Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu say is promised by 
“[t]erritorial control of the Internet”—“a world of Singaporean free 
speech, American tort law, Russian commercial regulation, and 
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Chinese civil rights.”1110 Freedom of speech, to offer one example, 
may need global protection so that censorious countries such as 
Iran,1111 Syria,1112 and China1113 cannot unilaterally shut down speech 
most of the world wants to receive.1114  
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1113. In China, at least five different government bureaucracies play a role in 
monitoring or censoring the Internet: the Internet Affairs Bureau and the Centre for 
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In addition, “overlapping and conflicting national agendas”
have complicated efforts to safeguard online privacy rights,1115
particularly the “right to be forgotten.”1116 This issue has become 
especially salient as private corporations, such as Facebook and 
Google, as well as other nongovernment actors, have come to play a 
larger role in shaping the meaning of free speech.1117 The Global 
Online Freedom Act, which would prevent U.S. technology 
companies from cooperating with foreign governments to help them 
censor the Internet by levying civil and criminal penalties against 
those who do, has been introduced in every session of Congress 
since the 109th Congress,1118 while the Global Internet Freedom Act, 
which would provide funding to combat Internet jamming by 
totalitarian foreign governments, was introduced in the 107th, 108th, 
and 109th Congresses, but has not been reintroduced since then.1119
                                                                                                               
the Study of Public Opinion of the State Council Information Office, the Internet 
Bureau and the Information and Public Opinion Bureau of the Publicity Department 
(formerly the Propaganda Department), the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, the Internet Information Security Supervision of the Ministry of Public 
Security, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s Internet Illegal 
Information Reporting Centre. See REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 1111,
at 19. China’s network of tools to filter, observe, and censor the Internet are 
collectively known as the “Great Firewall of China.” Id. at 20 (“The tools put in 
place to filter and monitor the Internet are collectively known as the Great Firewall 
of China.”); see also Mark McDonald, Adding More Bricks to the Great Firewall of 
China, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2012, 12:36 AM), 
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/adding-more-bricks-to-the-great-
firewall-of-china/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
1114. See sources cited supra notes 1110-12. 
1115. Tim Wu, The International Privacy Regime, in SECURING PRIVACY IN 
THE INTERNET AGE 91, 92 (Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman & Margaret Jane 
Radin eds., 2008). For one of the earlier analyses of the implications of the 
Internet’s breakdown of national boundaries on privacy rights, see generally Peter P. 
Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the 
Internet, 32 INT’L LAW. 991 (1998). 
1116. See Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web That Never
Forgets, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 345, 352 (2011). 
1117. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: A Small Group of Tech 
Executives Are Rewriting the Rules of Free Speech––Right Now, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 13, 2013, at 20, 23, 27. 
1118. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong.; Global 
Online Freedom Act of 2009, H.R. 2271, 111th Cong.; Global Online Freedom Act 
of 2011, H.R. 1389, 112th Cong.; Global Online Freedom Act of 2013, H.R. 491, 
113th Cong. 
1119. Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 5524, 107th Cong. (2002); Global 
Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 48, 108th Cong. (2003); Global Internet Freedom Act, 
H.R. 2216, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Kaydee Smith, Note, A Global First 
Amendment?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 509, 510 (2008). 
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Professor Wu argues that “any normative view of privacy must take 
into account the descriptive fact that much of the privacy policy that 
affects Americans will be set overseas.”1120 He suggests that 
Americans who want more privacy protection should lobby other 
nations “to enact strong and extraterritorial privacy legislation.”1121
However, the U.S. may be unable to tackle online speech alone, and 
the development of international norms regarding free speech may be 
needed.1122
Another argument in favor of international uniformity is the 
need to prevent the imposition of negative externalities by one nation 
against another.1123 One example of an externality between U.S. 
states, which Calabresi and Terrell offer, is “air pollution emissions 
by Midwestern manufacturing states that caused acid rain in New 
England.”1124 Nations often “have little political incentive to correct 
them because the[ir] . . . own citizens may benefit from [the 
externality-producing activity], the costs of which are felt mainly by 
[nonresidents] with no vote in the . . . state’s elections.”1125
Externalities that arise from “dissonant conceptions” of legal 
issues “can undermine comity between nations, making [matters of 
international relations] like extradition more difficult.”1126 What is an 
example of an action by one nation that imposes negative 
externalities on another? One may be the death penalty, which has 
been abolished in the United Kingdom but not the United States.1127
“[I]n the case of Soering (1989),1128 it proved impossible for the State 
of Virginia to extradite a young German man from the United 
Kingdom to be tried for the murder of the parents of his American 
girlfriend,” Waldron notes.1129 “No credible assurance could be given 
that Soering would not face the death penalty and hence become 
vulnerable to the death row syndrome, which is regarded in itself as 
                                                     
1120. Wu, supra note 1115, at 93. 
1121. Id.
1122. Cf. Smith, supra note 1119, at 519-29, 536 (describing two 
congressional efforts to unilaterally promote American free speech norms 
throughout the globe, but concluding that even the more promising of the two, 
coupled with other actions, would likely only lead to “a relatively minor change”).
1123. Cf. Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper 
Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 570-73 (1994). 
1124. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 21. 
1125. Id.
1126. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 116. 
1127. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37-38 (1989). 
1128. Id.
1129. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 116-17 (footnote inserted by authors). 
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an inhuman or unacceptably cruel form of treatment in European 
human rights law, but not in American law.”1130 A virtual global 
consensus on the death penalty, which the Court recognized in Roper 
with respect to crimes committed while under the age of eighteen,1131
could promote legal harmony and reduce the potential for such 
externalities to occur. It might make particular sense to harmonize 
the laws of the world’s nations in those areas with regard to which 
nations frequently interact.1132
A third economic argument for international legal uniformity 
induced by the citation and reading of foreign cases rests on the 
economies of scale that are experienced when activities are 
coordinated once by a central entity—in this case, the ius gentium
itself—rather than being done many times over by individual 
nations. “Less is not always more, and sometimes bigger is better,”
Calabresi says.1133 “This is why national grocery market chains have 
largely replaced corner grocery stores.”1134 Just as “it is self-evident 
that there are economies of scale that are gained by letting the 
national government create an Air Force, a National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, and a medical science research program 
through the National Institutes of Health,”1135 so it may make more 
sense to have one International Criminal Court, one World Bank, one 
International Monetary Fund, and one World Trade Organization 
than for each nation that is a party to one of these organizations to 
establish each of these bodies on their own. This explains why many 
European countries have chosen to develop a trans-European space 
program rather than develop their own programs independently.1136
International legal norms “can realize economies of scale that the 
[nation] states cannot.”1137
Finally, international legal uniformity may promote the 
protection of civil and human rights more effectively than having 
                                                     
1130. Id. at 117. 
1131. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005) (“In sum, it is fair to say 
that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the 
juvenile death penalty.”).
1132. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 187-88.
1133. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 24. 
1134. Id.
1135. Id.
1136. See What Is ESA?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/About_Us/ 
Welcome_to_ESA/What_is_ESA (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
1137. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 24. 
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different countries enjoy total discretion in these matters.1138 This 
argument 
has its origins in a debate that went on between 1787 and 1788, during the 
ratification process for the U.S. Constitution. Opponents of the 
Constitution, who called themselves the Anti-Federalists, argued that 
democracy was only possible in small city-states like Athens and Rome, 
before it acquired its empire. They claimed that government had to keep 
close to the source of its power (the people) to reduce agency and 
monitoring costs. Direct popular participation in governments larger than a 
city-state was obviously not feasible in the 18th Century given then-
available technologies. Moreover, the Framers’ prior experience with a 
sort of federalism through membership in the British Empire had soured 
them on the feasibility of making a distant imperial government 
responsive to democratic preferences in the provinces.1139
In The Federalist No. 10, James Madison responded to these 
concerns with an argument now understood as the backbone of 
American democracy.1140 He said that democracies are most 
threatened by factional conflict, which may yield a tyranny of the 
majority.1141 Federalism, he argued, would solve this challenge by 
“[e]xtend[ing] the sphere” to take in a greater number of interest 
groups, making it unlikelier that any one faction would become 
entrenched and capable of consistently determining policy.1142 “The 
latent causes of faction [were] . . . sown in the nature of man,”1143
Madison wrote. “Such a tyranny occurs, according to Madison, when 
an entrenched majority faction consistently decides an issue or a set 
of issues unjustly for its own self-interested benefit,” Calabresi 
says.1144
According to Calabresi and Terrell, Madison argued that two 
structural features of federalism would make tyranny of the majority 
less likely to occur.1145 Madison believed, they say, that as the 
number and variety of interest groups increase, “[t]his increase in the 
number and variety of factions . . . would make it harder for a 
permanent tyrannical majority coalition to form and to endure at the 
                                                     
1138. Cf. id. at 26. 
1139. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 36-39
(Morton Borden ed., 1965). 
1140. See Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 26-27. See generally 
Calabresi, supra note 893. 
1141. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 893, at 77 (James Madison). 
1142. Id. at 83. 
1143. Id. at 79. 
1144. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 27; see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 10, supra note 893, at 77 (James Madison). 
1145. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 27. 
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national level as compared to the state level.”1146 Obviously, there are 
fewer interest groups at the national level than at the international 
level, making it less likely that a faction or coalition will become 
entrenched at the international level. Second, larger numbers of 
participants in a governmental community create communications 
and organizational problems that impede the ability of majorities “to 
discover their own strength and to act in unison.”1147 “As Madison 
foresaw, communication and organizational costs are comparatively 
lower for discrete and insular minorities than for large amorphous 
groups.”1148 Thus, “this organizational advantage that minorities have 
over majorities becomes even more pronounced” and helps ensure 
their protection.1149 The traits that render minorities more vulnerable 
at lower levels of government—“[t]he very discreteness and 
insularity that render minorities vulnerable”—give them 
disproportionate influence as the sphere is expanded.1150
As the number of sub-units increases, the problems of 
collective action, externalities, economies of scale, and civil rights 
justify the empowerment of higher levels of authority to make 
decisions relating to these questions that are binding on all.1151 With 
regard to the ius gentium, therefore, arguments based on the 
economics of federalism at the very least cut both ways. 
C. How the “Shining City on a Hill” Argument Supports the Ius 
Gentium1152
A third argument against citing or looking at the ius gentium is 
that America is “a shining city on a hill” that has, for two centuries, 
had an “exceptional mission as an exemplar of liberty and a refuge 
for those yearning for both freedom and economic opportunity,” and 
                                                     
1146. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 893, at 83 (James 
Madison). 
1147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 893, at 83 (James Madison). 
1148. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 29; Calabresi, supra note 893, at 
1408; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 893, at 77 (James Madison);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 46-47 (8th prtg. 1980) (discussing collective action problems of 
groups engaged in the provision of public goods). 
1149. Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 160, at 29. 
1150. Id. at 30. 
1151. Cf. id. at 6. 
1152. This is the term Professor Calabresi previously used in arguing, on the 
basis of American exceptionalism, against the citation of foreign law. See generally
Calabresi, American Exceptionalism, supra note *. 
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that consequently, the citation of the law of foreign nation states 
from which our ancestors fled has no place in our courts.1153 We
might respond by asserting that America is not, in fact, quite as 
unique a country as the proponents of the “shining city on a hill” 
thesis suggest—i.e., to dispute the fundamental premise of the 
argument. One could certainly argue that the similarities between 
America’s cultural, political, legal, and economic systems and those 
of the rest of the world in fact do outweigh the differences. But why 
bother? We assume that such a response would not satisfy those who 
do believe in the shining city on a hill thesis; this argument would 
likely only hold sway for those who already accept or are 
sympathetic to it. Furthermore, we ourselves are not willing to 
discard the notion that America is in some respects “a shining city on 
a hill.”1154
Instead, while acknowledging that the United States is an 
extraordinary country, one could argue that these very differences 
between us and the rest of the world in fact offer the strongest 
argument in favor of the ius gentium. Why? Let us simply remember 
the necessary conditions for systems of spontaneous order to operate 
efficiently. The wisdom of a crowd is proportional to the “diversity 
of opinion” or “private information” it possesses.1155 Thus, American 
exceptionalism suggests that the knowledge taken in by the ius
gentium would be very diverse indeed, at least from our perspective.
After all, the more unlike the rest of the world we are, the more we 
can learn from those nations that are different from us in various 
respects. If, as Surowiecki says, crowd wisdom is likelier to emerge 
when groups are diverse,1156 how valuable would the ius gentium be 
if all nations were similar to one another in relevant legal, cultural, 
social, and economic aspects? Is there not more to potentially learn 
from nations that are unlike our own?  
This is not to say that the legal institutions of nations unlike our 
own are more likely to be wise or correct or applicable in U.S. 
constitutional cases. We may very well look at foreign legal regimes 
and then decide that we prefer our own. But with legal institutions so 
unlike our own, there is at least more to examine. Tautologically, the 
more exceptional America is, the more unlike other nations we are. 
The greater the differences between “us” and “them” are, however, 
                                                     
1153. Id. at 1365. 
1154. See generally id.
1155. SUROWIECKI, supra note 115, at 10. 
1156. Id.
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the greater the diversity of private knowledge that the ius gentium
would let us take into account, whether or not we choose to follow 
the foreign practice.1157 American exceptionalism offers an argument 
against the citation of foreign law, but it also suggests that the value 
of the ius gentium as a mechanism for discovering the best legal 
rules and principles would be quite high. The shining city on a hill
argument, like the economics-of-federalism argument, thus arguably 
cuts both ways; it is certainly an idea that can sometimes be 
employed in defense of the ius gentium by its proponents. 
D. Assuaging Concerns over American Sovereignty 
A fourth argument against the ius gentium is that it would 
undermine American sovereignty.1158 It certainly would be true that 
the citation of foreign law would lack democratic legitimacy if 
judges were to apply it as authority in place of, or in ways that 
contradicted, existing American law—if it operated in a manner 
similar to Justice Scalia’s droll characterization of the Roper
majority’s reasoning: “I do not believe that the meaning of . . . our 
Constitution[] should be determined by the subjective views of five 
Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners.”1159 We believe 
that this complaint may be overstated because even when American 
judges consult foreign legal materials, they do so at their own 
discretion, giving them “certainly nothing approaching binding 
weight[] in their decisions.”1160 It is not as if domestic judges are 
“submitting to [the] decisions of courts elsewhere as to a foreign 
overlord.”1161 American judges choose to undertake a review of 
foreign law during the process of judicial reasoning, deciding 
whether to cite foreign law just as they decide whether to cite law 
review articles or books. The oft-stated fear that citing foreign law is 
like submitting to foreign rule “obscures the fact that it is always a 
domestic decision-maker who concludes that a non-U.S. rule should 
                                                     
1157. Cf. id.
1158. Waldron himself acknowledges, and confronts, this line of attack. 
WALDRON, supra note 75, at 20-21 (“One can almost hear the response: ‘They may 
be willing to prostitute their legal traditions, but we shouldn’t give up our 
sovereignty so easily.’”); id. at 168-70 (considering and responding to the 
sovereignty objection in greater depth). 
1159. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1160. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 168-69.
1161. Id. at 168. 
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be” cited in a U.S. case.1162 Regardless of whether one likes a 
particular decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, “it is U.S. judges,”
acting with their own agency, “who are doing this in the course of 
American judicial reasoning,” not a foreign crown.1163
Even putting this point aside, however, arguments against 
citing foreign law resting on concerns over American sovereignty are 
misguided because, as Waldron says, the ius gentium should 
“complement the law of individual states, which are said to be ruled 
partly by [it] and partly by their own particular laws, in the rulings of 
those states’ national courts.”1164 It is “an additional common source
of national law,” he says, “rather than . . . a distinct body of law in its 
own right.”1165 We think the idea of foreign judges imposing their 
own laws and precedents in direct contradiction to what has clearly 
been established as law in America is a straw man, and fears of such 
judicial perversion that have been expressed are borne out of either a 
misunderstanding or distorted understanding of what the ius gentium
is. As Waldron makes clear, “everything depends on whether a 
convincing argument can be made that the proper interpretation of 
[constitutional or statutory] provisions like these requires or permits 
recourse to foreign law.”1166 If such an argument can be made, judges 
should consider foreign legal materials.1167 If it cannot be made, they 
should ignore foreign law altogether.1168 Waldron is correct in saying 
that “just as no foreign exporter forces us to take its goods, so no 
foreign legal system forces us to consider its precedents.”1169 When 
we look to foreign law, it is “because we judge it appropriate to do 
so.”1170
Judges should look to the decisions of foreign courts only when 
American law is so open-ended that it seems to invite, if not require, 
the citation of some source of understanding other than the text of 
the statute or constitutional provision in question. H.L.A. Hart speaks 
of the “open texture of law,”1171 a concept borrowed from the works 
                                                     
1162. Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 239, 262 (2003) (emphasis omitted). 
1163. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 169. 
1164. Id. at 59. 
1165. Id.
1166. Id. at 147. 
1167. Id.  
1168. Id.  
1169. Id. at 169. 
1170. Id.
1171. HART, supra note 128, at 124. 
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of Friedrich Waismann.1172 What this term seeks to convey is that 
“however tightly we think we define an expression, there always 
remains a set of (possibly remote) possibilities under which there 
would be no right answer to the question of whether it applies.”1173 In
other words, the plain text of a law, applied to a certain specific set 
of facts, often leaves room for interpretation or even discretion as to 
how it will be understood.1174 When this is so, who cares where 
helpful legal knowledge originates if it is useful to our courts’
contemporary inquiries? Again, we would never reject foreign 
epidemiological research because “‘this is an American epidemic we 
are fighting.’”1175
The Supreme Court has traditionally worried democrats 
because it is an unelected body that can overturn laws passed by 
majoritarian legislatures.1176 Allowing it and other courts to rely on 
foreign law, and especially to pick and choose which foreign 
precedents they will cite, may further distance judicial decisions, 
which carry significant political implications, from the will of the 
people. Justice Scalia complained that the Roper majority cited 
foreign law “to set aside [a] centuries-old American practice—a
practice still engaged in by a large majority of the relevant States.”1177
This is not an unreasonable concern, but if you are worried about 
unelected judges exercising discretion in issuing politically charged 
rulings, well, that train has already left the station. Even without 
citing foreign law, the Supreme Court has tremendous power to 
make important political decisions unchecked by the will of the 
                                                     
1172. D.M. MacKinnon, F. Waismann & W.C. Kneale, Symposium:
Verifiability, 19 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 101, 121 (1945). 
1173. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 261 (Simon Blackburn ed., 2d ed. 
2005). 
1174. Id.
1175. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 101 (“It would be ridiculous to say that 
because the problem had arisen in the United States, we should look only to 
American science to solve it . . . .”).
1176. For the most well-known, well-articulated, and most influential 
expression of this concern, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1968).
In this book Bickel coined the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe 
the problem of unelected judges exercising judicial review over laws approved in a 
democratic, majoritarian fashion. Id. at 16. For a compelling argument from political 
science that the Supreme Court rarely strays far from the preferences of 
contemporary public majorities, see generally Dahl, supra note 878. 
1177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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voting population.1178 It already chooses which precedents to obey, 
which to overturn, and whether to distinguish an old precedent from 
the facts before it. In 2000, the Supreme Court decided a presidential 
election without any need to reference foreign law.1179 It is regularly 
accused of engaging in judicial activism, from both the right and the 
left, and has been since before1180 Bush v. Gore,1181 the Warren 
Court,1182 and the Lochner Era.1183
                                                     
1178. Although, we should remember that the Article V amendment process 
provides a way for the people to check the Supreme Court’s ability to engage in 
decision-making with which they disagree. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
1179. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
1180. For instance, Abraham Lincoln relentlessly criticized the Dred Scott
decision, which he considered to be the product of judicial activism. David F. Forte, 
Lincoln, Marshall, and the Judicial Role, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 149 (2002). 
To Lincoln, Forte writes, “the ‘illegitimacy’ of Dred Scott” lay in the fact
that the Supreme Court, in the guise of making a legal decision, instead 
made a political decision. Even worse, it was a political decision that 
sought to redefine the polity in fundamental, constitutional terms. . . . [H]e 
refused to grant legitimacy to a Court bent on substituting its will for the 
results reached by the branches of government that are charged with 
making political decisions. 
Id. On the left, Forte writes, “[T]he Progressive movement expounded the notion 
that impermissible judicial activism included not only invalid political decisions 
made by the Court but also any decision wherein the Court struck down a considered 
act of Congress or of the States.” Id. at 150. On the right, “[i]n reaction [to the 
jurisprudence of the Warren Court], conservatives claimed the courts were acting in 
an activist manner.” Id. at 152. 
1181. Jeffrey Toobin called the decision “a classic example of judicial 
activism, not judicial restraint, by the majority.” Jeffrey Toobin, Precedent and 
Prologue, NEW YORKER (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/ 
comment/2010/12/06/101206taco_talk_toobin. 
1182. Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and 
Why It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 257 (2008) (“Indeed, in academia and in 
politics, the Warren Court is still synonymous with judicial activism.”). Zietlow, 
however, argues that the Warren Court showed “restraint” and “deference towards 
congressional power.” Id.
1183. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2001)
(“Until recently, scholars painted Lochner as the primary example of judicial 
activism, symbolic of an era during which courts inappropriately substituted their 
views as to proper social policy for those of representative assemblies.”); HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA 
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1993) (“According to the long-standing common 
wisdom about this period, . . . conservative American judges began to aggressively 
disregard the proper boundaries of their authority in order to search out and destroy 
‘social legislation’ that was inconsistent with their personal belief in laissez-faire 
economics and social Darwinism.”).
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For that reason, we think it is an unfair criticism to say that 
looking to the ius gentium would allow judges to pick and choose 
which sources of law to use and which to ignore in order to enact 
their ideological preferences under the guises of legal objectivity and 
neutrality. For better or for worse, judges already do this,1184 and it is 
hard to imagine that the availability of the ius gentium would make 
any real difference in the volume of this behavior one way or the 
other. We doubt that faithful, scrupulous judges who do not try to 
inject their own policy preferences into the law will begin doing so if 
the ius gentium is recognized as a valid source of law. Likewise, 
opportunistic judges can often find their fig leaves in other areas of 
legal indefiniteness, such as “traditional canons of statutory 
construction [which often] cut in different directions”1185 and the 
inherent indeterminacy of language itself.1186 The ius gentium, we 
believe, may actually limit judicial discretion, not unlike the way in 
which examination of legislative history is said to do the same by 
some of its proponents—the idea is that it can “best . . . respect the 
lawmaking supremacy of Congress” as a “junior partner in the 
lawmaking enterprise”1187 by ensuring that decisions are guided by 
“some form of legislative signal . . . rather than the judge’s own 
conception of which interpretation better completes the statutory 
scheme”1188—by making clear when judges are truly looking abroad 
to some source of law to discover universally applicable legal 
                                                     
1184. Recall Judge Kirby’s quote: “If judges want to be dishonest, then they’ll 
be dishonest.” Greaney, Kirby & Blumenson, supra note 1099, at 153. 
1185. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1509, 1534 (1998) (book review).
1186. Id. at 1533-35; see also Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 1169, 1180-81 (2000); Carlos E. González, Turning Unambiguous Statutory 
Materials into Ambiguous Statutes: Ordering Principles, Avoidance, and 
Transparent Justification in Cases of Interpretive Choice, 61 DUKE L.J. 583 (2011);
A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77-78 (1994) (“Legislative 
history . . . can supply information about how the statute is expected to operate, what 
subjects it addresses, what problems it seeks to solve, what objectives it tries to 
accomplish, and what means it employs to reach those objectives—all of which the 
judge may draw upon in testing his tentative construction of the statutory language. 
This process, then, may mark the difference between a blind decision and a decision 
made with one’s eyes open.” (footnote omitted)); Guido Calabresi, Being Honest 
About Being Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 910-13 (2010). 
1187. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on 
Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 117, 158 (2008). 
1188. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 161 (2d ed. 2013). 
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principles and when they are simply making up jurisprudence out of 
whole cloth. We believe that when the entire weight of global 
jurisprudence on a specific subject leans strongly in the direction of a 
particular understanding of the law, a contrary interpretation by an 
opportunistic judge will naturally carry less credibility. 
John Hart Ely said that the U.S. Constitution contains 
provisions that are “open-textured.”1189 Some, of course, clearly have 
explicit, unambiguous meanings; “the requirement that the President 
‘have attained to the Age of thirty five years,’”1190 for example, is in 
Ely’s words “so clear that a conscious reference to purpose seems 
unnecessary.”1191 Other provisions, however, such as those that are 
“expected to govern a broader and more important range of 
problems” or whose “language was not intended to be restricted to its 
1791 meaning,” seem to insist on “a reference to sources beyond the 
document itself and a ‘framers’ dictionary.”1192 Ely says that these 
include: (1) the First Amendment’s prohibition of laws “‘abridging 
the freedom of speech’”;1193 (2) the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on “‘cruel and unusual punishment[]’”;1194 (3) the Ninth 
Amendment’s protection of unenumerated rights;1195 and (4) the 
Fourteenth Amendment,1196 whose language is so open and sweeping,
Ely claims, it cannot be understood as anything other than a “quite 
broad invitation[] to import into the constitutional decision process 
considerations that will not be found in the language of the 
amendment or the debates that led up to it.”1197 Ely speculates that the 
Court’s refusal to reconsider the stunted construction it gave the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 
Slaughter-House Cases is due to the fact that “the invitation 
extended by the language of the clause is frightening.”1198 Further, 
uncertainty lies in the fact that, under Corfield v. Coryell, legislatures 
may trump even fundamental rights with “such restraints as the 
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
                                                     
1189. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 13 (1980). 
1190. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5).
1191. Id.
1192. Id.
1193. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
1194. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). 
1195. Id. at 14; U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
1196. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
1197. ELY, supra note 1189, at 14. 
1198. Id. at 23. 
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whole.”1199 Not only must we ask whether a claimed right is a 
“privilege” or “immunity,” but also whether a law restricting said 
right may be “justly prescribe[d] for the general good.”1200
Ronald Dworkin wrote that a judge’s “[d]iscretion, like the 
hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a 
surrounding belt of restriction.”1201 How should judges behave when 
there is no obvious meaning of a law—when the text of the law does 
not yield an immediately obvious “correct” answer? One option 
Dworkin raises is that “on some issue [an official] is simply not 
bound by standards set by the authority in question.”1202 His 
examples of this type of discretion include “a sergeant . . . who has 
been told to pick any five men for patrol he chooses or . . . a judge in 
a dog show . . . [who may] judge airedales before boxers if the rules 
do not stipulate an order of events.”1203 Dworkin’s “‘law as 
integrity’”1204 theory rests on the idea that the law must “speak with 
one voice, . . . act in a principled and coherent manner toward all . . . 
citizens,”1205 so that judges should “identify legal rights and 
duties . . . on the assumption that they were all created by a single 
author—the community personified—expressing a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness.”1206
What does any of this have to do with the ius gentium?
Waldron says that American judges should remember “that their 
particular problem has been confronted before and that they, like 
scientists, should try to think it through in the company of those who 
have already dealt with it.”1207 After all, Waldron says, “sometimes 
the material on which courts need to rely is [simply] not available 
locally.”1208 He points to Washington v. Glucksberg (1997),1209 saying 
that “Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Dutch experience with 
a scheme of legalized euthanasia to establish the regulatory 
challenges that surround this practice and to argue against simply
blundering into this area with judicial fiat.”1210 Vicki Jackson notes  
                                                     
1199. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
1200. Id.
1201. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 522, at 31. 
1202. Id. at 32. 
1203. Id.
1204. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 522, at 94. 
1205. Id. at 165. 
1206. Id. at 225. 
1207. Waldron, Foreign Law, supra note 87, at 133. 
1208. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 89. 
1209. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
1210. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 89. 
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Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952),1211 in which he expressed the view that 
other nations’ “experience[s] with emergency powers may not be 
irrelevant to the argument” before the Court.1212 In doing so, he 
“examined German, French, and British history and constitutional 
practice in the period leading up to and during World War II” with 
respect to emergency executive powers.1213 Where American law is 
porous, we believe foreign law may help judges determine the wisest 
way to fill in the holes. If the American legal regime is a house and 
our laws are the walls, floors, and ceilings, we believe the ius 
gentium can be thought of as epoxy; something that may help to 
efficiently fill in holes when they manifest themselves. Will 
reference to or citation of foreign law often be dispositive? Hardly! 
In fact, we expect that it seldom would be, and that is as it should be;
Waldron rightfully notes that “defenders of the citation of foreign 
law do not usually maintain that consistency with foreign law should 
be the be-all and end-all.”1214
Finally, we think that the idea of sovereignty turns out to not be 
a very potent argument against recognition of the ius gentium for two 
reasons. First, we believe that the notion of sovereignty runs contrary 
to the principle of “subsidiarity,” which, as Professor Calabresi and 
Lucy Bickford have said elsewhere, “recognizes the natural right of 
individuals to have their problems addressed by the level of 
government that is closest to them.”1215 They say that “[r]estricting 
lawmaking to the state or provincial level” has the advantages of 
accommodating local “tastes, preferences, and real world conditions”
and letting jurisdictions offer “different bundle[s] of public goods, 
levels of taxation, and government services.”1216 We believe these 
interests should also be taken into account when deciding the degree 
to which considerations of foreign law may be appropriate in specific 
instances of judicial decision-making. However, we believe there 
will be some cases—particularly those involving broad, ambiguous, 
                                                     
1211. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
1212. Id. at 651 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons: The Youngstown Decision and 
American Exceptionalism, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 198-201 (2006). 
1213. Jackson, supra note 1212, at 199. 
1214. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 162. 
1215. Calabresi & Bickford, supra note 884, at 19. But see Aurélian Portuese, 
The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 231 (2011). 
1216. Calabresi & Bickford, supra note 884, at 11. 
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rights-granting constitutional provisions,1217 whose meanings must 
be, as Balkin says, “fill[ed] out over time through constitutional 
construction”1218—where need for some measure of global 
jurisprudential uniformity will make it advisable that the 
development of American jurisprudence ought to take place with one 
eye toward what Waldron calls “the legal wisdom of the world.”1219
Just as importantly, we would argue that the U.S. Constitution 
spreads power so thinly across so many American political actors 
and institutions that indivisible American sovereignty arguably does 
not really exist, at least not in a practical sense. Morton Grodzins 
rejects the “layer cake” theory of American government, 
characterized by “the institutions and functions of each ‘level’ being 
considered separately,” for what he calls the “marble cake” model.1220
“No important activity of government in the United States is the 
exclusive province of one of the levels,” he says.1221 Rather, 
[t]he multitude of governments does not mask any simplicity of activity. 
There is no neat division of functions among them. If one looks closely, it 
appears that virtually all governments are involved in virtually all 
functions. More precisely, there is hardly an activity that does not involve 
the federal, state, and some local government in important responsibilities. 
Functions of the American governments are shared functions.1222
We believe in dual federalism and reject the marble-cake theory, but 
we also believe that the structure of government that the Framers 
established in the Constitution also undermines any claim that in our 
system, absolute sovereignty resides in any one actor or entity. 
Separation of powers ensures that “the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary departments . . . be separate and distinct”1223 and 
“confine[d] . . . to its assigned responsibility,”1224 while bicameralism 
divides the legislative power “into two distinctive bodies,”1225 the
                                                     
1217. Some examples of these constitutional provisions are the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition of takings without just compensation, the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, or the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, XIV. 
1218. See BALKIN, supra note 429, at 3. 
1219. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 188. 
1220. Morton Grodzins, The American System, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 213, 216 (Jay M. Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds., 7th ed. 2012). 
1221. Id.
1222. Id. at 213. 
1223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 761, at 249 (James Madison). 
1224. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
1225. Id.
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“aristocratic Senate . . . [and] the popular House,”1226 both of which 
must pass a bill in identical form before it can be presented to the 
President for his signature.1227 Add in scores of administrative 
agencies that exist “independent of executive authority”1228 and it 
quickly becomes apparent to us that power is too scattered and 
dispersed for any one actor to exercise sovereign power,1229 which in 
any event the Constitution reserves to “We the People.”1230
Federalism, meanwhile, ensures “the proper division of authority 
between the Federal Government and the States.”1231 Under the Tenth 
Amendment, “powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”1232 The powers of the federal 
government are, in turn, limited to those that are enumerated and 
granted by the Constitution.1233
Since at least the New Deal, however, the “cooperative model”
has defined the federal system and the Supreme Court’s approach to 
                                                     
1226. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 290 (2001). 
1227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
1228. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935).
1229. See generally Grodzins, supra note 1220. 
1230. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
1231. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
1232. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
1233. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House . . . shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment.”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.”); id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations . . . .”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties . . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may 
determine the Time of chusing the Electors . . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he 
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or 
Inability, . . . declaring what Officer shall then act as President . . . .”); id. art. III, § 1 
(“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in . . . such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 
(“[T]he Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have 
directed.”); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to declare the 
Punishment of Treason . . . .”); id. art. IV, § 1 (“Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, 
and the Effect thereof.”); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the 
Congress into this Union . . . .”); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”); id. art. V (“The 
Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution . . . .”). 
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federalism issues.1234 The New Deal was characterized by an 
“expansion of national government in economic and social policy 
[that] was seen as a necessary means of addressing grave national 
economic conditions.”1235 President Johnson’s “Creative Federalism”
would “further shift[] the power relationship between governmental 
levels toward the national government through the expansion of 
grant-in-aid system and the increasing use of regulations.”1236 Some 
scholars suggest that “[f]ederalism in the United States is entering a 
                                                     
1234. See Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of 
Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 644 
(1978) (“In many basic respects, modern cooperative federalism was the child of the 
Great Depression and the New Deal.”); Clifford Lee Staten, Theodore Roosevelt: 
Dual and Cooperative Federalism, 23 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 129, 130 (1993) 
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since the administration of Franklin Roosevelt.”); Emily Zackin, What’s Happened 
to American Federalism?, 43 POLITY 388, 389 (2011) (“It is frequently said that 
with the expansion of federal power and the explosion of New Deal grant-in-aid 
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between the two levels of government was one of competition (often known as dual 
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federalism).”); Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing 
Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 483 (1998)
(“Since the onset of the Great Depression, that centralization [of political power in 
the national government] has been relatively rapid.”); Norman R. Williams, The 
Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1851
(2007) (“Proponents[,] . . . such as Justice Thomas, believe that the modern Court 
departed from a dual federalist interpretation of federal authority that prevailed prior 
to the New Deal and that a proper understanding of and respect for history requires 
the modern Court to return to this preexisting model of American federalism in 
reviewing federal legislation.”); Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: 
Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15, 28 (2001) (“Many 
scholars concluded that the period of the dominance of the loosely defined theory of 
dual federalism ended in 1937 when the United States Supreme Court commenced 
to uphold the constitutionality of New Deal statutes by a five-to-four vote.”); Ernest 
A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs 
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 139 (2001) (“The Court’s effort, commonly 
known as ‘dual federalism,’ died an ignominious death in 1937 or shortly 
thereafter.”); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive 
Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (“After 1937, dual federalism lost all 
descriptive force. The Supreme Court acquiesced in a broad expansion of federal 
authority.”).
1235. EUGENE BOYD & MICHAEL K. FAUNTROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30772, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, 1776 TO 2000: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 11 (2000).
For a classic treatment of dual and cooperative federalism, see generally Edward S. 
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
1236. BOYD & FAUNTROY, supra note 1235, at 12. 
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third phase,”1237 an “interactive federalism” characterized by a 
recognition that “the goals of federalism are best achieved not 
through the quixotic attempt to separate state and federal spheres, but 
through embracing the interaction of state and federal 
governments.”1238 We believe that today the United States has 
witnessed such a wide dispersion of political power among such 
diverse governmental units that the unitary exercise of American 
sovereignty is neither practicable nor advisable. The sovereignty 
objection to the ius gentium is weak because it is already 
questionable whether sovereignty currently exists at all in a 
meaningful sense. 
While popular sovereignty is a guiding principle of the system 
of government enacted by the Constitution,1239 it is not absolute in 
practice. After all, the Framers chose a “republican government”
because they believed that “the public voice, pronounced by the 
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public 
good, than if pronounced by the people themselves.”1240 The 
President is elected by an electoral college, not directly by the 
people.1241 Prior to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,1242
senators were chosen indirectly by state legislatures,1243 and today 
they are chosen for lengthy six-year terms1244 that “lessen the 
immediate pressure of public opinion on members of the Senate”;1245
                                                     
1237. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-
Erie World, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 103, 106 (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2011). 
1238. Id. at 107. 
1239. That the Constitution’s very first words are an assertion that it is the 
instrument of “We the People,” established for the purpose of securing for them “a 
more perfect Union, . . . Justice, . . . domestic Tranquility, . . . common defence, . . . 
general Welfare, and . . . the Blessings of Liberty” serve as testament to the 
preeminence of the principle of popular sovereignty in its internal philosophy. U.S.
CONST. pmbl. 
1240. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 761, at 46, 48 (James Madison). 
1241. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 1-4.
1242. Id. amend. XVII. 
1243. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
1244. Id. amend. XVII. 
1245. The U.S. Senate, U.S. CAPITOL VISITOR CENTER, 
http://www.visitthecapitol.gov/about-congress/the-us-senate#.VNexjUswwlM (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2015); see also Jonathan P. Kastellec, Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. 
Phillips, Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 72 J.
POL. 767, 768 (2010) (“Although six-year terms provide senators with greater 
insulation than representatives, a reelection-minded senator will constantly consider 
how his votes, particularly highly visible ones, may affect approval back home.”).
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Supreme Court Justices are not elected at all,1246 and once confirmed 
“shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.”1247 Only the House 
of Representatives, whose members serve the shortest terms of any 
elected federal officers1248 and who lack the power to confirm 
presidential appointees or ratify treaties with foreign powers,1249 were 
originally elected directly “by the People of the several States.”1250 If 
America’s soul is popular sovereignty, its body was designed in part 
as that of a “Mixed Regime”; as Paulsen et al. note, 
the wisest of the framers, like John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and 
Gouverneur Morris, still believed that the eighteenth century Mixed 
Regime Constitution of Britain was the best constitution . . . [and] set out 
to create a wholly democratic and republican version of the Mixed Regime 
of the One, the Few, and the Many.1251
The other response we might offer is that the people in fact have
authorized judges to sometimes look to foreign sources of law to 
shed light on the meaning of American legal materials.1252 By 
                                                     
1246. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
1247. Id. art. III, § 1.
1248. Members of the House are “chosen every second Year,” id. art. I, § 2, 
cl. 1, compared with Senators, who serve “for six Years,” id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, and the 
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§ 2, cl. 2. 
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(1999); Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Strategic Redistricting, 100 AM. ECON.
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Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 320 (1985); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT 
REVOLUTION (2002); Michael C. Herron & Alan E. Wiseman, Gerrymanders and 
Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois, 70 J. POL.
151 (2008); Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does 
Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009). Jowei Chen 
and Jonathan Rodden, meanwhile, argue that partisan bias in election results is not 
due to deliberate gerrymandering but to the inefficient geographic distribution of 
Democratic voters. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional 
Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J.
POL. SCI. 239 (2013). 
1251. PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 968, at 200. 
1252. See generally BLACK, supra note 1047. 
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establishing a Constitution that vests “judicial Power of the United 
States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may . . . ordain and establish,”1253 we could argue that the 
American people authorized judges to hear “Cases” and 
“Controversies” arising under it, “the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties” entered under its authority.1254 By establishing a 
Constitution that declares itself to “be the supreme Law of the 
Land,”1255 along with the laws of the United States and treaties 
entered into under its authority, we might argue, the American 
people authorized—no, commanded—judges to judicially enforce 
the Constitution’s provisions by invalidating inferior sources of law 
incompatible with it. We believe that in enacting vague, unspecified, 
and indeterminate constitutional provisions, which nonetheless are 
superior to all other forms of law and cannot be disregarded,1256 the 
American people authorized judges to seek out necessary, useful, and 
relevant sources of information beyond the scope of the text itself to 
better understand what the Constitution means and requires, even 
when this meaning is not always initially clear.  
And finally, by not expressly forbidding judges from turning to 
any particular source of legal knowledge or information in their 
inquiries into the meaning of unclear or open-ended provisions of 
constitutional law, we believe that the people authorized judges to 
look beyond our own borders to any source of wisdom that can shed 
light on the denotation of these provisions, and that sometimes, 
foreign law may serve as a source of such light-shedding wisdom. 
Thus, it seems to us that in adopting the Constitution as their own 
law, the people may have indeed authorized judges to look for 
knowledge pertaining to American law in foreign sources of law, at 
least under some circumstances, the specifics of which are discussed 
elsewhere in this Article. We argue that there can be no fully 
persuasive objection to the judicial invocation of the ius gentium,
then, on the grounds of popular sovereignty, since we believe that it
is ultimately an expression of popular sovereignty itself—namely the 
U.S. Constitution—which legitimizes the ius gentium, inviting 
judges to reference it. We believe the people may in some limited 
number of cases have authorized judges to look for knowledge in 
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foreign sources of law when seeking a better understanding of the 
legal materials before them. 
Sovereignty is a much newer idea than some people realize; the 
dominant historical account of sovereignty dates the concept back 
only to the End of the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648.1257 Andreas Osiander argues that this narrative 
itself “is really a product of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
fixation on the concept of sovereignty.”1258 With nearly 200 countries 
in the world,1259 and given the increasing global interconnectedness 
caused by travel and communication, we believe that the idea of the 
absolute sovereignty of nation states is less tenable than it was even 
seventy years ago, when the United Nations was formed.1260 Even if 
emphasis on national sovereignty was essential at that time with the 
dissolution of European colonial empires,1261 we think that today it is 
more necessary to set up international systems of coordination to 
“harmonize the way in which the laws about fundamental rights are 
administered.”1262 Today, indivisible sovereignty is weakened by the 
emergence of “powerful non-sovereign actors than ever before, 
including corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist 
groups, drug cartels, regional and global institutions, and banks and 
private equity funds.”1263 As the “accelerating flow of people, ideas, 
greenhouse gases, goods, dollars, drugs, viruses, e-mails, and 
weapons within and across borders” increases, the notion that 
governments possess absolute territorial authority over the areas 
within their geographic borders grows increasingly antiquated.1264
We will therefore offer a final piece of advice for American 
judges to follow when looking to or citing the ius gentium to inform 
their decision-making. Unlike the other guidelines we laid out in this 
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Article, this one should not be thought of as a suggestion, but as a 
firm rule. It is this: The ius gentium should never be used to displace 
American law, only to understand it better. As Professor Young says, 
the existence of “a ‘consensus’ at the . . . international level” should 
not “displace state-by-state diversity on . . . question[s]” of local 
law.1265 We urge that American judges should only look to foreign 
law when American law and the constitutional text is 
“indeterminate,”1266 to use Jack Balkin’s term, and where looking at 
foreign sources is helpful in understanding our own law better. When 
the meaning or text of our own law is clear, as it often is, the citation 
of foreign law cannot be justified;1267 we believe this would indeed 
undermine American sovereignty and would pose significant 
problems regarding democratic legitimacy. Judges should only turn 
to the ius gentium when statutes or constitutional provisions seem to 
invite the application of some outside source of understanding. And 
even where unique considerations of American constitutional 
structure are relevant to the query being grappled with by an 
American court,1268 Waldron notes that “we may be able to learn 
from other countries how to analyze the bearing of federal structure 
on a problem.”1269 A shorter, simpler way to put our view is that the 
ius gentium can and should never displace American law; what it 
does is help American jurists better understand those areas of law 
that are unclear or indeterminate and require reference to some 
outside source of knowledge. 
So do we argue that the ius gentium is, in fact, sometimes 
binding? No, or at least not in a “peremptory, no-holds-barred, no-
questions-asked manner in which some legal philosophers suppose 
authoritative law has to bind us”—Waldron himself acknowledges as 
much.1270 He says that “[i]n . . . areas where . . . legal systems already 
have their own applicable law, the function of [the] ius gentium is 
not to preempt that law but to [be available to] guide its elaboration 
                                                     
1265. Young, supra note 72, at 165. 
1266. BALKIN, supra note 429, at 294. 
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text is law and legislative intent a clue to the meaning of the text, rather than the text 
being a clue to legislative intent.” Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & 
Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1158 (7th Cir. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
1269. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 103. 
1270. Id. at 153. 
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and development.”1271 So what sort of authority does the ius gentium
have? To answer that question, it is helpful to examine a model of 
“weak” judicial review proposed by Mark Tushnet.1272 Tushnet 
criticizes the “strong-form” judicial review practiced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in which judicial decisions are binding on the other 
branches of government.1273 He extols “weak-form review” models 
practiced by courts in nations such as the U.K. and Canada, where 
“judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions can be revised in 
the relatively short term by a legislature.”1274 Such systems, he says, 
are “attractive in part because they preserve legislative authority: 
weak-form systems assume that legislatures given responsibility for 
participating in the development of constitutional meaning, in 
dialogue with the courts, will do so reasonably well.”1275
Tushnet says that this weaker model of judicial review is 
consistent with “incorporating social and economic rights in 
constitutions.”1276 Two arguments often advanced against the 
constitutionalization of “social welfare rights,” Tushnet says, are that
courts . . . lack the capacity to give appropriate content to general social
welfare rights in the context of particular controversies, and . . . [that] 
judicial enforcement of social welfare rights is particularly intrusive on 
legislative—and therefore democratic—choice because enforcing social 
and economic rights typically has substantially larger implications for a 
government’s budgets than enforcing first-generation rights does.1277  
Weak judicial review, he says, undermines these objections.1278 The 
ius gentium should be similarly understood as being weakly citable 
by American courts, which may not be well equipped in all scenarios 
to discern or apply the “global” position or consensus that has 
emerged on a specific legal issue. An American court should never 
disregard existing American law in favor of foreign standards. The 
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ius gentium would at most merely bring the discrepancy between 
domestic and foreign legal standards to the attention of the American 
court, which would ultimately have the final say over what course of 
action to take. 
Before ending this discussion, we will note that while the 
Declaration of Independence does declare that the legitimacy of a 
legal regime requires the “consent of the governed,”1279 democracy is 
not, as Waldron notes, the be all and end all of political 
legitimacy.1280 Originalism, Dworkinian notions of law as integrity, 
and the principle of stare decisis all purport that certain things are 
relevant to the legitimacy of a particular judicial ruling other than 
just whether it conforms with the peoples’ democratic will. Consider 
the views of two of the most prominent originalists of our time: 
Judge Robert Bork said that in interpretation, “what counts is what 
the public understood,”1281 while Justice Scalia believes that the 
Constitution ought to be understood in light of the text’s original 
meaning as it was understood by “intelligent and informed people of 
the time.”1282 “Law as integrity” identifies “consistency in principle 
as a source of legal rights.”1283 Stare decisis reflects the notion that 
“the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such 
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, 
indispensable.”1284 These ideas all conflict with a purely democracy-
oriented jurisprudence, as each says that the people’s will does not 
always make for the right legal answer.
Even as the Declaration of Independence lambasts the “abuses 
and usurpations” of the King, it claims “a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind,”1285 not just for those of the American people.
It is not entirely fair, then, to say that the sentiments of the Founders 
                                                     
1279. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
1280. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 154. 
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ran entirely against considering the attitudes and perspectives of 
foreigners, for it seems that such opinions might indeed have 
weighed on their minds. 
Finally, if, as we believe, the ius gentium is not inconsistent 
with, but may complement, the principle of popular sovereignty, we 
would argue that Congress has the power with the support of a three-
quarters majority of the states to ratify a constitutional amendment1286
banning reliance on foreign law. Such an amendment would clearly 
reflect the will of the people that the ius gentium not take effect in 
the people’s territory. In other words, the ius gentium is not self-
executing independent of popular sovereignty; the people can choose 
to abridge or eliminate its effect in the judicial chambers.  
We do not think that such an amendment would be wise; the 
people would be needlessly denying themselves what Waldron calls 
the useful “possibility of epistemic benefits from recourse to foreign 
law.”1287 However, in democratic societies, the people are entitled to 
make the decision of whether they want foreign law to partially 
govern them, even if their judgment is what some might call foolish. 
There may be good reasons to think that the ius gentium is a good 
idea, but if the people want to exclude foreign law from their 
territory, they may do so. Those who express their objections to the 
ius gentium in terms of democratic legitimacy may rest easy. 
E. Compatibility with Originalism 
A final criticism of international legal borrowing is that the 
practice is incompatible with a jurisprudence based in originalism, 
which requires that the text of the Constitution be interpreted in light 
of the original meaning behind it.1288 According to Rosenkranz, 
“using foreign law to interpret the U.S. Constitution . . . is 
                                                     
1286. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
1287. WALDRON, supra note 75, at 86. 
1288. Justice Scalia suggests that his dislike of citing foreign law is rooted in 
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L. REV. 703, 704 (2009); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
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inconsistent with basic principles reflected in the Constitution 
itself.”1289
As two fans of originalist reasoning, we disagree that there is 
always a conflict between citing the ius gentium and originalism. 
There are certainly many fields of law in which originalists may not 
be at all interested with the practices and judgments of foreign 
countries or courts because those practices indeed have no bearing 
on the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution. However, it is 
important to remember that courts are called not just to determine 
questions of law, but questions of fact as well. As Posner and 
Sunstein ask, “Suppose that the original understanding of the 
Constitution requires courts to answer some question of fact.”1290 For 
example, whether “a restriction of ‘the freedom of speech’ is 
permissible, on the original understanding, if the government has a 
very strong reason for imposing the restriction; perhaps the original 
understanding requires an assessment of the strength of the 
government’s reason.”1291
Sometimes we have little historical evidence regarding which 
of multiple legal options would best fulfill the desires, meanings, and 
intentions inherent in the original understanding of the Constitution 
at the time of its adoption. When this is so, we must make a choice 
on the basis of information that is less than 100% complete. Waldron 
says that there is no inherent conflict with originalism in using 
foreign law to determine “how the various alternative[] 
[interpretations] would serve the Framers’ deeper values.”1292 The 
question at hand may very well be whether the restriction is 
reasonable, Posner and Sunstein say, in light of “the strength of the 
government’s reason.”1293 They say that the question of whether the 
law is reasonable may be a “question of fact—whether, for example, 
restrictions on false commercial advertising are likely to interfere 
with legitimate political debate or might end up limiting market 
competition by reducing the ability of new entrants to bring their 
products to the attention of the public”—that can be answered by 
looking at the practices and results of other countries.1294 After all, 
they say, “if other democratic states can tolerate such restrictions, or 
if other market economies can flourish despite such restrictions,” it
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Hayek and the Citation of Foreign Law 175
may be fair to say that “restricting commercial advertising provides 
significant benefits and imposes few costs.”1295
Likewise, Posner and Sunstein say, inquiries into whether 
certain types of police searches are “reasonable” under the Fourth 
Amendment may hinge on “judgments of both fact and value.”1296
Judgments of relevant foreign courts that a type of search is 
reasonable may merit attention if the experiences of these states can 
illustrate “whether such searches are likely to be intrusive or not, 
whether less restrictive substitutes are available, and whether the 
searches provide valuable information.”1297 Posner and Sunstein 
persuade us that in cases such as these, originalism may be 
compatible with the citation of foreign law.1298
Posner and Sunstein note that “American courts are already 
required to make their decisions on the basis of the facts.”1299 As 
such, “instructing [our courts] to take these ‘foreign’ facts into 
account no more reduces their authority than instructing them to take 
account of valid scientific studies.”1300 There is nothing new,
Waldron notes, about conceiving of law in a scientific manner.1301
Gottfried Leibniz envisioned law as “a science of reasons, reasons 
pertaining to justice and human happiness.”1302 It involved “‘the 
application of logic and reason to first principles, and so long as the 
reasoning was sound, proper results would always follow. . . . [L]aw 
became a rational science.’”1303 Leibniz conceived of “‘[t]he whole of 
judicial procedure [as] a kind of logic applied to questions of 
law[s].’”1304 Immanuel Kant, Waldron says, also envisioned “a sort of 
algebra of freedom with a system of law aiming to secure the 
greatest possible freedom to each, over the array of complex 
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circumstances in which humans interacted, compatible with an equal 
freedom for all.”1305
According to Posner and Sunstein, this is not problematic:  
Requiring courts to follow scientific studies rather than relying on 
anecdotes or local knowledge reduces their discretion in the unimportant 
sense that it reduces their discretion to make errors. It improves their 
decisions. Requiring courts to use information derived from foreign 
sources, where and if appropriate under the governing interpretive method, 
should have the same effect.1306
As Waldron says, what matters is not necessarily “empirical 
facts or moral insights or attractive reform proposals,” but “modes of 
specifically legal analysis which relate the elements of a problem to 
the basic reasons of justice and public welfare with which the law is 
concerned.”1307 He recognizes the concern that the ius gentium lets us 
go about “identifying the countries whose laws seem most congenial 
to the result we want to reach and ignoring the others,”1308 but 
reminds us that “in other contexts, judges are accused of cherry 
picking domestic precedents as well.”1309 To the extent we are 
required to rely on the fidelity of judges in rendering legal verdicts, 
little can be done to curb the potential for mischief without severely 
curtailing the powers of the judiciary altogether. Moreover, as 
Waldron  notes,  the  ius  gentium may promote “judicial restraint or 
. . . outcomes that are judged conservative or deferential by 
American standards.”1310 The experiences of foreign courts citing our 
own law do not create cause for fear that courts cite foreign law only 
to back up the conclusions they were already going to reach, he 
says;1311 rather, foreign courts sometimes invoke American 
precedents whose conclusions run contrary to the outcomes that the 
foreign courts eventually reach anyway.1312 According to Waldron,
courts cite American law “as a corrective to their own liberal 
instincts.”1313 This should give us confidence in the abilities of judges 
to responsibly cite foreign legal opinion in a non-self-serving way. 
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Nonetheless, even one who can accept the general logic of the 
ius gentium may object to its citation in constitutional law cases as 
opposed to mere common- and statutory-law cases. The common law 
is promulgated by judges and is ever changing, while statutes can be, 
and frequently are, amended through ordinary legislative processes. 
Seldom is more needed to change statutes than concurrent majorities 
in two legislative chambers and the signature of the executive. While 
not always an easy process, legislative change is relatively 
straightforward and attainable. In contrast, the Constitution is very 
difficult to amend, with amendments requiring two-thirds support of 
each chamber of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the 
state legislatures.1314 For this reason, it seldom changes; only twenty-
seven amendments have passed in U.S. history.1315 The comparative 
inflexibility of the constitutional text perhaps cautions us against 
hastily interjecting foreign legal materials into it, as any 
unanticipated harmful consequences cannot be so easily rectified.  
Moreover, as Neomi Rao points out, “[c]onstitutions are 
necessarily a product of various cultural and historic differences that 
reflect society’s most significant legal and social commitments.”1316
And the best way to determine what American society believes with 
respect to constitutional issues, Justice Scalia says, is “‘to look at the 
legislation that exists in states, democratically adopted by the 
American people.’”1317 Our Constitution is relatively short, 
containing only those rules, ideals, and structures that we have 
deemed essential. The entrenchment of specific governing principles 
in the form of a constitution can reasonably be called the 
quintessential expression of sovereignty by a free and independent 
people, and one can say that we should therefore decline to apply 
sources of law that originate outside the collectivity of “We the 
People.”
Professor Jack Balkin says that the Constitution’s text contains 
“rules, standards, and principles.”1318 “When the text provides an 
unambiguous, concrete and specific rule,” he says, “the principles or 
purposes behind the text cannot override the textual command. . . . 
The language creates a rule and must be applied accordingly.”1319
However, “where the text is ambiguous or vague, we look to the 
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principles and purposes behind the text to help us understand how to 
apply it.”1320 This requires us to “try to determine what principles 
underlie the text in order to build constructions that are consistent 
with it.”1321 This, he says, is “one of the tasks of constitutional 
construction.”1322 Balkin suggests that “[w]e can and should use 
history to articulate these constitutional principles.”1323 To the extent 
that information found in foreign law may illuminate these principles 
or help us understand things about our history, by way of comparison 
or contrast, in ways that are relevant to the question at hand, perhaps 
it can be relevant to the task of constitutional construction where 
“standards” and “principles” are involved.
For instance, an American court trying to decide whether a law 
that prohibits female soldiers from serving on the front lines in 
combat violates the Equal Protection Clause may turn to other 
countries to see what outcomes their respective approaches to this 
challenge have produced. Suppose that nations that have fully 
integrated their militaries with respect to gender have not seen any 
decreases in unit cohesion, readiness, or effectiveness.1324 If so, the 
American court may glean useful information from an examination 
of other nations’ practices—namely, that none of the proffered 
justifications for the military’s exclusionary policy can withstand 
empirical scrutiny. If the government cannot justify its policy by 
demonstrating that it serves an “important governmental 
objective[],” then the policy must be struck down.1325 In this manner, 
we feel that reliance on foreign law can help courts settle questions 
involving indeterminate constitutional standards and principles by 
appropriately seeking relevant factual information from foreign 
jurisdictions that are relevant to the legal matters before them.1326





1324. This issue was recently settled in the United States when former 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced in January 2013 that the Pentagon 
would soon lift its combat ban on women. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, 
Equality at the Front Line: Pentagon Is Set to Lift Ban on Women in Combat Roles,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
01/24/us/pentagon-says-it-is-lifting-ban-on-women-in-combat.html?pagewanted=all. 
However, prior to the change in policy, questions of the ethics and legality of 
excluding female soldiers from front-line service had been contentious subjects. Id.
1325. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In this case, the Court laid 
down the “intermediate scrutiny” standard for laws that discriminate on the basis of 
gender. See id.
1326. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1055, at 1310-11. 
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CONCLUSION
Judge Guido Calabresi, in defending the propriety of citing 
foreign law in American courts, has said that other “countries are our 
‘constitutional offspring’ and how they have dealt with problems 
analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult 
constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their 
children.”1327 In this Article, we have attempted to outline a stronger 
justification for the ius gentium than that put forward by Professor 
Waldron, who called for a more complete theoretical justification for 
the citation of foreign law, and attempted to offer his own take.1328
His ius gentium is “a positive law conception, not a concept of pure 
natural law—a brooding omnipresence on the ground.”1329 It is, he 
says, “a body of principles that particular systems may draw down 
from when they are seeking to resolve difficult issues in a way that is 
wise and just and in harmony with the way those issues are resolved 
elsewhere in the world.”1330
We began by listing a number of shortcomings with Waldron’s
theory, and suggesting that his argument for the citation of foreign 
legal materials lacks sufficient theoretical legitimacy.1331 We then 
argued that reliance on foreign law by American courts can be 
legitimated to some extent by a Hayekian argument for the virtue of 
“spontaneous order.”1332 We feel that like the common law, the ius 
gentium may, to use Hayek’s language, “emerge from the efforts of 
judges to decide disputes” over time,1333 and that it might “secure the 
utilization of widely dispersed knowledge” in the same way; a
market-set price is “wholly the product of competition, or at least of 
the openness of the market to anyone who has relevant information 
about some source of demand or supply for the good in question.”1334
Next, we discussed the concepts of “private knowledge” and 
“crowd wisdom” and their application to the ius gentium as further 
theoretical justifications for it.1335 Surowiecki argues large groups 
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yield wise collective decisions when four conditions are met, each of 
which may be argued to be present in the ius gentium—they are 
“diversity of opinion,” “decentralization,” “independence,” and an 
“aggregation” mechanism for producing collective judgments out of 
individual choices.1336 We suggested that the ius gentium is in fact, or 
else may be, characterized by these conditions.1337 Finally, we 
examined and responded to criticisms that may still be leveled at the 
ius gentium.1338
We make no claim to the perfection of the ideas we introduce 
in this Article; further improvements may still be offered. Strong 
arguments can be made against the ius gentium that we are not 
prepared to dismiss entirely; we are particularly concerned about the 
implications that citation of foreign law by American courts will 
have for American sovereignty. Nonetheless, we feel that there are 
certainly strong arguments to be made in its favor as well—stronger, 
at least, than those offered by Professor Waldron. We endorse citing 
foreign law only in the same way judges currently cite books and law 
review articles—for their persuasive value—and not as binding 
sources of authority. With that critical caveat, we do think the 
citation of foreign law can on occasion be valuable. 
In Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[i]t does not 
lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to 
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental 
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality 
of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”1339 We
agree. Where the citation of foreign law by domestic courts is 
concerned, we caution that care must always be taken and rules 
followed to ensure that all sides of a controversial opinion are taken 
into account; that subjectivity and arbitrariness is minimized; that 
such work does not become a mere veneer for unchecked judicial 
activism; and that proper respect is paid to the principle of American 
political and legal sovereignty. When these conditions are met, we 
believe that the ius gentium can be a powerful and helpful tool for 
American courts struggling with how best to understand and respond 
to the vagaries and indeterminacies that arise in the law. It is a guide 
for how the United States may best conceptualize itself as, to quote 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a “participant[] in a common judicial 
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enterprise” as a member of “a community with identifiable 
organizing principles,” engaging in “a profession that transcends 
national borders.”1340 At its best, we believe the ius gentium offers 
something of a loose roadmap for judges grappling with difficult but 
universal legal questions of how past jurists have navigated similar 
waters. Again, we endorse the citation of foreign law for its 
informational component, as with citation of a book or law review 
article, but not as a legally binding authority. 
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